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THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 196*4-1978
by Robert P. Guttmann
The thesis focuses on policy measures between 196A and 1978 to improve 
performance and growth in U.K.'s private industry. Underlying structural 
weaknesses and institutional constraints characteristic to U.K.'s company 
sector are identified and analysed in Part One. This exercise provides the 
basis for both a definition of the concept of "industrial policy" and a crit- 
ical assessment in Part Two of its relevance and effectiveness to tackle in- 
dustry's main difficulties. In discussing policy initiatives to assist com- 
panies with public funds for investment finance, industrial reorganisation 
and the application of new technology, a variety of problems associated with 
state intervention in private industry are highlighted. The various attempts 
by policy-makers to overcome shortcomings in the coordination of policy, 
communication with firms, public monitoring and exercise of control as a re- 
sult of experience with existing measures and by means of new, more powerful 
instruments are examined in detail. Industry's growing difficulties and 
pressure on policy-makers to expand or at least improve public assistance 
meant that industry policy evolved, despite controversy and policy shifts, 
with a certain degree of continuity. In the three case-studies which follow, 
shipbuilding, computers and the NEB, these dynamics are explored in depth.
One useful contribution of this thesis is to explain industrial decline 
in the U.K. economy in terms of supply-side constraints in the private sec- 
tor. This approach avoids the methodological shortcomings of currently pop- 
ular theories which instead concentrate on factors outside private industry, 
such as the public sector or international trade. The analysis of overall 
industrial policy since 1$6A and the attempt to develop criteria for assess- 
ing its effectiveness contribute to a better understanding of this subject. 
The case studies cover new areas of research. By linking the analysis of 
policy-making with theoretical hypotheses concerning industry's main problems 
the effects of policy measures in private industry can be evaluated to deter- 
mine both the limitations and the potential of state intervention in private 
industry.
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PREFACE
The following details should be kept In mind, when reading the text:
a) Notes: These are Indicated in the text by consecutive numbers In paren- 
theses at the end of the relevant sentence or paragraph, such as (1), (2), 
and so forth. They are arranged chapter by chapter and can be found at the 
end of the thesis, following Appendix 1.
b) Abbreviations; When used for the first time In text, abbreviations are 
usually written in parentheses after the words abbreviated; for example, 
"....the National Enterprise Board (NEB)...." In subsequent use, the text 
contains the abbreviation only. A list of frequently used abbreviations 
In alphabetical order Is attached, following the footnotes.
c) References: When a specific article, pamphlet, or book is mentioned in 
the text (or In the notes) for the first time, the name of the author(s) 
appears In capital letters; thereafter, in case of repeated reference, the 
lower case Is used. Each reference In text includes the name of the auth- 
or(s), the year of publication, and specific pages, tables, chapters or 
sections of that publication, where relevant.
For example: 1) S. YOUNG (1974, pp. 92-101)  
 this implies a specific ref- 
erence to pp. 92-101 of S. Young's book which Is mentioned here for the 
first time.
or 2) G. Ganz (1977)  
 this refers to Ganz's book as a whole 
and Implies that this publication has already been referred to previously 
In text (or footnotes).
In case of reference to different materials by the same author(s) publish- 
ed in the same year, these are distinguished by capital letters: e.g. 
M. Wllkinson (1978A), M. Wilkinson (1978B). A complete and alphabetically 
ordered bibliography follows the list of abbreviations at the end of the 
thesis. The titles are underlined, In the case of a book or an unpublish- 
ed mlmeo, and in the case of an article the name of the journal is under-
1tned.
The sign for the British pound used In the text is b.
PART 1 : PRODUCTION CONDITIONS AND ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS I^M THE 
PRIVATE INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The first part of the thesis presents in two chapters an analysis of 
the conditions for growth in U.K. private industry. Recent attempts to 
explain the comparatively low growth in the U.K. economy on the basis of 
the declining share of Its manufacturing sector are critically assessed 
In Chapter 1. Therein we argue that these theories of "deindustrializa- 
tion M , which emphasize the contribution of manufacturing in the economy 
as an important determinant of overall growth, are inadequate. Their focus 
on manufacturing industry and on constraints to its expansion, which oper- 
ate outside that sector's own dynamics, is shown to be incapable of pro- 
viding a satisfactory explanation of U.K.'s industrial problems.
In Chapter 2 we attempt an alternative framework of analysis by con- 
centrating Instead on private industry and Its internal supply factors de- 
termining growth which we term "production conditions." Among these we 
stress in particular: a) the lack of investment activity to add new and 
more modern production capacity at a sufficient rate; and b) the apparent 
Inability within private industry to use existing resources efficiently in 
the process of production.
It Is our hypothesis that these two deficiencies on the supply side of 
growth acted combined as a serious constraint on the expansion of U.K. pri- 
vate industry In the post-war period. Attention Is then focused on identi- 
fying Institutionalised "elements of structural weakness": limits on exter- 
nal finance, managerial Inefficiency, out-moded work practices and tech- 
niques of production. These elements, which are structural in the sense of 
constituting deep-rooted and institutionalized problems with a long history 
of evolution in the context of the U.K. economy, are analysed more closely 
In order to explain why the production conditions, most notably investment 
and efficiency in production, are so unfavourable.
The aim of this analytical exercise in the first part of the thesis is 
thus to establish tiie theoretical framework, within which major problems of 
U.K. private industry can be identified. Based on our explanations and 
findings concerning the constraints to expansion within the private sector 
In the first two chapters, we can then proceed to evaluate certain policy 
measures which have been introduced recently in this country to deal with 
those constraints.
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CHAPTER 1 : THE LIMITS OF ESTABLISHED EXPLANATIONS OF LOW GROWTH IN 
THE U.K.
1   1 .The U.K. Economy's Growth Record after WW2 in an international 
context
Over the last 100 years the U.K. economy has declined relative to 
other industrialised nations. This process, expressed in terms of its 
falling share of world exports, increasing import penetration and a growth 
rate of its industry that was gradually declining over time compared to 
previous periods and in relation to other countries, had already commenced 
in the 1870 1 s. The longevity of this downward trend points to deep- 
rooted, historical weaknesses within the U.K. industry. Even during the 
world-wide boom after WW2, which created even in the U.K. sustained expan- 
sion, full employment and record growth of exports to an unprecedented ex- 
tent, the U.K. economy as a whole did less well ,than other major economies, 
as Is evident from Table I.I.'2 '
Table 1.1. Comparison data   the U.K. economy in an international con- 
text during the 1960's and early 1970's.
change in average annual average annual average ann.ua', 
trade-share growth-rate of growth-rate of growth-rate of 
1961-197^ export volume real GDP real GDP per 
1961-1972* 1961-1972 capita
1961-1972
2.0*U.K.
Belgium
France
West Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
U.S.A.
-5.1*
+0.8*
+0.5*
+2.3*
-0.9*
+5-5*
+1.2*
-0.1*
-5.2*
4.9*
8.9*
10.3*
8.9*
10.8*
15. n
10.1*
7-3*
6.4*
4.5* 3-6* 
4.8* 4.1* 
10.1* 8.9* 
5.6* 
3-7* 3.0*
3.2*
SOURCE: OECD (197*0
These data show convincingly that in terms of growth and trading perfor- 
mance the U.K. lagged behind its main competitors even during the boom per- 
iod. In addition, the average growth rate of the U.K. economy began to 
fall from cycle to cycle from the mid-1960's onwards, thus ending a short 
period of more rapid growth In the early 1960's which had been encouraged
- 3  
by reflatlonary economic policies. After 1973, which marked the beginning 
of a recession in the U.K. and elsewhere, the average rate of growth fell 
to a level substantially below even that of the second half of the 1950's, 
during which a rigid policy of demand deflation in the interest of reestab- 
lishing the convertabllity of the currency had contributed to comparatively 
slow growth (see table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: The deterioration of growth In the U.K.
Year real average growth rate of GDP p.a.
(measured over cycles from peak to peak)
1955-59 2.24%
1960-63 3.10%
1964-67 2.90%
1968-72 2.46%
1973-77 1.36%
SOURCE: CSO (1976, T.I.12, p. 15); Trade and Industry, 2/6/1978, p. 495. 
To explain the comparatively poor and more latterly deteriorating growth 
record of the U.K., recent studies have pointed to the contraction of the 
manufacturing sector In the U.K. Its share in total GDP fell from an 
average 35.5% In 1955-59 to an average 30.7% in 1970-/5 with a low point 
of 28.7% in 1975. 5 ' While manufacturing declined relatively to other 
sectors also in countries, such as the USA, Sweden, and even Japan, this 
process was most pronounced in the U.K. 'Table 1.3. compares the relative 
strength of manufacturing industry In terms of growth of output, employ- 
ment and productivity In 6 EEC-countries and confirms the U.K. position. 
Table 1.3: Data of manufacturing industry's growth in selected
EEC-countries 
1) Annual growth rates of output In manufacturing (in per cent)
Belgium
France
West Germany
Italy
Netherlands
U.K.
1955-60
4. 08
5-72
7-72
8.02
6.33
2.83
1960-6**
7.22
7.11
5.95
7.13
6.28
3.25
196*1-69
5.67
6.48
6.15
8.00
6.63
3.16
196^-72
5.37
6.46
4.60
5.32
5.23
2.78
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2)-Annual growth-rates of employment In manufacturi ng
Belgium
France
West Germany
Italy
Netherlands
U.K.
1955-60
0.53
1.26
2.66
2.88
1.49
0.62
3) Annual growth-rates
Belgium
France
West Germany
Italy
Netherlands
U.K.
1955-60
3.53
4.40
4.92
5.00
4.77
2.19
1960-64
2.16
2.13
0.58
3.46
1.82
0.09
of output per person
1960-64
4.96
4.87
5.34
3-54
4.38
3.15
1964-69
-0.43
0.15
0.56
1.37
-0.38
-0.23
employed
1964-69
6.12
6.32
5.55
6.53
7.04
3.40
1969-72
0.71
1.80
0.22
1.14
-1.75
-1.61
in manufacturing
1969-72
4.62
4.58
4.37
4.14
7.11
4.46
SOURCE: D.T. JONES (1976, pp. 75-77)
The growth differential in manufacturing between the U.K. and the rest 
was substantial during the whole period 1955-1972. The U.K. manufacturing 
sector managed, however, to increase the growth rate in productivity (el- 
belt from a very low starting base) and thus to prevent any further widen- 
ing of the 'productivity gap. 1 At the same time the achievement cane at 
the expense of falling levels of employment and could therefore not be
 
transformed into higher output growth. Only the Netherlands had a strong- 
er decline in employment after 1964, but maintained it's output levels 
through significant productivity gains. All the other countries contin- 
ued more or less to experience net employment gains and therefore enjoyed 
higher growth-rates of manufacturing's output.
It seems from T. 1.3. that the price for improvements in productivity 
In the U.K. was a net reduction of employment In manufacturing, as capa- 
city expansion and with it the creation of new jobs were InsuffIcierr to 
absorb all those made redundant. According to R. BACON and W. ELTI3 
(1975» PP« 34-38) the rate of growth of industrial production fell in the 
U.K. from 35% in 1955-65 (equal to a 3.0% p.a. average) to 17% for 1S&5- 
7 75 (1.5% P«a. on average). Productive capacity expansion in manufacturing 
fell from 35% between 1955-65 to 22% (2.5% p.a.) between cyclical p-eaks 
1965 and 1973. At the same time productivity In the manufacturing sector
- 5 -
grew 33% in 1965-?** (3-2% p.a.). In as much as productivity growth since 
the mld-60's exceeded those of .capacity expansion and industrial produc- 
tion, there was a consequent decline In the numbers employed in manufac- 
turing of 12.5% In 1965-7 1* (1.5* P-a«) together with a fall in the number 
of hours worked. The key problem seems therefore to have been insuffici- 
clent capacity expansion with the effect that productivity gains did not 
result in higher levels of output. Without a higher level of net invest- 
ment the contraction of U.K. manufacturing in relation to the rest of the 
economy could neither be prevented nor stopped. This process of a rela- 
tively declining manufacturing sector (usually expressed in terms of its
(A) falling share in total GDP) was recently termed ^industrialisation. 1
1.2. The limitations of the 'deindustrialIsation' concept as the basis 
to explain low growth
Deindustrialisatlon, as defined by Bacon and Eltis, has recently be- 
come the concern of economists and policy-makers, because, as Slngh (1977,
p. 122) points out, manufacturing Is the most Important source for in-
creases In productivity, rapid technologies! change and expanding exports. 
We will argue in this section that 'deindustrialisation'-theories, as re- 
cently formulated by R. BACON and W. ELTIS (1976) or A. Singh (1977) to 
explain the low growth of the U.K. economy, are inadequate. Bacon and 
Eltis, for example, distinguish between a market sector where products are 
sold at a market price above costs, and a non-market sector which covers 
all activities of the public sector to the' extent that they are not sold 
at all or are sold at a subsidized price below costs, such as defense, law 
and order, administration, health, etc. They note the expansion of employ- 
ment in and relatively fast growth of non-market activities. They assume 
further that all Investment goods and exports are marketed and that all 
the money spent by wage and salary earners and pensioners is spent on mar- 
keted output. Hence the combined marketed output of the manufacturing and 
service sectors must supply all the private consumption, investment and 
export needs of the whole economy (pp. 26-27). Because of the expansion 
of (non-market) public sector enjoyment and activities a steadily increas- 
ing proportion of marketed output Is consumed by those who do not add to 
the country's resources. At the same time industrial workers have through 
wage militancy maintained their consumption share, resisting successfully 
a reduction in real net take-home pay. Therefore, as more resources are
- 6 -
absorbed by those who do not add to marketed output and as personal con- 
sumption of those producing marketed output cannot be lowered, the reduc- 
tion of resources available to the market sector had to come entirely from 
investment and exports (p. 28-29). This leads them to conclude that all 
the major economic ills in the U.K., be it the growing defensive militancy of 
of the industrial workforce, increasing balance of payments deficits, acc- 
elerating inflation, the squeeze on profits and investment in the market 
sector, were caused by the rapid expansion of employment and absorption of 
resources in the non-market public sector. This theory provides the basis 
for economic policies that aim to rechannel resources into investment and 
exports by cutting public sector employment and expenditure and by keeping 
wage increases down.
But this theory, which has had some impact on policy-making, has 
serious limitations:
1) The claim in Bacon and Eltis (1976, p. 27) that all investment is mar- 
keted is factually wrong. A growing proportion of investment in industry 
Is, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, heavily subsidised and sup- 
ported by public expenditure. Support for industrial investment in the 
form of allowances and grants, artificial low-cost pricing of products from 
public sector suppliers (steel, energy, transport, etc.)* regional aid, and 
selective investment aid schemes increased rapidly during the 1960's and 
1970's.
2) The analysis of Bacon and Eltis concentrates entirely on the costs of 
public sector activities and ignores their potential and actual benefits 
to private industry through raising the level of education, training and 
health of the workforce, as a source of aggregate demand or through direct 
subsidies.
3) G. HADJIMATHEOU (1977, p. 22-23 and T.2-*0 showed for the U.K. that 
at constant prices the share of public expenditure in GNP had actually 
fallen between 1955 and 197^. Therefore the claimed relative increase of 
the public sector was mostly due to relative price effects. The above- 
average inflation rate in the public sector resulted possibly from lower 
productiv/tty and other cost pressures. He also pointed out that the fast- 
est increase in public sector activities came in transfer payments to 
those outside the work-force and in net lending. Both findings contradict 
the claim by Bacon and Eltis that the present economic crisis is caused by 
the expansion of public sector activities directly depriving the private 
sector of needed resources. G. HADJIMATHEOU and A. SKOURAS (1977) exten-
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sively attacked Bacon and Eltis on both statistical and theoretical 
grounds, casting further doubts on the validity of their theory. 
A) According to the empirical evidence in OECD (197*0 and in R. NEILD 
and T. WARD (1976) other Western European countries experienced in the 
I960 1 s and 1970's proportionately larger and/or more rapidly growing non- 
market sectors (expressed in terms of levels and increases of both public 
expenditure and taxation) than the U.K. without having suffered from simi- 
lar consequences in terms of growth, inflation, balance of payments defi- 
cits.
5) The shift of resources into the public sector can only become a prob- 
lem if the production of marketed output has not been increasing suffic- 
iently to absorb the growing claims from an expanding public sector with- 
out reducing at given wage rates the proportion left for investment and/or 
exports of the market sector. This point is even briefly mentioned in 
Bacon and Eltis (1976, pp. 123-1210. But they make no attempt to explain 
why production in the private sector has not expanded at a high enough 
rate. Instead of focussing on this underlying problem they shift the em- 
phasis on the rapid expansion of non-marketed activity which can only be- 
come problematic as a consequence of marketed output not having risen 
enough. It is the latter that needs to be at the centre of any explanation 
of low growth in the U.K.
6) The implication of their theory that a shift of resources back into 
the market sector is a) achievable and b) takes care of major..economic ills 
Is dubious. It assumes that workers made redundant in the non-market sec- 
tor will find suitable employment in the market sector. This would pre- 
suppose extensive retraining facilities, motivation for occupational mo- 
bility and large enough capacity expansion in the market sector with pro- 
duction technologies of a less labour-saving nature. There is little indi- 
cation that all this is likely to occur. It is in addition less than cer- 
tain that the private sector will actually use the finaocial resources set 
free by cuts in public expenditure and taxation to achieve more investment 
and/or exports. In order to make this assumption it would be necessary to 
analyse the determinants of investment decisions, production techniques, 
employment levels and export potential in private industry. An investiga- 
tion of such factors is, however, entirely outside the reach of Bacon and 
Eltis 1 theoretical framework.
The second variant of the 'delndustrialisation 1 theory with policy 
Implications has been most clearly formulated by Singh. His basic argument
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in Stngh (1977, p. 11*0 is that the weakness of U.K.'s industrial economy, 
for whatever reasons, has been exacerbated by its increased participation 
in world trade, made possible by institutional arrangements such as free 
trade and currency convertibility. This has been due to a number of rea- 
sons: 1) The 'competitive aspects' of economic expansion elsewhere will 
create alternative sources of supply competing with and constraining a 
country's industries even in their own home market. 2) Successful compe- 
tition from other industrialised economies might occur most likely in the 
technically most advanced industries with largest potential for productiv- 
ity growth. This affects the structure of demand and output of a less 
successful economy even more adversely, as its sectors with the highest 
potential for future growth are most severely hit. 3) A deteriorating 
foreign trade position may via balance of payments deficits and a weakened
>
exchange rate force the government into deflationary policies and thus 
have an adverse effect on the aggregate level of demand at home, This 
constraint on demand and the pressure of foreign competition on the profit- 
rates of domestic firms will reduce their incentive to invest. For the 
same reasons foreign companies are less likely to invest in the U.K., while 
U.K. firms are rrore likely to invest abroad to the direct detriment of the 
already difficult balance of payments position of the U.K. This Is part- 
icularly true in a country like the U.K. with its long tradition of over- 
seas investment and its comparatively large number of multinational corp- 
orations.
The combination of all these forces in a situation of inadequate 
international competitiveness will perpetuate the deindustrialisation pro- 
cess and accelerate industrial decline. The major shortcoming of 
Slngh's theory Is that the lack of international competitiveness is already 
assumed a priori. His arguments concern only the aggravating effects of 
International trade on an already weak domestic industry. Their purpose is 
to present a strong case for Import controls. Singh explicitly (p. 119) 
does not attempt to Identify the prime reasons for the underlying weakness 
of U.K. industry. As in the case of Bacon and Eltis his analysis of dein- 
dustrial icat ion only refers to constraints external to manufacturing indus- 
try, and fails to analyse specific factors without which the expansion of 
the public sector or international trade could not have had such negative 
effects. This criticism requires In Singh's case, however, a minor quali- 
fication because of some important clues at the end of his article (p. 131) 
He notes that despite productivity improvements and relative price and cost
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advantages as a result of a series of devaluations since 1967 the trading 
performance of U.K. manufacturing deteriorated continuously. This phenom- 
enon Is probably not attributable to peculiar features of the structure of 
U.K. demand, because there Is evidence that a) the patterns of demand in 
all advanced economies (including the U.K.) are not very different from each 
other and grow Increasingly uniform, and b) the comparatively lower growth 
of personal Income in the U.K. has reduced the likelihood of rapid changes 
In U.K.'s demand pattern and has correspondingly also reduced the problems 
for Industry having to respond to such changes. He concludes that conse- 
quently the main reasons for such lack of competitiveness at home and abroad 
must be non-price factors operating on the supply-side and negatively af- 
fecting industrial performance. He then discusses briefly recent studies 
that have emphasised two key problem-areas with regard to U.K. industry's 
supply-side: its disappointing investment record and the poor effectiveness 
of Its investment with regard to raising output. These are first clues to 
an important direction of further research which will be more fully devel- 
oped below in Ch. 2, where we attempt to identify elements within U.K. in- 
dustry that may account for Its persistent lack of competitiveness and sat~ 
isfactory growth. Such an analysis should overcome the major short-comings 
of the deindustrialisatlon theories discussed, namely their concentration 
on factors external to industry (in this case manufacturing industry), be 
they International trade, public sector expansion or inability to shift
labour from agriculture to industry.
An alternative analysis of U.K.'s economic problems in terms of 
supply-side constraints within industry, as attempted in ch. 2, 
could, however, Justly be criticized for ignoring possible de= 
mand constraints on growth and their relation to macro-economic 
demand management. It is not denied here that growth has in the 
past been adversely affected by policy-induced restrictions on 
aggregate demand. Such deflationary policies, as introduced in 
1961, 1966, 1970 or 1975 § were always considered necessary after 
only short periods of demand reflation, exactly because domestic 
industry appeared incapable of preventing rapid growth of imports 
and the occurrence of supply bottlenecks or of achieving sustain= 
able increases in levels of output, export and investment. The 
resulting instability, as reflected in larger balance of payments 
deficits, higher inflation rates and a threatened exchange rate, 
forced policy-makers repeatedly to deflate the economy. By redu= 
cing aggregate demand more room would be created for exports,
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while the influx of imports and the bulla-up of inflationary 
pressures could be brought under control at the sane time. Thus 
the return to a healthier balance of payments position and the 
prevention of a currency crisis were achieved at the expense of 
a higher growth rate of both demand and productive capacity.
This raises two questions» firstly, how can these recurring 
crises be avoided in the future? We argue here that the growing 
balance of payments deficits and the acceleration of inflation 
during the upswing and boom phases of the business cycle (usually 
in the U.K. induced or supported by reflationary policies) have 
in the context of the U.K. economy been caused (or at least been 
exacerbated) by the inadequate productive capacity and competiti= 
veness of domestic companies, A higher level of investment acti= 
vity and more efficient use of existing and new capacity would 
probably help to prevent supply bottlenecks, reduce the growth 
of imports, improve U.K. industry's ability to export, and control 
inflationary pressures. This in turn would strengthen UK's balance 
of payments position, making crises and the adoption of drastic 
demand-curbing measures less likely events.
Secondly, are there better methods than demand deflation to 
deal with short-term balance of payments constraints, given that 
improvements of industry's competitiveness and supply-oriented 
policies may be absent or involve long-term processes of change? 
Remedial action to tackle within industry the underlying causes 
of the balance of payments constraint is unlikely to produce 
results soon enough to prevent the outbreak of yet another crisis. 
Should such a crisis provoke another round of demand deflation, 
it would certainly have the most serious repercussions for ratio= 
nalisation and expansion programs of domestic firms. Already com= 
pleted projects may not bring the expected benefits because of 
lack of market demand. Reduced levels of capacity utilization, 
profitability and availability of investment finance will lead 
to interruptions of ongoing projects and to the postponement or 
abadonement of Investment plans for the near future. Policies to 
reduce aggregate demand are therefore detrimental to those efforts 
aimed at the supply-side constraints within industry without 
which the chronic oalance of payments weakness will not be over= 
come. In addition, such policies bear very heavy social costs 
through the losses of output, income and employment opportunities,
as existing capacity is underutilized and possibly even preroatu= 
rely scrapped, unemployment is increased, investment plans are 
cancelled, and state revenues to finance, say, public welfare 
are reduced. 
The need to find less costly and less disruptive alternati= 
ves to deflation has been first recognized as an urgent issue in 
the early 1960's, when, as we shall discuss more fully below in 
sec 3«^ol, concern for higher growth gradually replaced currency
stability as the top economic policy priority. France's success=
<* 
ful method of avoidingbalnce of payments crises and subsequent pe=
riods of policy-induced recessions by devaluing its currency from 
time to time found, after 1961, advocates in the U.K. Devalua= 
tion would make imports more expensive, while domestically produ= 
ced goods would become more price-competitive both at home and 
abroad. The consequent increase in demand for domestic products 
and the improvement in the trade balance would facilitate demand 
management towards a higher growth-rate at the full employment 
level. However, devaluation of sterling could also undermine the 
strength of the dollar and thus the international monetary system. 
In addition it could add to Inflation, which would eventually wipe 
out any temporary improvements in the price competitiveness of 
UK goods due to a lower exchange rate. To avoid those difficulties, 
some economists proposed import controls as an alternative to de= 
valuation. In this way the balance of payments could be improved, 
while at the same time supporting domestic firms by shifting de= 
mand towards their goods and giving them an opportunity to under= 
take necessary reorganisation without the threat posed to their 
continued existence by overseas competitors.* '
As difficulties with UK's external balance continued, defla= 
tionary policies were applied even after the mid-1960's and during 
the 1970's despite their obvious costs in output and income lost. 
It seems therefore appropriate toaialyse why sporadic attempts 
after 1964 to find alternatives to deflation have not produced 
the benefits which their protagonists in the still ongoing policy 
debates have been promising. Devaluation, as first tried in 196? 
andsince the adoption of a floating exchange-rate in 1972 a more 
or less continuing process (with the possible.exception of the 
last two years), has, as pointed out in Singh(l977,p.i3i), failed 
to halt the deterioration in the trading performance of U.K.firms.
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There are several factors that reduce the effect of a lower ex= 
change-rate on industry's international competitiveness or the 
trade balance c Firstly, its impact on the sterling prices of UK 
Imports may be lessened, because other countries might devalue 
their currencies as well. This was the case in November 1967, 
when the devaluation of the sterling was followed within a week 
by similar action affecting eleven other currencies, or in the 
recent period of currency instability, which in 1976 prompted 
governments of the industrialised West to accuse each other of 
 currency warfare 1 as the modern successor of protectionist trade 
wars. Secondly, as UK costs and prices (in £) rise as a result 
of devaluation (causing in 1967,for example, a increase in the 
retail price index), the prices of UK exports (in foreign currency) 
will not fall proportionately. Thirdly, devaluation worsens a 
country's terms of trade. It causes each object exported 
to earn less foreign currency and hence export volume must be 
Increased to earn the same amount of foreign currency. Thus deva= 
luations, such as In 1967 and 1975/76, have been accompanied by 
policies to restrict public expenditure and personal consumption 
(through checks on» nominal wage increases) and to thus set free 
resources for increased exports. Devaluation has in effect never 
been an alternative to deflation. Quite to the contrary, it has 
resulted in restrictions on aggregate demand at home,not only to 
increase export volume, but also because UK's propensity to import 
failed to decline after devaluation and instead continued to- be
high. Fourthly , as established by P.HOLMES(1978, pp.93-10^) 
In a study of the pricing behaviour of large UK companies in the 
aftermath of devaluation, a majority of the larger UK firms under 
investigation did not take the opportunity to use the devaluation 
for price reductions of their goods (expressed in foreign curren= 
cy) and to increase their export volume, but Instead preferred 
to keep their export prices in foreign currencies unchanged and -so 
increase their profit margins (in B) abroad'!. He also found a 
positive relation between the degree of concent rat ic-n (i.e, the 
market structure) and the degree of competitive behaviour, with 
oligopolistic firms less likely to increase volume of sales rather 
than profit margins. The high degree of concentration in many in= 
dustries and among exporting firmslimite the use of devaluation 
to increase export volume. The problem.is aggrevated in
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the case of UK's multinationals, which traditionally have relied 
much more than their German or Japanese counterparts on direct 
investments overseas as an alternative to aid thus at the expense 
of sustained-export efforts. Furthermore, as pointed out in the 
LABOUR PARTY(1977.P* 30 f.)i the ability of multinational com= 
panies to set transfer prices in their intra-company trading across 
national boundaries meant that those corporate giants, in effect', 
set their own exchange rates. This is especially probable, when 
the trade is not in finished goods, but, as applies to the majo= 
rity 6f intra-group trade, in parts and components. 
Hence devalation will have less impact on such a company's export 
and import policies. Consequently, for devaluation to have its 
desired impact on trade, domestic producers must Become more com= 
petitive and import substitution needs to be encouraged (to reduce 
the country's inelasticity of demand for imports), whereas the 
decisions of UK's multinationals concerning their pricing strate= 
gies and their plans for exports or overseas investment need to 
be more closely scrutinized, and if necessary, influenced as part 
of policy-making.
What about Import controls? In November 1964, against the back= 
ground of a balance of payments crisis (with a deficit at the then 
unprecedented level of B 800m. p.a. and Imports rising by an alarm= 
ing 19# p«a.) and after having decided not to devalue, the newly 
elected Labour Government imposed a 15# import surcharge on most 
imported manufactured goods, which covered roughly a third of all 
merchandise imports in 1964. By making imports relatively more 
expensive, demand would be shifted to competing domestic products. 
At the same time the surcharge acted-as a tax on all the imports 
that continued despite the tariff. This, revenue was expected to 
reduce domestic expenditure by fe 200m. ana to thus counteract the 
inflationary effect of reducing Imports (by an estimated £300m. p.a.) 
and switching instead to domestic products. Subsequently the 
official forecasts of the reduction of imports turned out to be 
far too optimistic. The surcharge had much less impact on 
imports than anticipated. S.JOHNSTON and M.HENDERSON(196?), for 
example, put the savings in imports due to the surcharge over the 
whole 2-year period af its existence at no more than fc 210m. (in 
1964 prices). The storm of protests overseas, which followed 
the introduction of the surcharge , led within a month to private
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assurances by the UK government that the tariff would be first 
reduced and then abolished as soon as possible. General knowledge 
of the temporary character of the measure diminished however its 
effectiveness . Many foreign suppliers absorbed the charge them= 
selves rather than lose their grip on the UK market, helped in 
some cases, as were the Irish exporters to the UK t by a partial 
or full refund of the surcharge by their own governments. Import 
unit values, which before 1965 had gone up steadily, stopped ris= 
ing in 1965/66 despite continued price increases in most exporting 
countries. Because of the temporary nature of the surcharge many 
domestic firms did not reorient production to replace imports for 
such a short period of time. Furthermore, a uniform tariff, such 
as Labour's surcharge, lacks the degree of selectivity required 
to take account of differences in extent and impact of import 
penetration in various domestic industries.
The limited effect of this general and temporary measure does not, 
however, invalidate the case for quantitative controls on imports, 
such as quotas, and their selective and more long-term use. As 
mentioned above, Singh(l977) has shown, how domestic industries, 
which lack international competitiveness, are further weakened 
by unrestrained imports and constraints on demand following balan= 
ce of payments and currency crises. The application of quota res= 
trlctions or other non-tariff barriers to trade may then permit 
the government to avoid such crises or deflation. The argument 
that, unlike devaluation, import controls do not support exports 
is of less relevance, as long as the larger firms in control of 
most exports use a lower exchange-rate to raise their profit- 
margins rather than their volume of sales abroad or prefer di= 
rect investment overseas over exports. It is also weakened by the 
inflationary impact of devaluations (as alternatives to controls), 
which further reduces any benefits in terms of improved price 
competitiveness. The alleged loss of efficiency, caused supposed= 
ly by the shift of demand from more efficient foreign suppliers 
to less efficient domestic firms, is, as calculated by A.LEIBEN= 
STEIri(l966 A,p.393) and R.COOPER(1968,Ch.9,Annex), in the case 
of import controls small compared to the costs of deflating the 
economy below its productive potential. Furthermore, the increase 
in demand and thus in capacity utilization may in itself directly 
improve the efficiency of domestic firms, while at the same time
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encouraging a higher level of investment activity to expand and 
improve production facilities. In general, import controls would 
have to be accompanied by other forms of assistance and selective 
intervention to make sure that firms take the steps needed to 
make them more competitive , while being given the'breathing space*. 
It is therefore quite possible that import controls may well im= 
prove, rather than reduce, efficiency in the longer term. Finally, 
It is often argued that such restrictions on trade are to be avoi= 
ded , because they violate international agreements and invite 
retaliation against UK's exports. This ignores the fact that such 
treaties often have loopholes or exemptions permitting the use 
of Import controls. This policy option deserves therefore the 
serious consideration which unions, certain economists and parts 
of the Labour party have given it in .recent years.
In Ch.l we have argued that existing explanations of UK's 
industrial decline often tend to focus on factors outside in= 
dustry, such as the expansion of the public sector and partici= 
patIon in free trade, rather than on supply-side constraints in 
industry without which these external factors would not have be= 
come problematic. However, emphasis on industry's supply-constraints 
to Justify micro-economic supply-management must not ignore the 
importance of demand constraints for industry's ability to finance 
investment and maintain sales. There is a mutual interdependence 
and the removal of supply constraints will in the long-run help 
to avoid demand constraints, whilst the latter may in the mean= 
time impede efforts by firms and policy-makers to bring about the 
requires changes on the supply side. This Is especially true in 
the case of demand deflation because of its adverse effects on 
capacity utilization, productivity, investment finance and busi= 
ness confidence. Among the alternatives to deflation we found 
that selective, quantitative controls on imports may well be more 
effective than general, temporary import surcharges or devaluation 
of the currency.
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Chapter 2: SUPPLY-SIDE DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH IN THE PRIVATE 
COMPANY SECTOR
2.1. The presentation of our general argument
One methodological difficulty of the analyses of U.K.'s low economic 
growth mentioned so far, which prevents them from looking at factors oper- 
ating within the various industries as constraints to a higher rate of 
growth, is their conception of 'industry. 1 Most of them (Bacon and Eltis 
(1975), Kaldor (1966), Smith (1975) or Singh (1977)) focus on fl:,ianufactur- 
ing Industry." Such an approach makes no distinction between public sec- 
tor and private sector industries, while at the same time ignoring service 
Industries. Bacon and Eltis (1976) try to avoid this problem by differen- 
tiating between a 'market'- and a 'non-market 1 sector. This creates new 
problems, such as considering all exports and investment as marketed.
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Their distinction refers only to activities and is not argued on the 
basis of specific characteristics of a particular sector. Therefore they 
do not need to distinguish between nationalised industry and the public 
service sector. Once the nationalised industries 'market 1 their product 
(at a price including a mark-up over cost) they would become part of the 
market sector. This ignores the reasons why they were nationalised in the 
first place and abstracts further from the fact that even when having a 
legal duty to earn a commercial rate of return nationalised industries will 
continue to operate differently from the private sector. Most of them, for 
instance, are licensed monopolies. They are bound to take into account the 
government's social and political objectives with regard to, say, regional 
policy, industrial democracy, preferences given to specific customers and 
to domestic suppliers   often in contradiction to profit considerations. 
With the government as the only shareholder they may have easier access to 
external sources of finance.
The least problematic distinction seems to be that between the public
\
sector and the private sector   not on the basis of whether products are 
'marketed' or not, but whether the means of production are owned privately 
or by the state. The rationale for such an approach is that despite 
the popular notion of a 'mixed economy 1 this system is nevertheless fun- 
damentally a capitalist economy in which the function of the public sector 
is mainly to support private industry and to intervene where market forces 
fail or where private profit interests contradict social and political ob- 
jectives (termed the 'national interest 1 ). In terms of determining the 
balance of payments, prices, overall capacity expansion, regional balance, 
and so forth, the private sector is still the decisive force. And profit- 
ability is still the overriding criterion for location of plants, creation 
of employment, investment decisions, organisation of production, choice of
type of technology and-~prodttcfrs-r-artd determinat-i-en of wage revels, although
(2) the public sector may be used to a 1imited extent to give a lead. From
this follows the need to concentrate on the internal conditions and deter- 
minants of growth in the private company sector.
Using the Retail Price Index as a deflator, Table 2.1. indicates a 
deterioration of growth in the private sector (i'ncluding the financial 
companies) since 1956. 
Table 2.1: Growth in the U.K. company sector 1956-76
real growth rate of average annual real growth-rate 
U.K. company sector's GDP of company sector's GDP over
cycles (from beginning of down- 
turn to next peak)
1956 2.0% 1966 0.8% 1956-60: 3-72% p.a.
1957 2.2% 1967 0.3% 1961-64: 2.82% p.a.
1958 0.9% 1968 1.4% 1965-68: 0.80% p.a.
1959 5-5% 1969 -0.3% 1969-72: 1.60% p.a.
1960 8.0% 1970 2.4% 1973-76: -2.80% p.a. (incomplete
1961 2 5% 1971 0 4% cycle, underestimated figure due
to recessionary bias)
1962 -0.6% 1972 3-9%
1963 3.6% 1973- 3.4%
1964 5.8% 1974 -6.3%
1965 0.7% 1975 -6.4%
1976 J.0%
SOURCE: nominal GDP of company sector (including financial companies, gross 
of capital consumption, net of stock appreciation): CSO (1966, T.13, p. 15) 
and CSO (1977, T.I.10, p. 15); Retail Price Index: CSO (1976, p. 42) and 
OECD (1978, p. 118).
Since the mid-60's the company sector seems to have more or less stag- 
nated in real terms. Its rate of expansion as a trend has been below that
 
of the U.K. economy as a whole. Consequently its share in the GDP of the 
U.K. economy fell from an average 56.4% in 1955"59 to an average 52.9% in 
1970-75. Within the sector the financial companies grew relatively faster 
than the industrial and commercial companies and increased their overall 
share in the private company sector's GDP from 4.9% in 1956 to 8.9% in 
1975. The figures in Table 2.1 are therefore likely to underestimate the 
degree to which industrial and commercial companies alone within the pri- 
vate sector experienced stagnating or low growth.
By identifying major factors operating within the private 
sector as constraints to growth we may be able to clarify which 
policies are required to achieve and sustain a higher growth-rate 
and more competitve performance among domestic firms. Such an ex- 
ercise must be based on a theory of industrial decline. Using 
Belgium as a case-study, but developing a theoretical framework 
applicable to other 'low growth 1 economies, such as the UK,
-19-
A.LA.,rAL'J-oY( 19^1 ,u!..e, V ;.ndiO) fccussed especially on the dif;rc = 
rent impacts of market stagnation and rising demand on firms' in= 
vestment behaviour and their consequences for growth.
In rapidly^growing markets firms will frequently experience 
short-term capacity shortages, with prices and profits rising as
a result. There will thus be an inducement to invest and thus
with 
increase capacity to supply growing markets more products. Lam=
falussy(l96l,p.73ff ) termed this type of investment consciously 
aimed at expansion "enterprise investment 11 . It usually takes the 
form of major innovations, implying a complete overhaul of pro= 
duction processes, large building expenditure and frequently the 
erection of new plant. The growing confidence, resulting from 
high profits and steady Increases in demand, leads to a lower 
premium for uncertainty, which investors add to the interest rate 
in investment decisions. This cheapens capital relative to labour 
and stimulates therefore the adoption of more capital-intensive 
techniques. Investment plans in expanding markets will also be 
less hindered by the indivisibility of capital assetsi if brand- 
new plant cannot be fully employed at the present level of demand, 
regular increases in demand ensures full capacity utilization 
sooner or later. In a rapidly expanding economy investment acti= 
vlty and thus the demand for capital goods will be higher, leading
to a more active market and higher prices fc.r industrial buildings,
c 
second*-hand machinery and even scrap. This encourages the srapping
of old, but not yet fully worn out plant and machinery which in= 
novation and the introduction of new production techniques often 
may require. Firms facing regularly expanding markets are also 
more inclined to interrupt production to rebuild new plant and 
bear the short-term decline of profits due to innovation than 
firms struggling for survival in stagnating markets which are 
much less able to afford loosing a single customer. Furthermore, 
In a growing economy there will be more cash available to finance 
B&D and a higher willingness of firms to commit more of the re= 
sources for the introduction of new processes and products. But 
widespread "enterprise Investment", initially encouraged by actual 
and expected rapid growth, will in turn provide the basis for new 
Increase in demand, be it as a result of additional employment 
and wage income, by strengthening those sectors supplying the new 
plant and machinery, or because new products create new markets.
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The complete overhaul of production processes and possible cs= 
tablishrcent of new plant, which charactelze "enterprise invest- 
ment" , are more likely to lead to maximum scale economies and 
more rapid technological progress. The consequences v,ill be lower 
unit costs, Improved quality 6f existing products and frequent 
introduction of entirely new products. The resulting gains in r 
efficiency and international competitiveness provide the basis 
for export offensives and import substitution both new sources of 
demand. Expanding markets(the demand side) and "enterprise in= 
vestment"(the supply side) are thus interrelated .and condition 
each other, providing cumulative self-reinforcing benefits.
In a situation of declining, stagnating or only slowly grow= 
ing markets firms will not have the means and incentives to un= 
dertake "enterprise investment". If other firms do not simulta^ 
neously Increase their levels of investment activity and demand 
does not rise sufficiently, then those firms undertaking major 
investment projects may end up *rith excess capacity, lower profit- 
rates and subsequently more restricted and expensive access to 
sources of external finance. Whereas in a rapidly expanding eco= 
nomy firms may lose market shares and profits to competitors, 
if they do not keep up with the generally high investment activity, 
firms in a 'low growth' economy run large risks, if they do engage 
in "enterprise Investment" projects. Major innovation and capacity 
expansion will also be hampered by the lower cash flow, the longer 
pay-off periods for previous investment, and the low scrap values 
for old, but still functioning capital equipment characteristic 
of a 'low growth' economy. Instead firms, facing stagnating mar=
kets and their consequences, will try to defend their market-
 
share rather than expand aggressively. Their "defensive invest= 
merit" will focus more on the improvement of existing capital 
goods through rationalisation (i.e. organisational, rather than 
technological, innovation independent of long-term research, big 
R&D-budgets, expensive use of professional staff and automation 
devices) and minor innovations which can be dene without major 
investment expenditure and costly scrapping of existing plant and 
machinery. The effects of this "defensive" investment behaviour 
are less capacity expansion, slower pace of technological change 
and introduction of new products, longer use of old plant and 
machinery* As firms spend less, fewer new employment opportunities
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be created. All this results in production belov; the optimal 
efficiency levels, continued lack of international competitiveness 
and inadequate creation of new sources of demand. A 'low growth 1 
economy therefore not only leads to "defensive investment", but 
is at the same -time reinforced, perpetuated by it. The question 
is how to break out of this vicious cycle. Is it primarily a prob= 
lem for traditional macro-economic demand management and a question 
of developing means to cope with demand constraints other than 
self-defeating deflation (as discussed above in the analysis of 
devaluation versus import controls)? Or is there in addition a 
need for a policy oriented towards supply-side constraints within 
Industry to complement appropriate demand management measures?
Recent studies, whose conclusions were briefly summarized in A. Singh 
(1977), stressed in this context the need to focus on 'supply-side 1 defi- 
ciencies. The problem of inadequate levels of investment activity as well 
as the failure to use existing resources In production efficiently were 
both mentioned in Singh's concluding remarks as having contributed to the 
lack of growth and international competitiveness of domestic producers. 
In addition the empirical evidence of Table 1.3 indicated that insufficient 
creation of new capacity prevented higher productivity from being trans- 
lated Into higher levels of output and led instead to a net loss of employ- 
ment (in manufacturing and thus in significant parts of private industry).
A formal way of presenting these relations between , on the one hand, 
Investment and efficient use of productive resources, which in accordance 
with our definition in the introductory note to Part 1 are part of the 
"production conditions 11 In private industry, and growth on the other is 
through a reformulation of the HARROD-DOMAR accounting identity g «= s/k 
Expressed In supply-terms g stands for the rate of growth of output and k 
for the capital-output ratio, while s can be dePned as the share of net 
Investment In output, because actual savings equal investment by deflnl- 
t.on.<*>
Using the formula with Its most simplifying assumptions, as spelled 
out In footnote A, we can say that, ceteris par I bus, the growth-rate In 
the private company sector depends on a) the net investment share and b)
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the capital-output ratio. Later we will discuss in more detail why the 
capital-output ratio can be used as a proxy to'indicate investment effic- 
iency.
Our argument has thu^ far developed the following hypothesesi l)The 
'deindustrialisation 1 theories based on the lack of capacity expan= 
sion (Bacon and Eltis) or competitiveness (Singh) of domestic in=- 
dustry fail to explain supply constraints, but instead as= 
sume then a priori. 2) The effects of UK's balance of payments 
difficulties, aggravated by repeated deflation, and the interaction 
between 'low growth 1 and 'defensive investment' being one of mutual 
reinforcement, as analysed by Lamfalussy, emphasize both the need 
for demand management policies which help to create the environ= 
ment for more rapid growth. However, because expansion depends 
also on the Investment behaviour of firms and their ability to 
overcome existing supply-side constraints, we direct our attention 
to these factors. In the rest of Ch.2 we will examine more fully the 
effects ofinvestinent and of efficiency on growth in private industry,
2.2. The trend of investment activity In the U.K. company sector
2.2.1. Empirical Evidence
Table 2.2. is a time-series of the net investment share (i.e. net domestic 
fixed capital formation as a proportion of net domestic product) of the 
U.K. company sector as a whole, and of the industrial and commercial com- 
panies including and excluding the North Sea oil-related "petroleum and 
natural gas" sector. ' 
Table 2.2: The net investment share of the U.K. company sector 1956-76
Year net Investment share s of industrial s of ind. and
s^S/Y of total U.K. and commercial comm. companies 
company sector companies less "petroleum
and natural gas"
1956 6.5%
1957 7.4*
1958 7.2*
1959 7.1*
1960 7,7*
1961 8.7*
1962 8.1*
1963 7.0*
1964 8.5*
1965 9.0* 8.3*
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1966
196?
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
197**
1975
1976
8.2$
7.6$
8.5$
10.2$
10.3$
8.8$
8.2$
10.7$
11.1*$
9.9$
8.6$
(Table continued)
7.2$
6.1*$
7.0$
7.9$
8.1$
6.9$
6.4$
7.8$
8.7$
7.5$
n.a.
7.9$ 
6.6$
5.9$
6.9$
6.7$
3.1$ (est.)
n.a.
SOURCE: CSO (1966, T.62 and 65), CSO. (1976A, T.I.11, T.14.1, T.12.9, 
T.11.8), CSO (1977, T.11-10), Business Monitor, Provisional Results, 197^, 
and Business Monitor PA104, p. 3.
The net investment share s can, given the specified assumptions about 
capital consumption and replacement investment (see footnote 5), be taken 
as an indicator for capital expenditure to expand capacity. Table 2.2 
implies that the actual increase of the net investment share of the company 
sector after 196V65 was mostly due to the rapid expansion of financial 
companies and North Sea oil-related investment. Apart from these growth 
sectors the capacity creation in private industry seemed to have declined. 
That is, the proportion of the already slowly expanding company sector and 
Income spent on new capacity has been declining, if we exclude insurance, 
banking and financial business service and the installment of plant and ma- 
chinery to exploit U.K.'s oil reserves. We can conclude that the levels 
of investment activity in most parts of U.K.'s private industry has in 
relative terms, i.e. proportionately followed the decline of its growth 
rate since the early 1960* or, to put it less strongly, has not substan- 
tially increased. Even the rise in s for the company sector as a whole 
does not necessarily indicate a major increase, because it is measured in 
relation to a declin ing" growth of income.
2.2.2. Determinants of investment activity   the construction of an
Investment decision equation
Table 2.2. confirms the hypothesis that capacity creation in industry 
(particularly in manufacturing) was falling between 1965 and 1975 and was 
therefore incapable of generating enough new jobs for all those made re-
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dundant. The Harrod-Domar formula suggests that net investment is one of 
the supply-side factors determining growth. In this section we shall try 
to identify the factors influencing the investment decision process.
The willingness of firms to invest depends on business confidence, 
expectations about future demand trends and firms' target market share. 
On this basis, firms will estimate their future capacity needs and will 
assess the various possible investment projects according to their ex- 
pected rates of return. But these expectations are very much affected 
by the degree to which firms 1 predictions have proven to be accurate in 
terms of actual profitability, capacity utilization and demand levels dur- 
ing the recent past. If, for example, firms have been too optimistic and 
the actual increase in demand turns out to be below expectation, leading 
to overcapacity, then expectations will tend to be scaled down and in- 
vestment activity for the next period will tend to be lowered. Invest- 
ment decisions are therefore made as a response to divergencies between 
expectations and outcomes (expressed, say, in terms of profits) in a 
process of continuous adjustment to changing market conditions, extra- 
polation and rational decision-making.
In as much as investment involves expenditure, the capacity of firms 
to invest wi 11 depend on the amount of money resources available to fi- 
nance their projects. These can be financed either internally through 
retained profits (i.e. gross trading profits net of dividends, interest, 
taxes, and non-trading expenditure, but including depreciation provisions, 
investment allowances and interest revenues from financial assets), or 
from external sources, such as banks or the equity market.
Given these behavioural specifications, investment will depend large- 
ly on expected profitability. Discrepancies between past expectations and 
current outcome, even if stated in terms of demand/sales or degree of cap- 
aclty utilization, will show up as differences between expected and actual 
profit-rates. Furthermore, for any given level of appropriations (tax 
rate, interest, etc.) internal investment finance will depend on profits 
generated. Ultimately, the capcity of a firm to generate funds exter- 
nally through bank loans or the issue of shares at the stock market is
(6) determined by its actual and anticipated profit-rates.
With expectations, the experience of divergence between previous 
market evaluations and current outcome (prompting adjustments in planning 
ahead), internal and external investment finance the principal determi- 
nants of investment behaviour we can construct the following simple, 
linear Investment decision equation: Dt = a t (l+x t )S t with D t standing for
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investment decisions, S indicating internal finance, x being external 
finance as a proportion of internal finance and a^ constituting an adjust- 
ment variable in light of changing expectations, all in period t. D will 
go up with an increase in investment fina'nce (S or x or both) and/or in
expectations a . We can write
0>(e) -(P(e) -P(a) D
a t s   Rei;       
where P(e) expresses expected profitability at the start .of period t and 
P(a) t stands for actual profits as they materialize during period t. With 
no discrepancy and profits occurring as expected we get P(e) -P(a) = 0, 
hence a t= 1 and D remains unaffected. If, however, expectations were too 
optimistic, then P(e) -P(a) is larger than zero, a is below 1 and D 
will start to decline over period t. The same process in reverse happens 
with too pessimistic expectations. Furthermore, the expectations at the 
start of the next period P(e) .. are an increasing function of the adjust- 
ment a during t. Therefore, with firms being too optimistic in period t, 
a downward revision of expectations would follow in the next period: 
P(e) .< P(e) as a < 1. The exact reverse effect takes place in case 
of too pessimistic expectations during t: P(e) t ,, > P(e) as a > 1. The 
experience in one period will thus affect decisions in the next period. 
If therefore profits turn out to be higher (lower) than expected and 
a> 1 (a < 1), then more (less) investment projects are a) needed to meet 
increased (decreased) growth of sales, b) now rendered profitable and c) 
can be financed because of higher (lower) levels of internal and external 
investment finance. After a certain period k (during which investment 
goods are ordered, constructed and installed) the investment decisions D 
will turn into actual investment in new plant and machinery:
In most of the econometric studies of investment behaviour in U.K. 
Industry capacity utilization was used as a proxy variable for business 
confidence. In other words, our adjustment variable a would have to be 
formulated in terms of capacity utilization instead of profitability. 
Such a step is viable, because in a situation of surplus capacity a) in- 
vestment is made less urgent due to lack of pressure on existina capacity, 
b) expectations about future capacity needs will be Icwered, c) profitabil 
ity will be depressed as unit costs rise with lower capacity utilization. 
There Is thus a close relation between the rates of profit and of capa- 
city used.
Apart from this modification the studies confirm the validity of our
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approach to determine the factors influencing investment behaviour in U.K. 
industry: a) !n all the studies mentioned here, that is, D.J. SMYTH and 
G. BRISCOE (1969), J.P BURMAN (1970), P.N. JUNANKAR (1970), A.R. NOBAY 
(1970) and M. PANIC and K. VERNON (1975), capacity utilisation was the 
statistically most significant variable with the highest correlation co- 
efficient to explain the level of investment decisions; b) Nobay (1970), 
Panic and Vernon (1975), and Smyth and Briscoe (1969) also found that 
profits, when replacing capacity utilisation, were statistically signifi- 
cant and highly correlated with investment decisions; c) These three 
studies also used proxy data for expected output change (Nobay), invest- 
ment intention surveys of the CBI and Financial Times' share price index 
(Panic and Vernon), and Board of Trade (now Department of Industry)-in- 
quiries about investment intentions (Smyth and Briscoe) to estimate bus- 
iness confidence. They found that each of these indicators performed 
reasonably well to explain investment decisions and was highly correlated 
with capacity utilisation; d) Those who included different financial var- 
iables for both internal and external finance (Nobay and Burman) found 
that they made a significant contribution to the explanation of invest- 
ment behaviour; e) The estimation of the 'reaction lag 1 between variations 
In the independent variables (e.g. spare capacity) and related changes in 
investment orders varied between 1 quarter (Smyth and Briscoe) and 3 quar- 
ters (Burman). The 'gestation lag 1 between investment orders and delivery 
(including a "queuing" time depending on capital goods supply bottlenecks 
and a "production" time) was estimated by Nobay and Burman to vary between 
3 and 5 quarters. Total lag estimation varied between 9 months (Panic and 
Vernon) and 2 years (Burman).
To sum up, other studies have emphasized the importance of business 
confidence on the basis of recent experiences and to a lesser extent also 
of investment finance availability in explaining investment behaviour. 
They also pointed to the existence of lags. On the basis of such empiri- 
cal findings and also in reference to our equation we can now examine the 
extent to which the inadequate level of investment activity in private 
industry has been possibly resulting from lack of confidence because of 
expected low profitability and/or from any limitations on financial re- 
sources within many U.K. companies. These two factors within the "pro- 
duction conditions" of''private firms are more fully discussed in the 
following sections.
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2.2.3. The decline of the profit-rate in U.K.'s private company sector
Table 2.3*. The rate of profit of U.K. industrial and commercial companies 
1956-1977
Year
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Glyn & Sutcliffe 
Series
12. 
11.6% 
11.0* 
11
12.5* 
10.
9. 
10.7* 
11.0* 
10.2*
8.3*
8.8*
8.1*
6.
5.
Bank of England 
Series
11.5*
10.5*
11.
11.
11.2*
9.9* 
9-9* 
10.0* 
8.5* 
7.3* 
7-3* 
7.5* 
6.6*
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969'
1970
1971
1972
1973 
197*
1975
1976
1977
SOURCE: A. GLYN and B. SUTCLIFFE (1972), JrJ. Fleming, L.D.D. Price, and 
D.H. Ingram (1976), and Trade and Industry, 22/9/1978, p. 675 (for figures
1975-1977).
Both series are before tax, but after correction for stock appreciation 
and capital consumption. Both used the replacement cost-approach to cal- 
culate the value of capital stock and of accumulated stocks. The differ- 
ence in the absolute figures of the two series is likely to stem from diff- 
erent methods of evaluating firms' income and assets. As both move almost 
exactly together that difference does not diminish their validity of indi- 
cating a significant downward trend of the profit-rate over the cycles
3-1* 
3.5*
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since 1960. (8)
Glyn and Sutcliffe's explanation for this "profit squeeze," is the 
most elaborate among those which stress wage pressure and international 
competitiveness as the main causes. Rising wage costs could according to 
this theory not be fully passed on into higher prices because of increas- 
ing competition 'botb at home and abroad. In this context the findings of 
S. HENRY, M. SAWYER and P. SMITH (19?6) that unions in the U.K. based OR 
average their money wage demands on a target increase of real net earn- 
ings in line with productivity increases (i.e. p.a.) confirm the 
notion of strong wage pressure. As pointed out by D. JACKSON, G. TURNER
and F. WILKINSON (1972, p. 98-99) inflation, incomes policies and the 
'fiscal drag 1 , moving the average wage-earner into higher and higher in- 
come tax brackets, meant that the money wage demands had to be increasing- 
ly inflationary just to secure modest net gains in real net pay.
Glyn and Sutcliffe do not, however, explain why the growing wage 
demands in money terms could not be compensated for by equivalent pro- 
ductivity increases. For the profit-rate we can write P/K = Y/K (1-W/Y) 
with P for profits, W for wages, K for capital-stock and Y for income, 
derived from the standard formula Y P+W. This implies that the profit- 
rate does not only depend on the distribution of income, but also on the 
capital-output ratio. Glyn and Sutcliffe only concentrate on the wcge- 
(or profit-)share, emphasizing the decline of the profit-share as a re- 
sult of not being able to recuperate the growing money wages through 
higher prices. According to our formula this decline may not necessarily 
cause a fall in the profit-rate, if the lower profit-share was accompanied 
by an equivalent decrease in the capital-output ratio, indicating (as 
will be discussed below) higher efficiency in production. With higher 
productivity (leading to higher Y/K) companies could afford to pay higher 
wages without having to suffer from lower profitability   a point ignored 
by Glyn and Sutcliffe. Therefore the profit-crisis is not only a product 
of wage pressure and tougher international competition, but could have 
been avoided with a sufficiently high improvement in production efficiency. 
Why this has not happened will be discussed in sec, 2.3 below.
Our conclusion so far is that the deteriorating growth-rate of U.K.'s 
private industry is related to inadequate levels of nat investment caused 
by falling profit-rates. This process is self-reinforcing. Low investment
itself will in reverse keep down not only growth, but also profits over the
(q) 
coming period, thus causing its own perpetuation.
- 29-
2.2.1*. investment Finance
The downward trend in profitability will not only have a consistently 
depressing effect on business confidence and thus on investment into new 
capacity. It is also reducing the internal cash funds for investment, 
while at the same time making it more difficult and costly for companies 
to obtain external finance.
Lower profit-rates will weaken internally generated liquidity, unless 
there is a simultaneous and proportionate fall in the sum total of all the 
appropriations (replacement investment, stock appreciation, dividends, 
tax, interest) deducted from the companies' gross earnings. It is reason- 
able to assume that any such fal1 has not been sufficient to compensate 
firms for their lower profitability.
Table 2.4: Company liquidity, financial surplus/deficits and net invest- 
ment of industrial and commercial companies, all in nominal terms (h m.)
net fixed 
investment
value of 
physical 
increases 
in stocks
financial 
surplus (+) 
deficit (-)
Year retained and undis- 
tributed profits 
(i.e. gross trading 
profits minus app- 
ropriations)
1960 1665
1961 1242
1962 1001
1963 1476
1964 1756
1965 1687
1966 1351
1967 1493
1968 1876
1969 1700
1970 1178
1971 1489
1972 1944
1973 2493
1974 543
1975 1042
SOURCE: J.S. Fleming, L.D.D. Price, D.H. Ingram (1976)
   
With retained and undistributed profits as a fairly accurate indicator of 
available internal investment finance, Table 2.4. clearly points to the 
deteriorating ability of firms to finance net investment expenditure in-
874
1056
1004
835
1237
1292
1178
1076
1243
1489
l 44
1508
1577
2089
2725
3009
566
246
- 23
170
654
457
267
206
354
353
433
- 94
- 166
822
1079
-1631
+ 225
- 60
+ 20
+ 421
- 126
- 62
- 94
+ 211
+ 279
- 142
- 899
+ 75
+ 533
- 418
-3259
- 336
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ternally, especially in the recession 197^/75 after a short-lived im- 
provement in 1972/73= We also-note the relative stagnation of net in- 
vestment in nominal terms (indicating a decline in real terms) with the 
exception of 1973/7^, with changes in investment activity lagging about 
one year behind those in retained profits. The situation has recently 
been made worse, because since 1969 the fluctuations of stock levels 
lagged behind those of internal finance. This increased the financial 
deficits in the recessions of 1970/71 and 1973/7 2* considerably.
In addition, because of depressed profitability in domestic indus- 
trial activity firms will spend a higher proportion of their already de- 
teriorating internal funds on other assets wi.th an expected higher rate 
of return. With U.K.'s long tradition of investing overseas it is not 
surprising that U.K. companies raised their long-term investment spending 
abroad from h791 m. in 1970 to hl863 m. in 1975, compared with the much 
lower Increase of direct investment by foreign companies in the U.K. 
(from h7^7 m. in 1971 to t1255 m. in 1975). Higher nominal interest rates 
gave firms an additional incentive to build up their liquid assets fairly 
substantially during 1971~73. These were run down during the liquidity 
crisis of but in 1975 U.K. firms rebuilt their holdings of liquid 
assets and allocated k2500 m. for this purpose.
Such a deterioration in the position of internal investment finance 
was made worse by the effects of lower profitability on external invest- 
ment finance. With regard to equity finance low profitability depressed 
the confidence of shareholders and thus share-prices. Firms with rapidly 
declining prices of their shares face growing risks, as other firms with 
larger financial resources can more easily exploit this weakening of a 
firm's market position and launch successful take-over bids. At the same 
tirr.e, low profitability sets limits to the extent to which firms can pay 
out higher dividends to create demand for their stocks. Higher dividends 
not only represent increased costs to management, but might also generate 
unjustified expectations which will have to be frustrated later. In add- 
ition, with demand for. shares falling in a depressed market, competition 
between firms over the reduced amount of buyers will intensify and new 
share issues to finance investment will be made more difficult.
The risks and costs of borrowing from banks are even higher. In re- 
lation to interest payments, managements have to pay the fixed charges set 
by banks and thus loose the remaining flexibility they had over determin- 
ing dividends. Nominal interest charges go up during periods of accelera-
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ting inflation, but also when banks want compensation for their higher 
lending risks to financially weakened firms. When lending to those firms 
with a lower credit rating banks can also impose restrictions and con- 
trols, including sometimes changes in management apart from very detailed 
information and monitoring procedures. In case of default on repayment 
banks may refuse another loan (which would in any case be even more ex- 
pensive) or impose a moratorium and thus force the firm into liquidation, 
giving them complete control over the firm. Therefore a worsening profit- 
ability situation not only reduces internal investment finance, but in- 
volves higher costs and risks for firms seeking external sources of supply 
of funds.
An additional constraint in terms of external investment finance in 
the U.K. is the relation between City-banks and private industry as one 
'element of structural weakness. 1 U.K. banks have traditionally been less 
involved in and tied to the operations of industrial firms than in the 
case of, say, West Germany, Japan, and the U.S.A. This relative separa- 
tion between industry and finance in the U.K. has developed institution- 
ally and historically since the 1880's. It has meant not only a lower 
level of bank borrowing as a proportion of total investment finance in the 
U.K. compared to other industrialised countries, but also a less stable 
supply of funding from banks. When industrial enterprises had to borrow 
heavily to cover financial deficits in a particular year, they tried to 
reduce this dependency on banks as rapidly as possible by early repayment 
of thei r debts.* '
But despite the preference for internal finance U.K. firms were 
forced by the accelerating profitability decline in the 1970's to increas- 
ingly borrow from banks, because they could not generate enough cash flow 
by themselves. With the related erosion of confidence there was during 
1973/7^ little possibility to issue new shares at the stock market. These 
recent developments in the wake of the present crisis are summed up in 
Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: U.K. Industrial and Commercial Companies   sources of funds in 
per cent of total funds
1968-70 1971 1972 1973 197A
undistributed income 493 463 403 383 293 
bank borrowing 163 133 353 383 483 
capital issues (U.K.) 83 73 73 13 03 
other 153 163 73 103 A3 
overseas sources 123 183 113 133 193
SOURCE: NEDO (1975, p. *» 32 -
With firms having as a last resort to borrow increasingly from banks 
at nominally increasing interest rates and tighter conditions their debt 
burden grew significantly. In 197** interest payments of U.K. companies 
rose to 87% of pre-tax real profits, compared to only 13% in 1959. Many 
firms could not repay their loans and had to go into liquidation, leading 
to post-war record- figures in bankruptcies (2575 in 1973, 3720 in 197*», 
5398 in 1975 and 5939 in 1975). As uncertainty intensified, the decline 
of confidence continued, conditions in company liquidity and the stock 
market further deteriorated and more firms had to take more expensive 
credits, the cost of capital went up sharply. Considering equity finance 
and bank borrowing together and allowing for uncertainty as an additional 
cost factor, J.J. Flemming, L.D.D. Price and S.A. Byers (1976, p. 197) 
found that the real post-tax cost of capital (defined as the rate at which 
future earnings are discounted by the capital market) rose from p.a. 
in 1972 to 5.9$ p.a. in 1975.
We can conclude that as a consequence of the decline in profitability 
the capacity of firms to generate internal funds for investment weakened, 
while external supplies of finance were either more difficult to obtain or 
involved increasingly higher costs and risks. The climax of this process 
came in the recession of 197^ and 1975 with serious liquidity problems and 
widespread bankruptcies as a result.
2.3. Efficiency in private industry
2.3.1. The capital-output ratio as a proxy.for "production efficiency"
Up to now we have confined our discussion to the level of investment 
activity and its underlying determinants as one of the supply-side ele- 
ments Influencing growth in private industry. We now turn our attention
» 
to the second element in the Harrod-Domar accounting identity, g = s/k, in
order to complete our analysis of low growth in O.K. Industry.
It Is our intention in this section to use the capital-output ratio k 
as a proxy variable for "efficiency" which as part of the production con- 
dition within industry (together with investment finance, profitability 
and the level of new capacity creation) will be shown to have been a major 
constraint in the U.K. for the achievement of higher growth within private 
Industry. As C. ROWLEY (1977, p. 7) claims, most economists have used the 
term "efficiency" In the sense of "allocative efficiency" relating it to 
the correct allocation of resources between sectors. In this context 
"correct allocation" Implies that the prices charged to .the consumer re-
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fleet the marginal costs of production.
But since the introduction of the concept of "x-efficFency" in H. 
LEIBENSTEIN (1966 A) as an alternative micro-level measure, many econo- 
mists have become concerned with examining whether firms obtain the max- 
imum possible output from given resource inputs, i.e. use their resources 
as efficiently as possible. This "x-efficiency" concept has been further 
refined by R. WARE (1977, p. 77) who has termed it "labour efficiency." 
As such it deals only with organisational techniques and methods applied 
to raise output with given inputs. In addition "technical efficiency" 
refers to the development of new production techniques and improved mach- 
inery to push up output. In our discussion we use "production efficiency" 
as including both labour and technical efficiency. It can therefore be 
defined as the degree to which existing and potentially available re- 
sources are used both from an organisational and technological point of 
view to give the maximum possible output.
In addition to the mainfold and different uses of the "efficiency 11 
concept there are also enormous measurement difficulties involved, be- 
cause "efficiency," as A. SILBERSTON (1970, p. 59) pointed out, is neither 
visible nor absolute, and therefore not directly measurable.
As an alternative to direct measurement economists have generally 
used proxy variables to indicate the extent of "production efficiency." 
In this context empirical studies have shown the capital-output ratio k 
(either expressed as the incremental K/Y-ratio ICOR, measured as the ratio 
of net investment over growth of output net of capital consumption, or as 
the average K/Y-ratio ACOR, measured as net capital stock over net output) 
to be the best proxy for "production efficiency." This is in line with 
the accounting identity g * s/k of Harrod and Domar in which the capital- 
output ratio (as ACOR) is one of the growth determinants. Accordingly, 
the importance of production efficiency as an element of the production 
conditions determining growth has been emphasised recently by a number of
/iM
economists, v '
Table 2.6. shows that the capital-output ratio In the U.K. company sector 
has steadily increased since the mid-1960's indicating growing production 
Inefficiency, as more and more capital was required to generate one unit 
of output.
Table 2.6: The capital -output ratio in the U.K. company sector (in net 
terms) 1955-1976
net capital stock over net domestic product (ACOR)
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1.45
1.46
1.51
1.54
1.47
1.45
1,47
1.52
1.51
1.48
1.60
1.63
1.62
1.68
1.80
1.87
1.91
1-97
2.12
2.49
2.60
2.56
SOURCE: CSo (1966), T.66, T.72 and CSo (1977), T.11.10, 11.11 
Not only has there been a rising trend for ACOR (and thus also for ICOR), 
but production efficiency seems also to have been significantly below that 
of U.K.'s main competitors. Both H. LEIBENSTBIN (1966 B) and M. Panic 
(1967), for example, showed that investment in U.K. industry was relative- 
ly more concentrated than elsewhere in types of assets (e.g. dwellings) 
and sectors (e.g. public utilities) with high ICOR which created an al lo- 
cative bias against the U.K.'s overall capital -output ratio. And other- 
findings confirm the deteriorating and comparatively low capacity of U.K. 
firms to use capital efficiently for the production of output.
2.3-2. Elements of Structural Weakness as Causes of Low Production Efficiency 
This section will attempt to present an outline of the forces re-
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stricting the achievement of higher production efficiency. In as much as 
these have developed over a significant period of time and are institu- 
tionalized factors characteristic to the U.K. economy in particular, they 
are "elements of structural weakness."
2.3-2.1: Concentration of Industry and Size of Firms: A common argument 
relating to production efficiency is that the more concentrated industry 
is and the larger the size of its firms, the more efficient will they op-. 
erate as a result of economies of scale concerning access to finance, 
risk-sharing, management structure, production techniques, or marketing. 
Because of these economies, larger firms will achieve higher productivity, 
more rapid technological change, and faster growth rates than smaller 
firms. One might then argue that a possible reason for lower efficiency 
in U.K. industry resulted from comparatively lower levels of concentration 
and smaller size of its firms limiting the 'benefits of possible economies 
of scale.
But such an argument has very little validity. First of all, in many 
sectors U.K. firms are among the largest international firms. G.F. RAY 
(1970, p. 11), for instance, points out that in 1969/70 six of the largest 
ten European firms were from the U.K. and that the largest companies from 
Canada and Japan were also smaller than the largest U.K. firms. Only the 
U.S. had significantly larger companies than the U.K. in nearly all sec- 
tors. In addition there is convincing evidence that concentration 
(I.e. the market share of the largest firm) has quite rapidly increased 
in the U.K. since the mid-60's, which is precisely a period during which 
efficiency in relative terms seems to have declined. Not surprisingly a 
number of studies showed no positive correlation between size of firms or 
degree of concentration in industry and efficiency. It can safely be 
assumed that neither size nor the degree of concentration in UK. industry 
are major factors in explaining its low efficiency.
2.3.2.2: Product Mix and Resource Allocation between sectors: The find- 
ings of H. Leibenstein (1966 B) and M. Panic (1967), mentioned above in 
2;3.1, could be extended into a hypothesis that the lower efficiency in 
the U.K. was mostly an allocative problem with too many resources concen- 
trated in sectors with low productivity and long-run stagnation. This 
may be a result of the historically early industrialization in the U.K. 
taking place mostly in traditional sectors that are now declining, such as 
textiles and shipbuilding, with insufficient subsequent real location of 
resources into new growth sectors. There are, however, many studies that 
contradict this argument. M. PANIC (ed.) (1976) in a NEDO study of pro-
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ductivity differences in 1*» sectors 'performed systematically worse than 
their German competitors despite strong similarities in the patterns of 
Industrial growth across industry, structure of labour and capital inputs
(ig\
and the dependence of both countries on foreign trade. Both R. Caves 
(1968, p. 29*0, and G.F. Ray (1970, p. 6-8) present evidence to show that 
as in other countries there was also in the U.K. during the 1960's a sig- 
nificant real location of resources from declining, low-productivity sec- 
tors into high-productivity, "growth" sectors, such as chemicals, electri- 
cal engineering. So allocative inflexibility and disadvantageous pro- 
duct mix in U.K. industry have not been recently major problems. 
2.3.2.3: Production Runs; It is possible that despite the comparatively 
large size of U.K. firms (in terms of both average size and with regard 
to the largest enterprises) their production has been more fragmented and 
less centralized than elsewhere. Pratten (1976, pp. 28l), for instance, 
points out that many U.K. firms have smaller production runs, that is, 
smaller rates of output of individual products than their U.S. and EEC 
counterparts. Large production runs do not necessarily require large 
total output and company-size, as relatively small firms can achieve long 
production runs through specialization. But they are crucially important 
for the achievement of economies of scale. They increase the scope for 
using units of plant and machinery with higher capacity ancj little or no 
extra labour to operate them. They facilitate the mechanization and auto- 
mation of production and reduce the setting-up time for machinery. They 
maintain an even flow of work and allow for large savings in the use of 
indirect labour employed on stores, inventory, production and quality 
control. According to Pratten the early start of industrialisation in the
U.K. meant that in the early decades of this century domestic industry was
«
more fragmented than the then rapidly industrialfsing economies of the 
U.S.A. and the rest of Europe. Despite large-scale merger activities and 
higher concentration in later decades (in particular during the 1960's) 
leading to larger-sized firms, rationalisation of their product ranges and 
concentration of resources into fewer products and plants (that is, post- 
merger rationalisation) was often delayed by U.K. companies. They there- 
fore failed to increase their production runs. Manufacture of components 
continued in small quantities, as firms did not sufficiently integrate and 
rationalise the production and supply of spares. Caves (1968, p. 288-291) 
confirms the relatively high level of product differentiation and smaller 
scale of production runs for individual products even after mergers and 
despite the large size of firms. Again this is viewed as a consequence of
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inadequate rationalisation. Hence -the elements of structural weakness 
derived from early industrialisation and inadequate subsequent readjust- 
ment in the U.K. seem to focus less on insufficient concentration in 
industry or on a disadvantageous product mix across sectors. Instead the 
key problem, historicallyspeaking, in terms of adjustment and reorgani- 
sation is to be found within the organisation of production itself. Small 
production runs, lack of integrated production facilities and an overly 
fragmented range of products resulted in competitive disadvantages, when 
compared with the frequently more centralised and rationalised industrial 
activities in other countries.
2.3-2.A: Capital Vintage; C.F. Pratten (1976, p. ^l) stressed the older 
vintage of factories and plants in the U.K. in comparison to the U.S.A., 
West Germany and France. A special problem here is the predominance of 
old, multi-storey as opposed to new single-storey factories. The conse- 
quences of this old type of industrial buildings are more difficult pro- 
duction control, higher stocks and overhead labour requirements and less 
use of automated production control systems. Furthermore, U.K. companies 
seem also to have been slower in adopting "Best Practice Techniques" and 
in achieving possible technical improvements by scrapping machines that 
are still technically serviceable but already technologically obsolete. 
This was especially true in labour-intensive sectors, because the cost of 
labour relative to capital equipment was so much lower in the U.K. than, 
say, in Germany, France or the U.S.A. An important argument concerning 
the slower technological change and inefficient use of new equipment (with 
more modern machinery being installed without significant improvements in 
productivity) is the "defensive investment" hypothesis of A. LAMFALUSSY 
(1963, pp. 105). He argues that the U.K. has been more than other coun- 
tries characterised by an existina prewar inheritance of old plant which 
did not have to be replaced or rebuilt after the war. This combined often 
with low post-war rates of investment in new plant and machinery. And 
consequently modernisation investment was basically "defensive" and usual- 
ly" involved wedding of relatively small units of new equipment to old- 
fashioned blocks of capital. The findings of BACON and ELTIS (197M that 
the service life and average age of U.K. machine tools are, over a wide 
range of different types of machine tools, the same as in the U.S.A. are 
therefore incomplete, as they abstract from the persistence of old plant. 
The resulting complementarity between old plant and modern equipment was 
often an alternative to large-scale changes of production facilities and
*
techniques and prevented more fundamental rationalisation. New equipment
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was therefore not always efficiently used.
2.3.2.55 Management Inefficiency; The failure of U.K. firms to reduce 
product differentiation, achieve larger production runs and use new equip- 
ment more efficiently points to behavioural aspects as an important Ele- 
ment of structural, weakness underlying the persistently low level of pro- 
duction efficiency in the U.K. This has become a matter of increasing 
concern for scholars and policy-makers analysing the growth constraints in 
U.K. industry:
"...whatever combination of influences adversely affects the 
performance of United Kingdom industry, their widespread nature 
does suggest that there may be evidence of some deep-rooted 
malaise: some combination of attitudes, expectations and 
tastes that 'locks' United Kingdom industry to its present 
position." (A. Mueller, (1977, p. 26k))
More often than not the emphasis on such 'behavioural aspects'* in 
explaining UK's economic problems and weaknesses is used as a pre= 
text for demands to curb the power of the unions. According to 
D.PURDY(l9?6A,pp.27l-2?4) the strength of UK's labour movement 
derives from its comparatively deep historical roots, from having 
escaped repression and destruction in the 1930's (and the post- 
war reconstruction in highly centralised structures under moderate 
leadership, as in Austria, West Germany or Scandinavia), from not 
having to experience the political divisions of the unions in 
France, Italy, Belgium or the Netherlands or the difficulties 
associated with a minority position of the urban industrial wor= 
king class and with an ethnically and racially heterogenous la= 
bour force, as is the case in the USA. But the probably most lm= 
portant characteristics of the UK labour movement are its unique 
system of shop steward organisation and workplace bargaining and 
the decentralised structure of its unions. Both C.F.Pratten(19?6, 
P»53-55) and L.ULMAN(196&,pp.352-5) comment upon the power of 
shop stewards in the UK to conduct plant bargaining in order to 
drive pay above nationally agreed wage rates ("wage drift") and 
to force management into negotiating work procedures and Job 
specifications with regard to labour mobility, manning levels for 
different types of work and new technology, speed of operations, 
and demarcation between unions (to protect especially the smaller 
craft unions)  To conclude from this, however, that unions are 
the main force behind inflation or prevent more efficient organi= 
satlon of production, is one-sided and simplistic. D.JACKSON, 
H.A. TURNER and F.WILKINSON (1972) have shown convincingly how
unions have in general exhibited growing militancy and pushed for
substantial wage increases- in reaction to rapid price increases, 
the 'fiscal drag 1 and incomes policies which led to losses in real 
take home pay, but failed to control prices. From their empirical 
evidence it is also clear that in order to Just achieve increases 
in real, nefe pay in line with productivity growth the unions had 
to ask for higher and higher monetary wage increases. The existen= 
ce of widespread restrictive work practices (especially overmanning) 
in many industries, as analysed and confirmed by L.Ulman(1968,p, 
or C.F.PRATTEN and A.ATKIKSON(l9?6,p.57^). is likely to have had 
a negative Impact on productivity. But neither inflation nor re= 
strictive working practices can be abolished by attacking the 
unions. The failure of such attempts in the past makes that clear. 
Higher(not lower) wages provide the level of demand necessary for 
higher growth and facilitate Improvements in efficiency/producti= 
vity, as the wage gains are transformed into more demand,benefit 
work motivation and vthe climate of industrial relations, espe= 
dally if they are contingent on increases in output or on accep= 
ted changes in technology and work content, or induce management 
to Invest In more capital-intensive, labour-saving techniques. 
Given UK industry's record of low pay, of labour-shedding, of in= 
adequate investment to create sufficient new jobs at home and es= 
pecially in depressed regions, and of direct investment overseas, 
It is not surprising that unions and their members on the shop 
floor defend Jobs and working practices against proposed changes, 
try to maintain manning levels and often oppose new technology. 
Their position is often hardened by the lack of consultations,ne= 
gotiations and information channels on management decisions that 
affect their working conditions and pay. There is no doubt that 
the changes necessary to establish conditions for higher growth 
will require rationalisation of production, mobility of labour, 
more use of new technology, reallocation of resources, and reforms 
of the collective bargaining process. But precisely because indus= 
trial regeneration depends on such large-scale changes, is it 
neceseary to gain the cooperation and participation of the work- 
force by extending the scope of bargaining, by giving the unions 
and the shopfloor a larger .say in the affairs and plans of compa= 
nies, by improving the flow of information and communication, and 
by offering workers tangible material benefits in exchange
for accepting changes in v.jj.^i,.. J^cii L-
It is not only a question of democracy or fairness, but also 
one of prudence on the part of management to involve the work- 
force- actively in the planning of massive changes that affect 
their working conditions. This would enable management to bene= 
fit from the knowledge of their employees, to win their coopera= 
tion, and in this way to carry out the mutually agreed initiati= 
ves without confrontation and delay. By being able to participate 
in the formulation of plans, to evaluate management proposals 
for changes in the work-place, and to ultimately share in the 
benefits of improved performance to which they contributed, 
industrial workers are probably more willing to accept and adapt 
to necessary reorganisation of production. Resistance to change 
has up to now mostly been motivated by the perception of the 
unions and their members that any motives and proposals of 
management weredirected against their own interests, that the 
status quo had to be defended against initiatives demanding 
sacrifice, and that management's monopoly of control had to be 
countered through extension of the scope of bargaining and, 
whenever necessary, through industrial action. Moves towards 
industrial democracy would therefore help to reestablish a more 
constructive approach to common problems with both sides seeking 
acceptable solutions.
But the degree to which firms compete successfully and expand 
their operations depends also on the quality of their managers in 
terms of of production planning , cost controls, appraisals of 
investment opportunities and markets, and their ability to carry 
out remedial action in the areas o f weakness. Evidence points to 
need for improvements on how UK firms are managed. Ulman (1968, 
P«335) and pratten (I9?6,p. 52) have both analysed the widespread 
problem of overmanning in UK industry and concluded that this is
mostly due to management inefficiency.According to Caves{l968,p.303) 
the majority of U.K. firms do not use the best investment appraisal and work
study techniques. And C.C. NEW (1970) in a study of 186 plants in the 
U.K. engineering industry showed that the proportion of production time, 
during which operations were uninterrupted, averaged less than 30% (1). 
No less than 70fc of the time taken to produce components was spent queu- 
ing and waiting for the next operation. This led to much longer produc- 
tion time of single products than necessary, excessive levels of stock 
and work In progress, long delivery lead times and unreliable delivery 
dates   all major non-price competition disadvantages. He found that
only 20% of the plants studied achieved a target of delivery on time. 
The key problems were inadequate methods to organize and monitor the 
production process, covering the determination of work methods and work 
flow patterns, the rate of technological innovation, and the scheduling 
of production in relation to delivery times.
Pratten (1976, p. compared U.K. firms and U.S.-subsidiaries in 
the U.K. and found apart from lower productivity also less successful pro- 
duct development and investment proposals on the part of the U.K. firms. 
The U.S.-subsidiaries concentrated their efforts and resources much more 
on product designs which reduced the number of components required for 
production. They also managed a smaller product range which allowed in 
turn larger production runs and easier production control. Or they opted 
for special products which could be sold at high prices, providing high 
levels of value added per man. They also compiled more often than their 
U.K. counterparts computer records of production sequences for various 
products to facilitate optimal utilization of the most efficient machines 
and manpower. Pratten (1976, p. 52) also noted the lack of "administra- 
tive" efficiency of U.K. firms to keep updated management and control data 
and thus avoid or reduce lost waiting time. J. DUNNING (1966) found that 
U.S.-subsidiaries in the U.K. spent a smaller fraction of sales revenue 
on administration and more on marketing and distribution than their U.K.- 
owned counterparts.
Pratten and Atkinson (1976, pp. 57^-575) have pointed out that this 
degree of management inefficiency within U.K. firms had been identified 
as the principal cause of production inefficiency in 20 post-war studies 
of low productivity in six major sectors of U.K. industry. It therefore 
seems to be a widespread phenomenon. Caves (1968, pp. 302-305) related 
poor management quality to a preference in many firms for filling top 
management positions with graduates from Cambridge or Oxford. Those tend 
to be trained in classics rather than engineering, have the Civil Service 
as thetr model and play therefore too much of a trustee role. He also 
noted the imderuti1ization of qualified scientists and engineers and the 
lack of interest and general training in formal business management meth- 
ods. Compared to other countries there is much ] ess inter- and intra-com- 
pany mobility among U.K. top managers and a smaller proportion of them 
rose from the firms' own ranks to top positions. These factors have also 
been emphasized in the detailed sector-by-sector study of U.K. industry 
by D.F. CHANNON (1973, PP- *»3ff.).
Summing up, It seems clear that industrial performance in 
the U.K. has suffered from the widespread absence of efficient 
methods to organize production, appraise investment and develop 
new products. The combination of low productivity, sub-optimal 
production techniques, smaller production runs, inferior quality 
controls, unreliable delivery time and inadequate technological 
innovation has meant that resources absorbed as inputs in produ'c= 
tion are less efficiently utilized and transformed into output. 
This has led to a higher capital-output ratio and consequently 
depressed growth. All these supply-side constraints are the like= 
ly outcome of "defensive" investment, but, as we have tried to 
argue in this section, may well have been exacerbated by poor 
Management quality. Their successful overcoming will therefore 
not least depend on more efficient management.
CONCLUDING REMARKS TO PART 1
We started our analysis with evidence that the rate of growth in 
U.K. industry has been low by international standards and has been deter- 
iorating as a trend since the early 1960's. In Ch.1 we argued that 
attempts to explain this comparatively unfavourable situation as a result 
of the declining share of manufacturing's output and employment fail to
identify underlying forces, which act as constraints on more rapid growth. 
We then discussed different policy options for demand management
to cope with UK's balance of payments crises. At the same time we 
argued that UK's industrial decline is not solely a problem of in- 
adequate demand and has to be analysed in terms of supply-side 
determinants of growth within private industry.
In particular, we discussed in this context both the low net invest- 
ment activity and the inefficient use of existing resources in production 
as underlying factors negatively affecting the rate of growth in private 
industry. Inadequate levels of net investment were seen as a consequence 
of declining profit-rates. This downward trend of profitability depress- 
ed the domestic creation of new productive capacity via its negative 
effects on business confidence and internal and external investment fin- 
ance. In addition, we also focussed on the underlying reasons for the 
growing inefficiency in production as the second influence on low growth. 
Supported by the findings and conclusions of various recent studies on
dif-fereru *, ^cts of efficiency, we. argued that U.K. irrdustry suffers in 
particular from sn-o i ^rruSct-'^n runs, a comparative lack of modernizing 
whole plants and production lines, *.,.   inadequate application of "Best 
Practice Techniques." (Other factors witli r ---Tb^« impact on efficiency, 
such as the size of firms-, the degree of concentration in u.f r ^rent Indus-. 
tries, the allocation of resources between sectors and the product mix, 
oo ,, . -^«i to have contributed to that extent to U.K.'s competitive weak- 
ness in the post «r period). These factors, discussed above in 2.3-2.3 
and 2.3»2.4, are togetnex k .l';';. +M& co.T>p«rat'i'»ciy "  o~- level of in- 
vestment activity mentioned above to be understood as the outcome 
of widespread "defensive" investment. As shown by Lamfalussy, such 
investment behaviour, concentrating mostly on minor innovations 
and rationalisation, is not only typical for a 'low growth 1 econo= 
my, such as the U.K., but tends to reinforce stagnation as well. 
Efficiency in the production process as one of the "production 
conditions" determining growth, may,.however, not just suffer 
because of "defensive investment" behaviour, but may be further 
hampered by poor industrial management, as has been argued in 
sec. 2.3.2.5.
In the course of our analysis of how the "production conditions" con- 
tributed at their various levels directly and indirectly to (the lack of) 
growth we mentioned repeatedly different institutional and historical 
characteristics specific to the U.K. economy that exacerbated the compet- 
itive disadvantages of U.K. industry.. We refer to these particular char-
/ 
acteristics as "elements of structural weakness," inasmuch as they are
deep-rooted and integral parts of the structure of this country's economy 
and cannot simply be changed or resolved by conventional means of short- 
run economic policy. They call for more far-reaching processes of trans- 
formation and structural change within the institutional framework of the 
domestic economy which policy-makers can only help to create or accelerate 
by introducing appropriate incentives or measures of control. Among those 
elements we discussed briefly the role of the city, the decentralized 
nature of collective bargaining and structure of the unions, and the con- 
tinuing Importance of overseas operations for many U.K. firms DS a conse- 
quence of U.K.'s colonial past and previous dominance in the world market.
It Is therefore our thesis that economic growth in this country has 
suffered because of low levels of investment and production efficiency. 
To the extent that low growth itself will reduce profits and investment 
and will make it more difficult to generate the resources necessary for
an improvement in production efficiency, that process of industrial 
decline is self-reinforcing. Cbnsequently we conclude that to break out 
of this process requires fundamental changes within industry so that 
efficiency can be improved and investment activity increased. In the 
following chapters we will examine the development of industrial policy 
In the U.K. since the mid-1960's and in particular examine the impact 
and limitations of measures within this branch of economic policy in 
bringing about sustained improvements in the production conditions of 
private industry.
PART 2: THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE U.K. BETWEEN 
1964 AND 1978
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
In Part 2 of our thesis we discuss the evolution of policy measures 
In the U.K. which were designed to tackle the problems within private in- 
dustry as outlined above In Ch. 2. We begin our discussion in Ch. 3 by 
defining these measures through the concept of "industrial policy." We 
then proceed to explain why policy-makers began in the early 1960's to 
accept the need for a more active role of the state in the promotion of 
economic growth. This reassessment of priorities and scope of economic 
policy In the period of 'indicative planning 1 between 1960 and 1966 led to 
a transition in the U.K. from purely macro-economic demand management 
towards state Intervention In the private sector equipped with new types 
of economic policy. At the end of Ch. 3 we assess this development in 
terms of Its significance for the introduction of first industrial policy 
measures after 1964.
In Ch. 4 we differentiate, In correspondence with the Intentions of 
policy-makers when Introducing such measures, between various areas of in- 
tervention and objectives of industrial policy. More specifically £ we 
categorize Industrial policy measures as either a) aiming mainly at an in- 
crease of Investment finance within private industry, b) attempting to 
accelerate the restructuring of specific Industries or firms, or c) pro- 
moting technological change and innovative activities throughout the pri- 
vate sector. Within each of these categories we analyze relevant measures 
Individually with regard to their underlying objectives, actual implemen- 
tation, and relation to other previous and current policy initiatives. 
Special emphasis In these analyses of single measures is laid on assessing 
their Impact on Industry and on the continued development of industrial 
policy. (The case-studies In Part 3 will provide us with an opportunity to 
deal much more extensively with this task).
The structure of our analysis In Ch. 4, and particularly the grouping 
together of measures Into different categories according to common object- 
ives, reflects the expansion of Industrial policy under the Labour Govern- 
ment 1964-1970. During that phase policy-makers undertook a number of in- 
itiatives to Improve the liquidity position, the Industrial structure and 
the application of new technology within many sectors of private Industry. 
But at the same time policy-makers relied often on relatively limited mea-
46 -
sures with narrowly defined aims and conducted industrial policy without 
formulating any explicit strategies beforehand 6r attempting any overall 
coordination of policy measures In the course of Implementing those. The 
repeated expansion of measures beyond the initial intention of the govern- 
ment and the constant need to Introduce additional means of public assist- 
ance and/or control underscored, In our view, already in the late 1360's 
the necessity for a more extensive and integrated policy of state inter- 
vention In private industry.
In Ch. 5 we discuss how industrial policy developed gradually during 
the 1970's from Its Initially frequent reliance on experimental 'ad hoc' 
measures with limited objectives into an autonomous and increasingly inte- 
grated branch of economic policy with Its own range of government institu- 
tions. Whereas we will already have discussed in sec. A.1 (investment fi- 
nance) and sec. (science and technology), how industrial policy has 
been strengthened during the 1970's within specific areas of intervention, 
we turn our attention In Ch. 5 to those central policy initiatives after 
1971/72 which were intended to tackle a variety of problems simultaneously 
across a wide range of industries within the private company sector: the 
Industry Acts 1972 and 1975, and the Industrial Strategy after 1975. This 
extension of industrial policy must In our view be understood as a conse- 
quence of both the rapid deterioration during the 1970's of private indus- 
try's production conditions (as characterized and analysed above in Ch. 2) 
and the experience gained by policy-makers from the successes and failures 
of previous Intervention in the 1960's.
In Ch. 5 we also point out that this expansion of industrial policy 
took place amidst Intensified political controversies concerning the extent 
of state Intervention In the economy. In sec. 5.1 we analyse the attempts 
of the Conservative Government after the 1970 elections to 'disengage 1 the 
state apparatus from private industry. The failure to carry out this 
strategy and Its subsequent reversal, which restored a high degree of state 
Intervention, are to us clear proof of the need for industrial policy as 
a politically justified and potentially effective framework within which 
remedial measures can be formulated to deal with problems in private indus- 
try. In sec. 5.2 (and again further below In the case-study on the Nation- 
al Enterprise Board In Part 3/ Ch. 7) we have to conclude, however, that 
the radical proposals for more far-reaching and powerful means of state 
Intervention and public control in private industry, which became offic- 
ial policy of the Labour Party in 1973/71* and were to be implemented after 
Labour's election victories In 1972*, failed to materialize in the face of
widespread opposition among industrialists, financial institutions and 
more moderate or conservative politicians. Judging from the actual evo- 
lution of industrial policy between 196A and 1978, it seems clear that 
both parties were despite major ideological and political differences 
forced to adopt similar policy measures. In the face of growing economic 
difficulties in the U.K. both parties had to expand the scope of industrial 
policy. At the same time opposition from within industry prevented either 
party from successfully carrying out a policy course in line with its own 
ideological preferences. Any ultimate conclusions concerning the effects 
of industrial policy in orivate industry (as attempted in Part VCh. 8), 
which may lead to arguments for either less or more state intervention, 
will therefore have to tske account of these existing pressures on policy- 
makers. Whether determined economically or politically, such pressures 
are likely to reduce any government's ability to adopt policies of its own 
choice.
CHAPTER 3: DEFINITION OF "INDUSTRIAL POLICY" AND iTS INTRODUCTION (N THE 
CONTEXT OF U.K. POLICY-MAKING
3-1. A note on attempts at definition in the existing literature
With the growth of state intervention in private industry during the 
I960's and 1970's the body of literature on the relationship between state 
and industry has expanded considerably. At the same time the concept of 
"industrial policy" has neither become widely established, nor has it been, 
up to now, adequately and precisely defined. The basically institutional 
analyses (for example, E. MOONMAN (1971), E. DELL (1973), N. ABRAHAM (197 2*), 
A. KNIGHT (1973)) consider Government and Industry as two different organ- 
isational systems. Each is analysed In terms of its own objectives, mode 
of operation, and historical development. Then common interests, mutual 
Interdependencies and the historical decline of "laissez faire" are more 
closely examined as factors responsible since the inter-war period for the 
experienced growing intensity and scope of interrelation between these two 
entirely different institutional structures. Each of the authors mentioned 
proceeds with concrete case-studies to show the contradictory nature of 
this relationship which, while being essentially one of mutual dependency, 
Is frequently dominated by conflicts of interest.
Their institutional perspective allows only a description of the most 
apparent developments in industry which on such a level of generalisation
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are.valid for other economies as well. They abstract from any problems 
peculiar to U.K. industry. Furthermore, neither Abraham (197*0 nor 
hoonman (1971), for instance, use the term "industrial policy" at all. 
Instead they prefer the more general "Government intervention/involvement 
in industry" or "Government-Industry relation", referring usually to a 
wide range of government activities, including education, arbitration in 
industrial relations, fiscal and monetary policies, and so forth. Only 
Dell (1973, pp. ^6) actually introduces the concept of "industrial policy," 
but defines it so widely and vaguely, as to include almost the whole range 
of government policies affecting industry.
The so-called economic liberals concentrate their writings on a strong 
defence of the "free market" economy and are consequently principally 
opposed to any extension of government activity in the economy. To 
varying degrees they may acknowledge the existence of market imperfections^ 
such as oligopolistic market structures, which justify limited government 
activity to safeguard the "public interest." But any extension of state 
intervention in industrial affairs beyond that is usually, as in 
S. Brittan (1971, pp. 19-20), assumed to be either politically motivated, 
unfairly discriminatory or aggravating the situation by preventing the 
market forces from properly functioning. To use and elaborate on the term 
"industrial policy" implies the acknowledgement of contradictions and prob- 
lems that cannot be resolved by private industry and the market mechanisms 
alone. The term is therefore beyond the scope of and in opposition to the 
rationale of "economic liberalism."
At the other end of the political spectrum are those arguing the case 
for a transition to socialism, often on the basis of contradictions, irra- 
tionalities and injustice within the capitalist type of market economy.
In their view direct state Intervention in industry is a vitally important
(2) part in any overall transition program. v ' They all stress, for example,
the potential of recently introduced industrial policy tools, such as the 
National Enterprise Board (NEB) and Planning Agreements, for any such 
transformation and regeneration of industry. But despite its key role in 
their programs "industrial policy" once again does not exist as an estab- 
lished concept. Instead, the use of alternatives, such as "soci?list 
planning strategy" in S. Holland (1975, Ch. 8), "industrial strategy" and 
"democratic planning" in A. Benn et al. (1975), and "planning" in M. Ell- 
man et al. (197*1, Ch. 3), reflects the emphasis on an all embracing pro- 
gram to transform the economic system governing U.K. industry. "Indus- 
trial policy" in this context is clearly seen as too restricted a concept
in as much as it refers to a more narrow sphere of intervention and basic- 
ally Implies measures within the given confines of the existing system.
The only group of literature to explicitly introduce definitions of 
"industrial policy" is the one dealing with specific phases or measures 
of that policy; But these "partial analyses" (of measures and/or 
phases) do not usually look at the development of industrial policy as a 
dynamic process over the last 15 years. They therefore ignore the connec- 
tion between various measures, as experience led to more refined and/or 
stronger policy initiatives. Moreover, they lack an overall assessment of 
industrial policy, while in some cases there is not even a conception of 
"industrial policy." F. BROADWAY (1969) refers, for instance, only to 
"intervention" or "interventionism" and as a sub-categcry to "policies 
towards capital investment, industrial structure and technology." The 
various articles in R. Caves (ed.) (1968) separate different parts of in- 
dustrial policy and discuss these without a single reference to an overall 
"industrial policy." Thus fiscal policy, "specific interventions in in- 
dustry" (p. 317), or policy on science and technology are all terms used 
to cover specific industrial policy measures.
Other authors in this category use "industrial policy" in a very gen- 
eral sense, including regional, manpower, competition and other policies 
affecting private industry in the widest sense. Such a broad interpreta- 
tion of the concept, as for example used by A.^SKUSE (1972), or OECD (1970, 
disregards important characteristics of each specific policy in terms of 
objective, type of policy tools and measures, administration and implemen- 
tation. It is much too general and superficial to be of any use for our 
purpose which is to discuss a specific range of measures that all have as a 
common objective the removal of growth constraints within private indus- 
try's production conditions.
The feWj mnrg spprifjr definitions of industrial policy, such as in 
S. Young (197**, p. 16) and A. Graham (1972, p. 182), that are confined to 
a narrower range of measures, are neither based on nor related to any 
theoretical framework or empirically tested hypotheses about the major 
difficulties inherent in private industry. There is consequently no ex- 
planation why these policy measures were necessary or how they could be of 
help in solving industry's problems. Furthermore, without a theoretical 
basis it is difficult to assess the impact of various measures within in- 
dustry. They are no more than descriptive ex-post definitions arrived at 
by simply looking at different measures after they have been introduced 
and summing up their respective objectives.
This brief comment on the existing literature covering the subject of 
state intervention in industry points to the need of a more comprehensive. 
definition that is related to an underlying analysis of industry's major 
internal difficulties or short-comings. Only on that basis can the ob- 
jectives and effects of industrial policy be evaluated.
3.2. Industrial policy defined
In Ch. 2 we investigated the main factors within private industry 
which constrained the achievement of higher growth-rates and international 
competitiveness. The state will not only be concerned with these factors, 
because of the Government's social and political obligations to ensure 
full employment, price stability, higher personal income, the generation of 
wealth, better regional balance, and so on. Nor will the state only inter- 
vene, because the balance of payments and the capacity to finance public 
expenditure depend both ultimately on the strength of private industry. 
In addition to all these considerations state intervention in industry 
becomes necessary, because individual firms themselves are often incapable 
of carrying ovit the necessary remedial action on their own. They may lack 
the required framework of planning to carry out large changes because of 
the predominance of more short-run profit considerations. They may not 
have the financial resources, the technical knowledge, or the organisation- 
al capacity necessary to take steps that would improve performance. Such 
steps may involve considerable risks and/or costs which firms may be un- 
willing or incapable of facing. Or the problems they face may be beyond 
the scope and influence of individual firms, such as limited access to ex- 
ternal finance, bottlenecks and delays in sectors that supply industry with 
essential goods and services, or unfair practices by foreign competition. 
For all these specific reasons the state validly intervenes in the inter- 
ests of private firms.
Industrial policy is one specific part of state intervention in pri- 
vate industry. It can be defined in relation to the previous chapter's 
analysis of supply-side determinants of growth. In reference to that 
theoretical and empirical framework industrial policy comprises all those 
measures by the state that are explicitly and directly concerned with 
improving the production conditions within private industry and aim to 
influence management decision-making in this direction.
More specifically it includes measures that will: a) try to improve 
the provision of internally generated funds for the purpose of investment
(such as double taxation of dividends, investment incentives); b) increase 
the supply of external investment funds (for instance, through the state 
offering grants, loans, equity participation to private companies); c) im- 
prove business confidence (such as government purchasing policies assuring 
firms of sales, risk-sharing through joint ventures between the state and 
private firms); d) change the structure of industry to facilitate the 
achievement of economies of scale and/or growth (promoting mergers and 
sectoral reorganisation towards a more rational structure of a particular 
industry, taxing employment in some sectors, whilst paying premiums for 
employment in others); e) accelerate reorganisation of a particular firm 
by promoting rationalisation, financing modernisation and expansion of 
production facilities, facilitating the cutting down 01 product ranges, 
lengthening production runs, integrating the flow of production processes, 
improving management techniques and pushing for changes in the management 
personnel; in other words, deal with the organisational aspects of pro- 
duction efficiency; f) support the improvement of production technology 
and its application in industry, the promotion of product development, de- 
sign and quality, and the expansion of "high technology" industries.
All these objectives concern increasing investment activity and/or 
production efficiency as preconditions for higher growth and improved in- 
ternational competitiveness. They all are designed to tackle identifiedi
problems within U.K. industry's production conditions. Industrial policy 
can therefore be viewed as part of supply management at the more disaggre- 
gated level of sectors and individual firms. We confine ourselves here to 
measures directed at the private sector only, even if these lead to the 
eventual take-over of private firms into public ownership. We exclude the 
traditional nationalized industries because of the wider scope of state 
regulation and different modes of operation in these activities (for 
example-, as 1 icensed-fflonopoii^s^-QT wi th c^os44eEa£-ions that- are pre- 
dominantly non-commercial),
Although most measures have more than one of the objectives specified 
above, we can group and classify them according to their principal object- 
ive Into the following categories: genc-al investment finance (see a) and 
b) above), industrial restructuring (see c) to e) above) and science and 
technology promotion policy (point f)). As a form of direct state inter- 
vention in private industry the following problems concern industrial 
policy and determine its effectiveness: a) the expansion of the state 
apparatus to carry out such a policy; b) the gathering and processing of 
Information to form a picture about the extent and type of problems that
need to be tackled and about the priorities expressed by representatives 
of Industry; c) the formulation of policy measures that are adequate and 
effective responses to problems and expressed priorities, and the learn- 
ing from experience by the state authorities as a method of poUcy Im- 
provements, d) the degree to which measures contain powers to influence 
and direct decision-making in private ffrms; e) the need to control and 
monitor progress in industry after use had been made of measures; f) the 
possible opposition and resistance by private firms to industrial policy 
which they may consider to be "outside" interference; g) the coordination 
of measures within industrial policy and also with other policies not only 
to maximize the overall effectiveness of economic pol.icy and its flexibil- 
ity, but also to avoid policy contradictions; and finally h) the extent to 
which industrial policy can be applied selectively, so as to differentiate 
between and correspond to the specific characteristics and needs of a 
firm's or a sector's production conditions. Each of these problems has 
played a major role in the evolutionary process of industrial policy. And 
each will contribute to the failure or success of any particular initiative 
in this area of policy-making.
With this preliminary clarification of the concept of "industrial 
policy" we can now proceed to discuss its application isn the form of diff- 
erent measures. But before that we will briefly deal with the internation- 
al dimension of industrial policy in as much as it concerns policy-making 
in the U.K.
3.3. The international Dimension of industrial Policy
Industrial policy has a much longer tradition and is more extensively 
applied in other countries, whilst in the U.K. this policy has only been 
fairly recently developed in response to unsatisfactory performance and 
growth in industry. In countries such as Austria, France and Italy, 
rapid growth of industry has resulted at least partially from the exten- 
sive involvement of the state in the private sector since the end of the 
war.
In Austria, for example, consistently high growth rates and invest- 
ment activity with expansion mostly in growth sectors and a strong export 
position have been achieved largely on the basis of successful develop- 
ment and marketing of specialized products. This strategy had been made 
possible by the combination of a very centralised and strongly state- 
controlled financial sector, a large public sector run strictly along
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comroercial lines, State-funds for specialised and applied R&D, and in par- 
ticular the very active public share-holding agency OelAG.
Italy has the most developed system of public share-holding agencies 
and industrial development banks. !RI was* founded in 1933 and, together 
with ENI, established in 135**, was until the late 1950's mostly concen- 
trated in basic industrial and natural-resources sectors. But its success
*
in running its industries profitably allowed, its gradual extension into 
building up import-saving and export-oriented growth industries or advanced 
technology sectors, such as communications equipment, computers, nuclear 
power plants, cars, aerospace. IRI has also been engaged in countercyclical 
investment activity during recessions (in particular between 1968 and 1971) 
and in bringing major investment projects to the less developed South. It 
has increased competition in otherwise extremely concentrated sectors, such 
as cars where it took over Alfa Romeo to challenge Fiat. It has also acted 
to prevent foreign take-overs in the food-processing and nuclear engineer- 
Ing Industries. ENI was initially formed to secure Italy's autonomy in the 
energy field. It was responsible for the exploitation of natural gas in 
Italy and for the importation, refining and distribution of oil and petro- 
leum products. Later it expanded into other sectors, such as the textile 
industry. GEPI, created in 1971 is primarily a state-holding agency pro- 
viding funds and organisational support for smaller and medium-sized firms 
In financial difficulties.
"Planification" In France has given the state apparatus wide central 
powers over industry to direct and distribute industry's investment activ- 
ity both sectorally and regionally. Until the early 60's this has been 
successful in reducing industrial backwardness through very rapid expan- 
sion. During the last 10 years industrial policy efforts have initiated 
large-scale restructuring and modernisation in several key sectors, such 
as Iron and steel. In addition "national champions" have been created 
through centralisation of production into one or two giant companies in 
high-technology growth sectors such as computers, aerospace and nuclear 
energy. The French state also extended its control over direct invest- 
ment of foreign multinational companies through state-supported joint 
ventures of these with French firms.
These few examples indicate that industrial policy is by no means an 
Isolated phenomenon in the U.K., but has been applied even more widely
I Q )
and earlier in other countries often with noticeable success.
A. WHITING (1976, p. A6) points out rightly that because of each 
country's specific industrial environment measures, which were successful
in one country, might not work anywhere else. Despite this limitation 
on the standardised use of policies across borders, industrial policy in 
the U.K. has been affected by measures being carried out elsewhere. For
example, the success of "planning" in France in the late 1950's was partly 
responsible for the adoption of "indicative planning" in the U.K. during 
the early 1960's. The extensive range of activities and intervention poss- 
ibilities of para-governmental agencies acting as holding companies or in- 
dustrial development banks in other countries certainly influenced to some 
extent U.K. policy-makers when they designed and then set up the National 
Enterprise Board (NEB) between 1973 and 1975.
Apart from specific measures in certain countries U.K. industrial pol- 
icy is increasingly also affected by the initiatives of the EEC-Commission. 
Despite the considerable powers given to the EEC Commission in the Treaty 
of Rome the EEC had made very little progress over the last 20 years. Its 
most serious constraint has been the principle of having to approve all 
major policy decisions of the EEC Council of Ministers on a unanimous basis 
rather than by majority vote. This has not only blocked many initiatives, 
but has made it nearly impossible for the EEC to move against the national 
Interests of any member state. But recently, and again as a result of the 
International recession, the EEC has become more activexand capable of 
undertaking its own industrial policy initiatives, especial.ly since the 
EEC Industry Directorate has now been upgraded. Under the new leadership 
of Industry Directorate Davignon the EEC Commission has been active over 
the last two years In setting up so-called "crisis cartels" in sectors 
which suffer in all member-states from long-run excess capacity and losses. 
These were made possible, because the overcapacity in those sectors threat- 
ened each member and its companies in the wake of massive losses and price- 
cutting. These cartels usually contain agreements by all EEC-firms cover- 
ing specified price and production levels, intra-EEC trade levels, quotas 
against imports from outside into the EEC, capacity reduction or limita- 
tions on expansion by firms, and sometimes even detailed outlines of major 
readjustment plans or proposals. The EEC Commission not only initiates, 
but also monitors these agreements, and can impose fines and other sanc- 
tions In case of violation. Such cartels now exist in synthetic fibres 
and steel, while similar proposals are currently in progress for ship- 
building and chemicals (especially plastics and base petrochemicals).
With Increasing competitive pressure from Japanese and U.S. compan- 
ies and because the scale of operations is moving more and more beyond 
the capacity of individual national firms, the EEC Commission has recently
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stepped up its efforts to promote joint ventures and collaborative agree- 
ments across national borders in the advanced technology and/or growth 
sectors, such as computers, aerospace, nuclear energy, cars, and tele- 
communications. Up to now this has brought results only on a very limited 
scale, but currently the Industry Directorate is working on a report on 
"growth industries" to launch more effective initiatives in this area. It 
also plans to expand the borrowing 1'imits and lending activity of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) which finances the EEC's social and regional 
funds, its industrial policy and loans to member countries in payments 
difficulties.
The key question concerning these initiatives by the EEC is whether 
they can prevent national industrial policy measures that are designed to 
support a member's own industry If necessary also against the interests of 
other EEC-members. It is not yet clear to what extent the authority of the 
EEC-officials will succeed in establishing control over national policy- 
making. Recently there have been a growing number of examples where indus- 
trial policy in the U.K. has come under attack from the EEC-commiss'ion, as 
for Instance, U.K.'s shipbuilding intervention fund to help its own uncom- 
petltive shipyards in getting orders from overseas through subsidies for 
artificially low prices, or its temporary employment subsidies for firms 
that give up redundancy plans, or in the debate as to whether U.K.'s aero- 
space Industry should reenter EEC's Airbus project or should link up with 
Boeing from the U.S.A. '' From the examples discussed in this section it 
Is safe to conclude that an international context exists for industrial 
policy and that U.K.'s own measures have already been affected by it in 
isolated cases. It is probable that future national industrial policy 
will be determined or at least influenced to a growing extent by supra- 
national forces, such as the EEC.
3.4. The era of "indicative planning" 1960-1966 as a transition period 
In the U.K. towards more direct state intervention in industry
3.A.I. The shift towards the idea of "planning" during 1959-1962
During the 13 cO's economic policy in the U.K. was based mainly on 
macro-economic demand management with the various Conservative Administra- 
tions refraining from direct intervention in industry. The emphasis was 
to minimise government interference with market forces: This was partly a
reaction to the use of wide-spread controls under the Labour Government in
/o\
the immediate post-war years 1945-51. The formulation of policies dur-
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ing the 1950's was almost entirely carried out by the Treasury-Bank of 
England nexus, reflecting the lack of any policies other than fiscal and 
monetary ones. As a result the economic policy priorities were strongly 
biased towards reflecting the interests of the financial sector to make 
the currency convertible, attract foreign depositors through high interest 
rates and a strong exchange rate and react with adequate policies against 
balance of payments deficits and/or international speculation, if those 
threatened the stability of the currency. In this way the international 
Importance of the City as a world financial centre and of the sterling as 
a world reserve currency could be maintained.
We have already mentioned above in sec. 2.2.*i. the institutional sep- 
aration and conflict of interests between private industry and the City as 
one element of structural weakness in the U.K. economy. This element was 
extended into policy-making. In the interests of the City periods of de- 
flation were necessary in an attempt to contain inflationary pressures and 
to prevent balance of payments crises from undermining confidence in sterl- 
ing. These were regularly interrupted by short-lived reflations to main- 
tain high employment and to increase the government's popularity with the 
electorate before elections. These "stop-go" cycles underscored, however, 
the inadequacy of the state apparatus and the lack of committment on the 
part of policy-makers to tackle the underlying problems in t industry. They 
also involved frequent policy reversals, a committment to keep the domes- 
tic level of interest-rates above that of other countries to attract depos- 
itors from overseas and an exchange-rate which in the interest of main- 
taining a "strong" currency led to cheapened imports and inflated export 
prices. The combined effect of all these consequences of "stop-go" policy 
was positively harmful to industry. As pointed out by J.C.R. Dow 0965, 
pp. 207"211), even depreciation allowances, compajny taxation and conditions
of borrowing from banks, which all affect investment finance, underwent
(9) frequent alterations as part of the "stop-go" cycles. '
In I960 pressures to alter this policy began to build up. The return 
to full convertibility of the currency in 1958 had been accompanied by 
three years of demand deflation. During that period other European econo- 
mies had expanded very rapidly. France, in particular, had been success- 
ful after establishing a system of "indicative planning". In the wake of 
yet another deflation the Federation of British Industries (.the predecess- 
or of the CBI) urged the Government in November 1960 to adopt a policy 
with growth as the top priority and within a "planning ahead"-framework 
to avoid rapid switches of policy. This position was reinforced by a re-
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port in 196l of the influential and usually conservative Council on Prices, 
Productivity and Incomes. The failure of exports to rise despite depressed 
demand conditions at home and buoyant world trade in 1960/61 and the 
sterling-crisis of July 1961 followed by additional deflation finally 
forced the Government to consider an alternative to its policy of reactive, 
destabilizing, short-run "stop-go" measures.
After exhaustive discussions with representatives from industry, 
including the TUC, the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) was 
finally set up in 1962 as a "planning bureau". The structure of the NEDC 
included a) the Council as the central tri-partite communication forum to 
formulate the overall direction of policies, b) the sector-specific and 
equally tri-partite Economic Development Committees (FOCs) to study partic- 
ular problems and growth conditions of industry on a sectoral basis, and 
c) the Office (NEDO) to carry out research work and act as a counter- 
weight to the Treasury. The NEDC-framework has since then managed to act 
as a communication network between industry and government ensuring an 
ongoing and continuous dialogue between all parties concerned. As such it 
also became the principal body within the state apparatus to gather infor- 
mation on the problems of industry and the specific constraints, weakness- 
es and needs of different sectors within industry. At the time of its est- 
ablishment it filled a major gap in the state apparatus which up to then 
had not been equipped to carry out analyses of industry's activities in 
order to develop policy measures in response to identified difficulties. 
The NEDO thus opened up the era of "indicative planning" in the U.K. 
After setting a growth target of p.a. with approval from the Government, 
industrial inquiries were carried out in various key sectors to study the 
implications of the growth target in the production sphere. These inquir- 
ies were subsequently expanded into EDCs and v/ere thus given a more perm- 
anent existence. On the basis of this concerted effort to analyse the 
underlying difficulties of U.K. industry it published its first report, 
NEDC (1963 A), which was subsequently supplemented by NEDC (1963 B), con- 
taining policy recommendations with regard to such matters as education, 
labour mobility, taxation, balance of payments, regional development, etc. 
Subsequently NEDC (196*0 dealt with ways to increase exports. Although the 
Government did not commit itself to carrying out any of the proposals of 
NEDC's "Plan", the latter had some limited impact on economic policy- 
making. The *»%-growth target was accepted marking a shi.ft in policy 
priorities towards growth followed by demand reflation. The Board of 
Trade responsible for sponsoring private industry was strengthened and
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thus became the first inside-challenge to Treasury-Bank of England control 
over the formulation of policies within the state apparatus. '
3.*4.2. The National Plan
Labour's election victory In 196*t ensured a significant expansion of 
"indicative planning". Even before the NEDC-structure was set up, Labour 
had undertaken a first commitment to planning in H. WILSON (1961). In H. 
WILSON 0962) and T. BALOGH (1962) it had attacked NEDC's "plan" as too 
weak, too general, and ineffective because of lack of government commit- 
ment to specific policy actions. Economists and businessmen sympathetic 
to Labour Party policies argued, as for example in T. BALOGH (1963), 
LORD SAINSBURY 096*0 and R. HARROD (196*0, for a more extensive form of 
"planning" carried out by the Government itself with a commitment to under- 
take specific actions. And in a series of pre-election speeches the Labour 
Party developed a comprehensive "new policy" program around a "plan" which 
included support for science and technology, incomes policy, and incentives 
to accelerate modernisation of industry.
After the election the necessary changes in the state apparatus were 
carried out in order to diversify the process of economic policy formula- 
tion beyond the Treasury. The Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) was 
set up to carry out the planning exercise, the Ministry of Technology 
(Min Tech) was created to promote science and technology, and incomes pol- 
icy became the responsibility of the new National Beard for Prices and 
Incomes (NBPI). Using the NEDC-structure and the concept of Industrial 
Inquiries to study on a sectoral basis the likely consequences and problems 
of trying to achieve a specified growth target, the DEA finally published 
In September 1965 the "National Plan" (see DEA (1965)) as the climax of 
these "planning" efforts.
On the basis of a growth target of 3-8% p.a. for 196*4-70 the Plan set 
sub-targets for investment, productivity, exports, etc. The findings of 
the Industrial Inquiries formed the basis for specific policy initiatives, 
summed up in a "check list of actions" (pp. 17-21). Each particular 5et 
of policies, such as manpower policy, investment, prices and incomes poli- 
cy, measures to contain the balance of payments problems, regional policy, 
was then dealt with in separate chapters. Part Two of the Plan contained 
the Industrial Inquiry Reports on different sectors.
Although the Plan was to be only a relatively short-lived exercise 
and considered as such a failure, it was in retrospect nevertheless an 
important step in the evolution of industrial policy in the U.K. It pro-
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vided the first detailed and sectoral inquiry by Government into the prob- 
lems of private industry and identified in DEA (1965. pp. M», pp. 55, 62- 
6*0 the lack of adequate investment and of industrial efficiency as key 
constraints on growth. It concluded the accelerating shift away from the 
previous economic policy of "stop-go." As an alternative to sole reliance 
on fiscal and monetary policies it proposed the expansion of the state 
apparatus and range of new economic policies to allow for direct and sel- 
ective state intervention in private industry, with higher economic growth 
as the top policy priority. The Plan thus prepared the ground and acted as 
a catalyst for the actual carrying out of new types of policy, such as in- 
comes, manpower, regional, and industrial policy, after 196V65. The mea- 
sures proposed in the Plan and subsequently introduced had a life-span 
beyond that of the Plan, and in many cases they formed the basis for con- 
tinued expansion and refinement of policy-making.
But the Plan also had serious shortcomings. Its insights into the 
depth and complexity of industry's problems were admitted to be limited. 
This is why it emphasised the need for further EDCs to be set up in many 
more sectors in a fact-finding and policy-recommend ing role (p. f). 
The whole question of inadequate investment levels, for instance, was 
dealt with only in relation to external constraints (regional balance, 
other demands on resources, output target) without analysing the internal 
conditions determining investment decisions, as done in Ch. 2 (.see p. 55}.
The Plan had neither a fully worked-out strategy nor a defined con- 
cept for industrial pqlicy. Its various areas of intervention (see our 
definition in sec. 3-2.) were treated by the Plan in isolation from each 
other without connecting them into an overall approach. Instead areas, 
like efficiency in industry, technological change and investment, were 
understood and rationalised sole'/ in relation ta external factors, such 
as the need to reduce the balance of payments deficit. While there was 
general agreement that efficiency, capacity utilisation or the industrial 
structure all needed to be improved, there was no attempt to analyse why 
these were unsatisfactory in U.K. industry.
In addition policy recommendations were mostly expansions of already 
existing policies or leaned on already previously developed idecs. "Indic- 
ative planning 11 itself was borrowed initially as an Idea from France and 
then institutionalised by the Conservatives. Labour only expanded it. 
The same was true for the NEDC and its EDCs which it had inherited from t!~e 
previous administration, but which had been unsuccessfully proposed as 
early as 19*»8 (see footnote 8). The proposed Selective'Employment Tax (SET)
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can be traced back to a discussion on a payroll tax in 1961. With regard 
to Investment Incentives and company taxation the Plan proposed only 
reforms of already established systems.
The really innovative initiatives, which in the coming years became 
the central parts of industrial policy, were at this stage (1964/65) still 
only very vaguely formulated intentions. The policy towards science and 
technology, although often mentioned, relied in this early phase mostly on 
expanding the resources of already existing research bodies and on reducing 
defence R&D in favour of civil R&D. The Government had at that point al- 
ready set up Min Tech, but had only given it largely co-ordinating and in- 
formation providing powers, while keeping its intervention powers in spe- 
cific industries initially to a minimum. The phenomenal expansion of Mm 
Tech's influence and range of intervention began only after mid-1966. The 
IRC, after 1966 the centrepiece of industrial policy, was confined to a 
very short and vague reference in the Plan (p. 49).
Not surprisingly, the Plan did not define the concept of "Industrial 
Policy." The term is used only in reference to measures relating to im- 
port substitution, standardisation, rationalisation and export promotion 
(pp. 46-48). Measures aiming at an increase of overall investment activity 
were excluded and instead termed "investment policy" (pp. 62-64), while 
science and technology-related measures were also seen as distinct from 
industrial policy (pp. 48-51).
The most widely discussed criticism of the Plan addressed the nature 
of "indicative planning" itself. Such a method of planning gave the Gov- 
ernment neither sufficient powers of implementation nor controls to deter- 
mine decision-making in private industry and thus ensure the realisation 
of the planned targets. Instead the Plan merely "indicated" to industry 
how much investment was required and which bottlenecks had to be overcome 
in order to achieve the growth target. Unlike "regulatory planning" the 
Plan's only powers lay in persuasion, in the creation of confidence and in 
raising expectations designed to produce a change of attitude within in- 
dustry. From this should follow efforts to achieve a higher growth rate. 
Industrialists, however, did not have to commit themselves to any particu- 
lar action and were free to ignore the Plan altogether. It was therefore 
not surprising that up to 1970 none of the targets (except productivity) 
were actually met   a clear indication of the limited impact of merely 
indicative planning on industry. ' The Government itself abandoned the 
Plan de facto in July 1966 when another sterling crisis led once again to 
the adoption of deflation measures. These buried any remaining hopes of
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achieving the Plan's growth target.
The real importance of the Plan was not in-terms of its direct re- 
sults. As the climax of the "indicative planning" era as a transition
period of change in economic policy-thinking the Plan's historic signif- 
icance was that it spelled out the Government's commitment to implement
for the first time new forms of policy, including industrial policy, which
(12) 
from then on became significant features of overall policy-making.
CHAPTER THE AREAS OF INTERVENTION AND OBJECTIVES OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Our analysis in Ch. 2 of the production conditions in U.K. private 
industry identified the lack of adequate levels of investment to carry out
large-scale modernisation and capacity expansion and the existing limita-\
tions on efficient organisation of production as two main problems with 
adverse consequences for domestic growth and international competitive- 
ness. Defining the concept of "industrial policy" as a series of policy 
measures designed to deal with these problems and the underlying factors 
that cause them, we distinguished in sec. 3-2. such measures according to 
their specific objectives to assist private companies in their attempts to 
improve their respective production conditions in different ways. We con- 
cluded that industrial policy measures focused either on (internal or ex- 
ternal) investment finance, industrial restructuring (of single firms or 
whole sectors), or more rapid and widespread application of new technology 
in production. In all these areas of intervention policy-makers will aim 
to introduce measures which are expected to have a beneficial impact on 
business confidence and thus influence managerial decisions in a desired 
direction. This latter objective has, as we shall see in the following 
sections below, frequently been a major factor in determining new policy 
Initiatives and their particular form and content.
Such categorisation of industrial policy according to objectives not 
only serves the purpose of structuring the arguments of our analysis, but 
reflects also the actual evolution of the policy during the 19^0's. As 
pointed out in sec. 3.^.2., the Labour Government did not start out with 
an integrated concept cf "industrial policy," nor did it present in the 
National Plan of 1965 a coherent and coordinated strategy of direct state 
intervention in private industry. Instead the Plan proposed sets of mea- 
sures to deal separately with the problems of industrial restructuring and 
efficiency, investment activity, and technological change. Consequently
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policy initiatives after 1965, reflecting this lack of coordination and 
this degree of separation, remained in their initial stages of implemen- 
tation confined to either one of these categories, as discussed more ex- 
tensively in Ch. 4 below. The development of industrial policy towards 
more far-reaching measures with multiple objectives that cut across these 
categories was therefore a gradual process. As pointed out in Ch. 5, it 
did not fully materialise until the Industry Act 1972 , although the est- 
ablishment of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) in 1966 and 
the enactment of the Industrial Expansion Act 1968 were major steps in 
this direction. This is why we discuss in Ch. 4 the various industrial 
policy measures of the 1960's and their succeeding initiatives and modi- 
fications during the 197C's in separate categories according to their diff- 
erent objectives, while focussing in Ch. 5 on the expansion of industrial 
policy since 1972 through multi-objective measures.
4.1. Measures to increase investment finance
4.1.1. Labour's Reforms 1965/66
The measures to increase sources of finance are confined in their 
objective to raise the amount of funds available to private firms and to 
Influence corporate decision-making by linking the level of benefits to 
expenditure on fixed assets. These measures consisted up to 1964 princi- 
pally of: a) changes in the level and in the structure of profits taxa- 
tion to increase profit retention as a form of internal investment 
finance; b) depreciation allowances which allow firms to set a specified 
amount of their investment expenditure against their taxes; c) the 
supply of funds for investment projects in industry through financial 
Institutions, namely the ICFC end the FCI, which were partly Owned by the 
Bank of England and were thus only to a limited extent policy instru- 
ments.'
One of Labour's first initiatives after 1964 in the area of indus- 
trial policy aimed at a substantial reform of these measures. In April 
1965 the previous system of taxing profits through a combination of the 
income tax at the standard rate and a profits tax was replaced with a new 
Corporation Tax. Under the previous system any change in the income tax 
also affected company taxation and had to be compensated by a change in 
the profits tax. With the new tax wage-earners and companies were taxed 
separately which was seen as a step towards potentially greater distribu- 
tional equity and simpler administration. But more importantly, the re-
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form was to encourage the retention of profits by double-taxing dividends. 
With industrial investment in the U.K. mostly self-financed such a move 
was intended to raise the proportion of internally generated funds avail- 
able for investment expenditure.
Between April 1958 and April 1965 both retained and distributed pro- 
fits had been taxed- at the same rate which before the 1965 reform had 
stood at 53*75%. With the new Corporation Tax retained profits were only 
to be taxed at *iO%, while share-holders had to pay twice for dividends 
received: A0% corporation tax plus the income tax standard rate of 38.75% 
on the remaining 60%, giving a tax total of 63-25%.
The objective of this new tax, namely to lower industry's pay-out 
ratio and to encourage a larger retention of profits, seems, however, not 
to have been met. Empirical evidence suggests that dividends were not 
lowered. They continued to grow between 196^ and 1969 by about the same 
amount as undistributed income before depreciation and stock appreciation. 
The only major effect of the tax differential might have been to redistri- 
bute post-tax profits to firms with a low pay-out ratio that were growing 
rapidly and needed high profit retention to finance their capacity expan-
The 1965 Reform also abolished tax exemption for overseas profits in 
order to discourage U.K. firms from investing abroad. In isolated in- 
stances this might have instigated companies to expand domestic capacity as 
an alternative to overseas investment, as was for example the case with 
the British Aluminum Corporation's decision in 1968 to build an aluminum 
smelter in the U.K. Combined with the old'and at that time still operating 
system of allowances the new Corporation Tax at **0% reduced the value of 
investment incentives because of the lower tax liability base. Hence, 
while profits were taxed at a lower rate, the incentives to invest in the 
form of allowances at any given rate declined as well, because there was 
less profit tax to deduct them from. Only when the Labour Government com- 
pleted its reform in January 1966 by replacing investment allowances with 
Investment Grants were the benefits to industry restored to at least pre- 
vious levels (see D.E.A. (1966)).
Although the grants were set initially at a level (national rate of 
20% of capital expenditure incurred), which in absolute terms did not yield 
noticeably larger benefits to industry, they were for a number of reasons 
designed to make the incentive system more effective. First of all, many 
firms did not take investment allowances into account when deciding where 
and how much to invest. This is clearly a consequence of management ineff-
iciency (discussed above in subsection 2.3-2.5), expressed In this partic- 
ular case by the widespread failure In U.K. industry to use more sophisti-
-ated investment appraisal methods that allow for the calculation of incen- 
ives to be included in investment decision-making. It was hoped thit
r irms would take more notice of grants than of tax allowances with a con- 
equently stronger impact of incentives on investment decisions. Further- 
ore, by making incentives Independent of the achievement: of profits,
.rants gave firms a higher degree of certainty that they would reaily be 
ible to take full advantage of the Incentives offered. Because of this
independency the grant system aided In particular small but rapidly ex-
-andlng firms whose investment needs exceeded .their capacity to generate 
profits and cash flow. Under the old system these finr.s could not take
*"ull advantage of the available benefits, as their profit tax liabilities 
vere smaller than the sum total of their allowances. Thus part of the 
allowances were either lost or had to be deducted later with Inflation 
eroding their value in the meantime. For the same reason the new system 
as more capable of encouraging new entrants Into industry, which usually 
ake time to achieve profitability, but on the other hand face Immediate 
nvestment expenditure. And investment projects with a long gestation 
erlod and other high-risk projects benefltted therefore from the new 
system as well. In general, grants allowed for a speedier recovery of 
cash, and firms did not have to wait for profits, before they could make 
;se of the Investment Incentive. Thus the new grant system helped es- 
pecially those firms and projects with the most likely cash problems and 
'he greatest difficulties In getting support from banks or the equity 
narket.
An additional advantage of the new grant system was the flexibility
*or the policy-maker to use It selectively. Under the Industrial Oevelop-
 7»eot Act 1966 grants were set at *»0$ (of capital expenditure) for invest- 
<^nt in U.K.'s development areas to encourage investment especially In 
^pressed regions. As In the case of the SET later the grants discrimin- 
-fid In favour of manufacturing and against the service sector whose only 
;neflt was a 30% Initial allowance. Tne system was also used to support 
e manufacturers of such Items, as computers, ships, and hovercraft ve- 
icles, which qualified for grants as well. Special assistance tn that 
iy was also given to Investment In plant and machinery for the purposes
scientific research which besides grants enjoyed also a 100$ write off- 
lit ia! allowance.
Sec. 8(2) of the 1966 Act demanded from applying firms the provision
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to the Board of Trade (and later Min Tech) of information on the project 
for assessment. Sec. 8(5) entitled the Government to authorise inspectors 
with power to enter and inspect any premises where the asset in question 
was supposedly installed. And Sec. 8(6) regulated offences, proceedings 
and fines. Thus the grants increased the degree of monitoring by the 
Government with regard to the use of public funds in private industry. 
For all these advantages over the old system the grant system in- 
volved major expenditure of state funds. The annual total payments for 
investment grants increased steadily from k288 m. in 1967/68 (the first 
full year under the scheme) to h544 m. in 1970/71 with a constant decline 
afterwards as a result of a decision by the newly elected Conservative 
Government in 1970 to phase the scheme out. The distribution of grant 
payments is specified in Table 4.1. below. 
Table 4.1.: Investment Grant Payments 1967/68 - 1972/73 (in h '000)
Plant and Machinery
(sec. 1 of Industrial 
Development Act 1966)
a) manufacturing, ship 
repairing and 
generation of energy
b) extraction of 
minerals
c) construction and 
civil engineering
Totals a) - c) 
Special Qualifying Assets
a) Computers (sec. 2)
b) Hovercraft (sec. 3)
c) Ships (sec. 5)
d) Mining Works (sec. 6) 
Total
standard 
rate
947,401
42,738
88,686
1,078,825
development 
area rate
1,045,779
42,293
38,392
1,126,464
total
1,993,180
85,031
127,0.78
2,205,289
140,821
2,182
394,166
35,525
4,224
nil
nil
8,958
145,045
2,182
394,166
44,483
1,651,519 1,139,646 2,791,165
SOURCE: Dfi (1973 A , App. C, p. 36 )
Hence, the grant system cost between 1967/68 and 1972/73 h2.8bn. with
over 40% of it spent for investment in the development areas.
In evaluating the impact of this expensive scheme on investment be- 
haviour we have found the various econometric studies because of their 
restrictive stochastic assumptions concerning the estimation of invest-
ment behaviour and the often admitted difficulty in fin'ding adequate data 
to be only of limited usefulness. Other studies, such, as G.C. HARCOURT 
(1966) and T. STARK (1966) compared the grant system with the old system 
of allowances by comparing their effects on the DCF-value of specified 
Investment projects. On that basis they both found that grants should 
have slightly more impact on the level of investment activity. But given 
the limited use of the DCF-method in industry there are considerable 
doubts whether firms acted as these studies predicted.
The initial reaction by representatives of industry was scepticism 
and opposition. "Unfair discrimination" and fear about delays and admin- 
istrative uncertainties were frequent worries. They were expressions of 
Industry's suspicions towards Labour's return to office after 13 years 
in opposition and of its hostility against the then still unusual use of 
grants as a form of assistance and of selective intervention. Later, how-
ro\
ever, many firms favoured grants over allowances. ' Both G.C. Harcourt 
09661 and T. Stark 0966} showed that grants were more beneficial than 
allowances even for profitable firms and projects with high rates of 
return which countered the frequent objection that grants promote non- 
profitable investment.
The selective use of the grant system certainly ha.d some beneficial 
effects. Evidence from the Expenditure Committee 0972) and DTI (1970, 
para. 8) suggests that grants for ships helped the order books of ship- 
building firms. Of similar help were grants pa.id for the purchase of 
computers. ICL estimated in SCST (1971, vol. 2, Q. 887-8) that without 
grants the computer market would have been'reduced by 20% in 1971. Other 
computer firms confirmed that grants helped their cash flow positions 
(ibid., vol. 1, para. 150). P.V. ELLIS (1969, p. 186) pointed out that 
because of grants computer firms could reduce the proportion of equipment, 
which had to be rented rather than sold, and thus also increase their cash 
flow further. The study by Min Tech 0970) found that firms responsible 
for over 50% of the investment covered by its survey increased capacity 
and capital expenditure In the development areas because of the regional 
grant differential. But, as argued by D. BURN (1970, p. 51) many of the 
projects in the development areas were capital-intensive, as those types 
of investment benefi tted especially from the higher grant rate. Therefore 
the grants had very little effect in raising employment levels in those 
regions.
Finally, A. Graham (1972, p. 206) notes that despite pessimistic 
forecasts investment in manufacturing fell much less in the recession
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1967 and also in 1968/69 than in previous cyclical downturns. This, he 
argues, may very well have been as a direct result of the grant scheme -- 
a point made also repeatedly in the evidence presented in Expenditure 
Committee (1972).
We can safely conclude from the evidence mentioned that grants were 
more effective in promoting investment than the previous combination of 
initial and investment allowances. From the point of view of the evolu- 
tion of industrial policy their introduction established the concept of 
grants as a form of assistance which in the light of its later expansion 
was an important step. Equally significant was the concept of selective 
intervention applied for the first time through the grant scheme. On the 
other hand it was a very expensive scheme and it is far from clear whether 
Its impact justified the costs.
J|.1.2. Policy Changes under the Conservatives 1970-7**
When returning to office, the Conservatives (as part of a more funda- 
mental reversal of Labour's policies, discussed below in sec. 5-1) decided 
to phase out the grant scheme. This step was justified on the grounds of 
Its public expenditure costs, its preference for "uneconomic investment", 
tts "unjustifiable discrimination" and its administrative burden on the 
government (see DTI (1970), para. 2). Instead a first-year initial allow- 
ance of 35% and a writing-down allowance of (valid already from first 
year of expenditure onwards) was introduced so that 60% of capital expen- 
diture could be written off immediately and of the reduced balance of 
expenditure successively in later years. Discrimination in favour of the 
assisted areas was maintained by allowing free depreciation for expendi- 
ture on new plant and machinery and a higher initial allowance on indus- 
trial buildings. Free depreciation, where firms were free to choose the 
timing of claiming their allowances, and which took mostly the form of a 
100$ Initial allowance, was also provided across the U.K. as a whole for 
ships and capital expenditure on scientific research.
These changes of policy were clearly disadvantagous to industry. A. 
Brown calculated with the DCF-method that on a five-year project with a 
10% expected return the grant-scheme resulted in a post-tax return of 19% 
while the new allowances only gave a 10%. On the basis of the same pro- 
ject the old scheme gave h156 worth of incentives by moving into a devel- 
opment area for each hlOO worth of incentives outside the assisted areas, 
compared to only hi 11 under the new system (see Expenditure Committee 
(1972 , vol. 3, Q. 2766-2768)). With such a reduction in the benefits of
the regional differential it was not surprising that the number of in- 
quiries by industrialists about investment into the assisted areas fell 
from 2*400 in first quarter of 1970, when grants were still in full oper- 
ation, to only 1083 one year later (after grants had started to be phased 
out) (see Trade and Industry, 19/5/1971, p. 352). The Government openly 
admitted that this change had led to a "liquidity gap" which was to be 
compensated by a staged reduction of the Corporation Tax rate by 5% (see 
Trade and Industry, T»A/1971, P- 70).
When investment activity in 1971 and 1972 was significantly lower 
than in previous years (as indicated in Table 2.**) pressure grew on the 
Government to reverse its policy on incentives once again to provide 
larger benefits to investing firms. After gradually increasing the rates 
of the various allowances from the summer of 1971 onwards it extended 
free depreciation (100% initial allowance) 'from the assisted areas to the 
whole of the U.K. According to the survey by Min Tech (1970) this form 
of incentive is even more popular with private firms than grants.
On top of this firms were to receive a Regional Development Grant 
(Part 1 of the Industry Act 1972) of 20% in the Development Areas and 22% 
in the newly created Special Development Areas for expenditure on both 
Industrial buildings and plant and machinery. In the 1972 Budget the 
Corporation Tax system was reformed to end discrimination against divi- 
dends. Under the new so-called "imputation system" a firm paid one single 
basic tax rate for all profits, whether retained or distributed. In the 
case of dividends it paid in addition an Advance Corporation Tax measured 
by reference to the amount of profits distributed during the financial 
year which could later be set off against the regular corporation tax. 
The reform included also a lower tax for the profits of small firms which 
introduced a series of measures up to 1978 aimed at easing the tax burden 
on smaller firms.
These measures more than compensated industry for the decline of 
benefits caused by the abolition of the grant scheme and the reintroduc- 
tion of depreciation allowances in 1970. They established the most exten- 
sive system of incentives so far: free depreciation, which provides for 
speeJy recovery of benefits, easy administration and maximum flexibility 
for firms to optimize the timing of their claims, supported by the return 
of a grant scheme applied for investment in assisted areas. The double- 
reversal by the Conservative Government reflects, together with other sim- 
ilar examples, the failure of the "disengagement" strategy with its 
emphasis on reducing the role of the state in favour of market forces.
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The recession of 1971/72 forced the return to a more pragmatic approach 
and justified the existence and extension of industrial policy. Further- 
more the importance of experience with previous measures for the formula- 
tion of subsequent policies, which was a-vital element in the development 
of industrial policy, was once more underlined here.
4.1.3- The extension of measures under the Labour Government 1S74-78
In principle the system of incentives established in 1972 was pre- 
served by the Labour Government. During 197^/75, however, U.K. firms 
faced, over a wide range of sectors, their worst liquidity crisis since 
the depression of 1929-1934 (see Table 2.4). Not only had profitability 
declined considerably and the debt burden increased (see 2.2.4.), bur 
accelerating inflation had rapidly pushed up the replacement cost of fixed 
assets and of stock. Representatives from industry started a publicity 
campaign on the basis that inflation seriously distorted the level of 
"real" profits. The method of calculation based on historic cost was 
seriously underestimating the value of capital stock and reducing the real 
value of investment incentives. The profits made on stock appreciation 
should not be considered real as stocks will eventually have to be re- 
placed at higher cost.
As a result of the liquidity shortage and these arguments the Govern- 
ment introduced in November 1974 stock relief to exclude profits made on 
holding stocks now worth more because of inflation from the corporation 
tax. Between 1974 and 1977 this measure alone was estimated to have re- 
duced the tax liability of U.K. firms by a,bout h3 bn. To correct the 
overestimation of profits by valuing capital stock at historic cost ignor- 
ing the fact that the replacement of assets has become much costlier, a
public debate was started to introduce a system of inflation accounting.
 
Progress in this direction of replacing the historic cost-method with one 
that is based on current cost has been slow. Under the presently adopted 
Hyde guidelines firms publish three figures in their accounts to correct 
their profits for the impact of inflation. Once the current cost account- 
Ing method is fully established, it will further reduce the tax liability 
of profits. The most ambitious recent initiatives in the area of increas- 
ing Investment finance concerned the institutional relationship between 
private industry and the financial sector. In Ch. 2 we identified this as 
an element of structural weakness in the U.K. economy. The much closer 
relationship between banks and industry has most likely contributed to the 
high growth rates of the German and Japanese economies.. This shifted the
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attention in the U.K. to the availability of long-term borrowing faciii-
(9) ties for industry.
During 1975/76 political pressure by the unions and from within the 
Labour Party (with a National Executive Counci1-proposal to nationalise 
the largest banks and insurance companies) against the City and for grow- 
ing government intervention in financing investment increased. In re- 
sponse to this and in the aftermath of the liquidity crisis of 197^/75 the 
Government decided in 1976 to set up a "Committee to review the function- 
ing of the financial institutions," chaired by Sir Harold Wilson. On the 
basis of evidence from all parties concerned and research studies the 
Committee is undertaking a detailed study of the relation between finan- 
cial institutions and industry with a final report expected for 1979- In 
the interim report of December 1977 the Committee discussed the lack of 
external finance for small firms, the growing power of investing institu- 
tions, such as pension funds and investment trusts, and their threat to 
the proper functioning of the stock-market, and the limits and difficulties 
for industry to get long-term funds at reasonable rates. While noting 
that there was otherwise no shortage of funds for industry, the evidence 
presented reveals a lack of communication between industry and lenders, a 
strong risk aversity of companies to borrow extensively and of banks to 
lend for projects with uncertain outcomes. Furthermore, compared to other 
countries such as Germany and Japan, U.K. financial institutions are re- 
sisting involvement in industrial management, such as holding equity, ap- 
pointing directors, or evaluating projects for possible support.
It Is yet unclear what the results an.d effects of the inquiry will be 
In the end and what policy initiatives will follow from it. The TUC de- 
mands the establishment of a tl bn. investment fund, financed partly out 
of industry's profits and partly with public money to support projects and 
companies with long-run viability but la^k of institutional support. More 
likely Is the establishment of a central monitoring commission with par- 
ticipants from industry, finance houses and the Government to look after 
the various aspects of the City's activities. More minor institutional 
changes and adjustments in certain specific areas, such as special lending 
facilities for small firms, wil! probably be recommended as well. The 
Inquiry is, however, not expected to have the far-reaching implications 
for U.K.'s financial and policy-making institutions of the report by the 
Macmlllan Committee on Finance and Industry in 1931, in which the Govern- 
ment's goals and control mechanisms in the sphere of monetary policy were 
defined for the first time.
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4.1.1*. Concluding remarks
The measures discussed above under the category of the general pro- 
vision of investment finance have, in relation to the expansion of other 
parts of industrial policy, become increasingly less important. Their 
impact on raising the level of investment activity was always hampered by 
a variety of factors, such as their dependency on the extent to which 
firms respond to the benefits offered. Nevertheless, their evolution 
reflects some of the most important problems involved in the formulation 
of industrial policy.
One of these problems concerns the ability of policy-makers to in- 
fluence management decision-making. In the case of investment incentives 
private firms have complete power to determine on their own whether and to 
what extent to use benefits. Given the already discussed lack of use of 
effective investment appraisal methods the entirely voluntary character 
of these measures left the Government with little power to extend the use 
of benefits against this constraint of management inefficiency. The mea- 
sures were also restricted because they allowed little public monitoring 
over the choice and realisation of investment projects by private firms. 
Thefr degree of selectivity to take into account different production 
conditions in specific sectors was very limited. All these factors (pub- 
lic control, monitoring, selective use) are important conditions for any 
effective industrial policy measures. And in all these aspects general 
Investment incentives were less developed and forceful than the subse- 
quent measures. Given these limits they are by and large a very expensive 
method of assisting private industry.
The various reforms and changes made with regard to investment incen- 
tives are also indicative of the forces that determined the evolution of 
Industrial policy as a whole. For instance, drastic changes and reversals 
characterised not only this group of measures, but were a destabilising 
element on a more general scale. Investment incentives during the 1950's 
frequently had their rates varied in the wake of short-run stop-go policy 
considerations. After 1965/66 not only rates, but the whole system of 
incentives was repeatedly altered. The discontinuity of measures and/or 
shor«--run changes i,i the levels of benefits considerably reduced the pre- 
dictability and security required In long-run investment planning.
On the other hand, with a more interventionistic policy and improved 
Information gathering, measures, such as the grant scheme, could be intro- 
duced that were considerably more suited to meet industry's needs and had 
a greater impact on firms. In addition, despite the uneven application of
these measures, policy-makers managed to expand, refine and coordinate 
them ultimately into a comprehensive system of free depreciation and 
grants. This gradual evolution of policy measures towards a higher level 
of Integration, despite temporary interruptions, was typical of industrial 
policy as a whole between 1965 and 1978.
4.2. Measures to encourage "industrial restructuring" in the 1960' s
4.2.1. Introductory remarks on the SET and the Shipbuilding 
Industry Act 196?
After the "indicative planning" era ended with the deflation measures 
in July 1966 and even more after the sterling devaluation of November 1967 
raised the potential for increasing exports and import substitution the 
Labour Government shifted its attention and policy efforts towards pro- 
moting directly the reorganisation and modernisation of private industry. 
This area of industrial policy, known as "industrial restructuring," in- 
volved measures aimed at facilitating changes in the production conditions 
of various industrial sectors that would lead to higher production effi- 
ciency, modernised production processes, a more rational range of prod- 
ucts and better management quality as means to higher growth and improved 
international competitiveness within U.K. industry. This shift of empha- 
sis marked a turning-point in the evolution of industrial policy. Previ- 
ously that policy was confined mostly to information-gathering (NEDO, 
National Plan) and financial support to industry through general invest- 
ment incentives which involved only a limrted degree of selectivity, pub- 
lic control, monitoring, and influence over management decisions. Mea- 
sures in this category, however, expressed a more directly intervention- 
istlc, selective and forceful policy approach towards industry's problems, 
carried at the level of individual firms or sectors. Financial aid was in 
general made conditional on some specified course of action by the compan- 
ies affected and was not any longer the prime objective and end in itself, 
but became the means to realise other objectives. In addition public 
monitoring and follow-up checks to evaluate the progress made and to see 
a project through as intended were also emphasised. All these character- 
istics increased the power and control of policy-makers over the use of 
public funds by private firms.
The Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967, one of the measures in this cat- 
egory, was based on a detailed Parliamentary Inquiry into that declining 
sector tn which a strategy of reorganisation was spelled out (in the
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Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Shipbuilding Industry, Cmnd. 
2937, 1966). It established the first sector-specific para-government-:}) 
agency, the Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB), for the purpose of carry- 
ing out and supervising the restructuring of a particular industry. It 
was the first example of a coherent government strategy, combining a ser- 
ies of different measures, for a single sector outside the "advanced tech- 
nology" industries. And its subsequent failure to achieve the intended 
results provides important insights with regard to the limitations and 
difficulties, but also potential of industrial policy. For all these 
reasons measures concerning the Shipbuilding Industry will be discussed 
more fully as a case-study in sec. 6.1.
Another measure concerning "industrial restructuring" was the Select- 
ive Employment Tax (SET). This will be dealt with here only briefly be- 
cause of its limited importance for subsequent industrial policy develop- 
ments and its lack of lasting impact on industry. As a tax on the employ- 
ment of labour it was introduced in 1966 primarily to broaden the State's 
revenue base. It gave manufacturing industry a refund in excess of the 
Initially paid tax (in other words, a premium to firms for the employment 
of labour), but at the same time did not piovide the service sector (and 
construction) with any refund. One reason for this selective discrimina- 
tion was to compensate manufacturing industry for its relatively heavier 
tax burden based on indirect taxes that did not apply to the service sec- 
tor. As a measure promoting "industrial restructuring" it was the brain- 
child of N. Kaldor who at that time was economic advisor to the Labour 
Government. His work, as pointed out above in sec. 1.2, concentrated then 
on the role of manufacturing as a source of higher productivity and for 
that reason also of higher growth. In this context the SET was designed 
to d) induce labour-saving in the service sector to improve productivity 
and. growth there and b) to redeploy within manufacturing labour set free 
from the service sector as an incentive for capacity expansion.
In assessing SET's effects it seems to have increased productiv r ty 
both by improving efficiency in the service sector and also by shifting to 
some limited degree output into industries with high productivity levels. 
But the precise extent of this effect is hard to calculate and was the 
subject of heated debate. It is also likely that the SET somewhat slowed 
down the expansion of.the service sector's output share while increasing 
manufacturing's share in total output and employment. But the actual 
shift of labour from services into manufacturing was probably rather mini- 
mal. Instead the SET caused a reduction of vacancies in the service sec-
tor This meant that the labour typically shed in manufacturing during 
recessions was no longer after 1966 finding employment in the services 
sector, but remained unemployed or dropped out of the labour market alto- 
gether. Such a hypothesis identifies the SET as one contributory factor 
in the above-trend rise, of unemployment and the remarkable decline by over 
1/2 m. workers employed in the private sector during 1966-70. Its overall 
impact, however, seems both in terms of productivity gains and labour market 
shifts to have been rather insignificant. It was certainly a very 
indirect method to achieve a shift of resources between sectors and to 
improve productivity and growth. In 1971 it was abolished as part of the 
"disengagement" of the Conservatives.
We will now discuss in some detail the two other measures established 
by Labour during the 1360"s in this area of intervention, namely the IRC 
and the Industrial Expansion Act 1968.
The establishment of the IRC as a para-governmental agency
The termination of the planning exercise in mid-1966 left the govern- 
ment without any significant policy tool to intervene in the production 
conditions of private industry on a major scale. In particular there was 
no policy measure capable of promoting industrial restructuring. To fill 
this gap rapidly the Government decided to accelerate the setting up of 
the IRC. Hardly mentioned in the National Plan previously and still only 
very briefly and tentatively outlined in a White Paper at the beginning 
of 1966 (Cmnd.2889, Jan. 1966), the IRC was to become within a short 
period of time (in December 1966) the most ambitious and powerful indus- 
trial policy project of the 1960's.
As a para-governmental agency the IRC was a novelty in the U.K.   
a body outside government departments but publicly financed. The Govern- 
ment's control over the JRC was limited to determining its legal powers 
and duties, setting its overall budget limit, demanding the presentation 
of regular reports and accounts and in giving the IRC occasional direc- 
tives to act in legally specified circumstances on the Government's behalf. 
The day-to-day running of the agency and the decision-making with regard 
to support for projects in industry was otherwise entirely the IRC's own 
responsibility. This relative independence from Government interference 
and control was designed to increase IRC's effectiveness to initiate 
changes in Industry. It could In contrast to Government act without being 
subject to political pressures and without having to take into account 
non-commercial factors. This was In line with the Government's Intention
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to support only commercially viable rationalisation projects with public 
funds channelled through the IRC. By staffing the corporation with exper- 
ienced managers, industrialists were supposed to be reas.sured, At the 
same time the IRC could thus concentrate a higher level of expertise and 
thereby respond more effectively to the needs of industry.
The concept of a paragovernmental agency located state intervention 
very close to industry by creating an independent corporation with powers 
to intervene fn the equity and credit markets and alter the structure of 
an industrial sector. The IRC was envisaged and designed to establish a 
continuing dialogue with individual firms. This would allow a more de- 
tailed gathering of information, a more flexible intervention and improved
monitoring of projects than was possible with sole reliance on government
(12) departments.
The functions and powers of the Corporation were set out in the IRC 
Act 1966. Its basic functions were to "(a) promote or assist the reorgan- 
isation or development of any industry; or (b) if requested to do so by 
the Secretary of State, establish or develop, or promote or assist the 
establishment of, any industrial enterprise" (sec. 2(1))  Sec. 2C2) gave 
the IRC the legal entitlement to gather information and to decide by 
Itself in which Industries to intervene. According to sec. 2(3) the IRC 
had the "power to do anything...calculated to facilitate the discharge of 
Its functions." More specifically this section mentioned the acquisition 
and holding of equity, loans and loan guarantees, the setting up of new 
companies and the acquisition (or disposal) of buildings, plant and ma- 
chinery as possible methods for the IRC to achieve its objectives. Sec. 
7 gave the IRC a budget of t150 m. to carry out its activity.
The Act defined the functions of the IRC rather vaguely and gave it 
very wide and general powers of intervention. T*his was partly a result of 
the rapid Introduction of the IRC after-the-Jul 4y 196&-crisis which had
prevented the Government from clarifying Its role and operations more pre- 
fiT,)
clsely. In addition the Act's rather unspecific terms of reference 
were Intended to maintain a high degree of flexibility for the possible 
range of its initiatives. They made it possible for the IRC to gradually 
develop its modus operandi and to expand the scope of its activities 
through "experience in office."
The IRC inltally met with strong opposition from many industrialists 
rfho feared its wide powers and its obviously significant intervention po- 
tential. Its ability to obtain equity holdings in private firms created/1
the suspicion that It might be a means for "backdoor nationalisation."
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In response to this hostility the Government restricted the opera- 
tions of the IRC in a number of significant ways to gain initial wider 
acceptance of the IRC in industry. For instance, the IRC had no compul- 
sory powers to take action against the will of the companies concerned. 
Assistance for the rationalisation and/or expansion of an individual 
firm, as distinct from aiding the reorganisation of several firms in a 
particular sector through mergers or sector-wide investment schemes, could 
under sec. 2(1) only be provided at the request of the Secretary of State. 
This was clearly a restriction of its activities and led to directing its 
principal efforts at merger projects. Sec. 2(3) excluded grants as a 
form of IRC-assistance to dispel industry's suspicion that the IRC was a 
"soft option" lender. The IRC repeatedly rejected this criticism and 
stressed its role as a "lender of last resort" imposing stringent condi- 
tions on its loans to firms (see IRC (1968), p. 7), B.R. CANT (1969, 
p. 1»6), and M.E. BeesTey and G.M. White (1973, p. 79)). In this role 
funds were only offered by the IRC if a) all reasonable alternative 
sources of finance were exhausted, b) the project was commercially viable 
and expected to earn the IRC a commercial return on its contribution, 
c) the management of the assisted firm appeared sound and able to complete 
the project successfully, and d) the company concerned agreed to IRC's 
monitoring and follow-up conditions.
Furthermore, the IRC clearly was not designed to act as a state hold- 
ing company (like Italy's IRI). So there was no danger of backdoor na- 
tionalisation. Its equity holdings were supposed tc be only temporary and 
to be disposed of after the successful completion of the project. As a 
form of support equity financing was only to be used when the size of as- 
sistance demanded a higher degree of control or when a firm's gearing ra- 
tio was stretched to the upper limits of sound financing. In general the
restrictions Of a rat^r 1 ImlfpH hiiHgPf nf H Rfl m. ^and_^bJJ_Lfy tO borrow
In financial markets only temporarily forced the IRC to turn its funds 
over as quickly as possible. It aimed therefore to recover them rapiuly 
so that they could be put to work elsewhere. This imposed a certain limit 
to its degree of using more long-term fruity finance.
In addition to these operational restrictions the small IRC-Board was 
purposely composed mostly of industrial managers and merchant bankers with 
good success records,, and a reputation for strong opposition to nationali- 
sation. The first Managing Director of the IRC, Grierson, was known to 
favour a more passive, limited and less interventionistic role for the IRC.
Finally, because of the vague terms of reference and the initially
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narrow interpretation of its powers by the IRC-Board the Agency started 
very slowly and cautiously. In its first year of existence the IRC con- 
centrated mostly on gathering more information about various sectors and 
establishing a two-way communication network with a large number of firms. 
In this way it tried to build up confidence among industrialists about its 
usefulness and intentions. The only setback came when the Government re- 
quested in January 1967 that the IRG should take a share in the troubled 
car producer Rootes in order to maintain some U.K. control over the firm 
when it was acquired by the U.S.-multinational company Chrysler. S. Young 
0971*, p. 92) and A. Lejeune (1973, P- 100) describe the frustration of 
some members of the IRC-Board that its first intervention (i.e. the Rootes 
case) strengthened industry's fears about the IRC being basically a Gov- 
ernment tool to achieve its political aims and acting as a prop for firms 
in financial difficulties.
But apart from that the legal restrictions, the composition of its 
Board and its cautious beginning soon helped to convince many firms that 
the IRC was a potentially useful source of assistance. However, during 
Its lifetime the IRC never stopped being controversial and on many occa- 
sions firms resisted its attempts at intervention. But all in all there 
was no shortage of firms asking for its help or expressing their willing- 
ness to cooperate.
4.2.3. The formulation and implementation of IRC's initiatives
In order to select promising projects in private industry for possi- 
ble support the IRC had to gather and process information so that it 
could determine where assistance was required and in what form. As part 
of this exercise industrial sectors were identified which were of major 
importance for the U.K. economy as a whole and which could benefit sig- 
nificantly from IRC support. Once this was done companies and potential 
projects within high-priority sectors had to be examined.
The most important external source of guidance and information in 
this research activity was the government Itself. For example, during the 
earliest phase (1966/67) the IRC worked on a DEA-list of problems and of 
Industries that needed attention, including wool, footwear, cables, pumps, 
scientific instruments, turbines and transformers. Later the government 
asked the IRC on a number of occasions to study specific problems and pos- 
sibly intervene in sectors, such as vehicles, ball bearings, industrial 
process control and automation, numerically controlled machine tools. 
Throughout Its existence it maintained a close relationship with other
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Government departments and agencies-, such as Min Tech and the National 
Research Development Corporation (NRDC)> and used their information re- 
sources and advice. In addition, it obtained information through fre- 
quent contacts with merchant banks in the City, employers associations 
and the EDCs.
But most of the search activity for possible projects was, according 
to IRC (1969, p. 8), carried out by the IRC itself through desk research 
of available statistics and visits to companies for detailed discussions 
with management. In assessing sectors the IRC would look at indicators, 
such as their respective export-import balance, size distribution of 
firms, the employment of qualified scientists, value-added-ratio, produc- 
tivity, relation between demand and capacity and international comparison 
of industry in terms of structure and performance. IRC's thoroughness and 
depth of analysis in its research on sectors has been repeatedly stressed 
by authors familiar with the agency, as for example in W.G. McClelland 
(1972, p. 26) and in M.E. Beesley and G.M. White (1973, p. 78). In gen- 
eral sectors characterized by either substantial balance of payments con- 
tributions, high value added, high technology content, large productivity 
potential or significant proportion of employment in assisted areas were 
all considered to be high priority cases for intervention.
With regard to the more detailed research concerning individual firms 
particularly important indicators were the quality of management (see 
sec. 2.3.2.5« for assessment criteria), research and development expendi- 
ture, investment plans, profitability-, company liquidity, productivity, 
capacity utilisation. This evaluation would precede any negotiations on 
the terms of a scheme.
This process of information gathering and the expertise to make use 
of it, combined with the availability of funds arid intervention powers, 
secured the IRC a strong position to -i-R-k-iate changes-witKin a variety of 
sectors. Its generation of knowledge and experience at the level of com- 
pany appraisal and its access to confidential information from firms under 
protected secrecy was unmatched by any Government department. Various 
parts of the Government machinery started to make increasing use of the 
IRC's fact-finding abilities and growing experience in assessing companies 
by asking the agency to conduct inquiries and make policy recommendations 
In complex industrial situations, such as a study on the relation between 
telecommunication industry and Post Office, proposals to build aluminium 
smelters in the U.K., study of the bacon curing industry's structure. 
From 1968 onwards the IRC was also increasingly asked to implement its
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recommendations after it reported on its findings (e.g. in the case of 
reorganising the nuclear power industry, helping Rolls Royce and Cammel1 
Laird to overcome their financial difficulties). Thus one of the func- 
tions of the IRC which developed through experience in office was to act 
as the government's merchant bank.
Every project undertaken by the IRC involved not only extensive pre- 
paratory research but also the establishment of monitoring procedures and 
controls to examine the progress made and to check whether its funds were 
used as intended. Usually conditions were attached to the offer of finan- 
cial assistance. These covered to a varying extent, depending on each 
particular case, repayment terms, performance targets, and the time-table 
necessary to complete a restructuring scheme, and the follow-up procedure. 
This gave the IRC considerable power vis-a-vis assisted firms. It could 
ask for changes to be carried out, steps to be implemented and standards 
to be met over a wide range of issues. In certain cases, where the IRC 
was not satisfied with the quality of management it insisted, for in- 
stance, on sweeping management changes, as was according to S. Young 
097*1, p. 76) the case with Kent, Ransome Hofmann Pollard (RHP), Rolls 
Royce, Cammell Laird and Brown Bailey.
After assistance had been granted for a specific project, the follow- 
up procedure allowed the IRC a continued dialogue with the firms concerned 
and gave it control over the implementation and fulfillment of the ini- 
tially agreed conditions by those firms. As IRC (1970, pp. 12-13) points 
out, the IRC standardised this monitoring procedure during 19&9-70. It 
then consisted of follow-up visits on a twice-yearly basis and reports on 
these visits (all carried by one and the same IRC-member B.R. Cant) to the 
IRC Board. In addition the companies had to regularly supply the IRC with 
thefr accounts and information on specified items (sometimes on a quarter- 
ly or even monthly basis, usually only twice a year). By early 1970 
follow-up arrangements covered projects involving IRC-assistance which 
was a substantial majority of all its initiatives.
To strengthen its control even further the IRC sometimes offered com- 
panies stand-by facilities for later use or phased its loans in different 
stages subject to the achievement of specified targets, such as in the 
case of British Insulated Callenders Cables (BICC), the Steel Group, Sam- 
uel Osborn, Marvin. This was designed as an incentive for firms to meet 
their performance targets. Rootes, Herbert Ingersoll, the Laird group, 
Kearney & Trecker, and the nuclear power construction firms were all ex- 
amples where the IRC took minority shareholdings as an additional method
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of control. S. Young (197**, p. 77) mentions that In 11 such cases involv- 
ing the IRC in equity participation it appointed its own director to the 
board of the assisted company to make its monitoring even more effec- 
tive. Apart from loans and equity participation as forms of assis- 
tance the IRC could often generate action on the parts of private firms 
as a "catalyst" by bringing together companies and persuading them to take 
appropriate steps. This could bring desired results without any financial 
aid. To create the necessary pressure on firms the IRC from time to time 
used what W. McClelland (1972, p. 3*0 called "stimulation of third par- 
ties," by approaching, for instance, the media, a firm's customers or 
shareholders to bring them into the negotiations.
To conclude this section, the IRC not only raised the level of infor- 
mation gathering involved in an expanding and increasingly selective in- 
dustrial policy, but also broke new grounds in policy-making with regard 
to the exercising of control and monitoring procedure over the publicly 
funded activities in private industry. And the use of a variety of dif- 
ferent forms of assistance gave the IRC also an improved degree of flexi- 
bility to adapt its support to the specific conditions of each particular 
case.
The scope of IRC's activities
The most important concern of the IRC was to tackle identified con- 
straints on growth, competitiveness and efficiency by promoting "re- 
structuring" within the private sector. W. McClelland (1972, p. 2*0 
points out that during the late 1960's this was "...an euphemism for cre- 
ating larger units." According to IRC (1970, p. 5) "...the bulk of IRC's 
work has been devoted to effecting reorganisation through company mergers." 
This equation of "reorganisation" with "mergers" was based on the somewhat 
dubious assumption that the principal "structural weakness" in many U.K. 
sectors was a high degree of fragmentation compared to other countries and 
to what was considered to be optimal size of a firm in those sectors. 
B.R. Cant (1969, p. 5), when discussing this problem, stresses the compe- 
tition ("*uitual attrition") between U.K. firms which "confront each other 
with comparatively small competing production units ranged across a wide 
front of manufacturing activities." In such a situation only few compan- 
ies can take full advantage of the production volume to accelerate the in- 
stallment of automatic processes and product development. G. ROBINSON 
(1970, p. 76) argues that the problem in this context is not so much one 
of an inadequate degree of concentration in a particular sector, which ex-
ceeds in the U.K. often that of other countries, but instead should be 
viewed in terms of diversified activity at the product end. Even the 
larger U.K. firms do not aim at large production runs of a few products, 
but remain conglomerates producing too many products at relatively small 
volumes. Our findings in-sections 2.3-2.1. and 2.3-2.3. support this 
argument.
The IRC, as stated clearly in IRC (19&9, P- 7), considered the ques- 
tion of company size only relatively in the context of international com- 
petitiveness and the size of a sector's largest firm in other countries 
or as determined by technological considerations. Especially in the "ad- 
vanced technology" sectors (such as aerospace, nuclear power, computers, 
telecommunications, other parts of electrical engineering) RSD expenditure, 
product development and other overhead costs have accelerated considerably 
In the wake of international competitiveness which has pushed up the mini- 
mum viable size of a company. In sectors with a large balance of payments 
contribution and/or a high technology content the IRC concentrated there- 
fore on the creation of "national champions." This involved the merg- 
ing of already large domestic firms into a single, nationally dominant 
company to improve international competitiveness by achieving greater econ- 
omies of scale in marketing, product development and investment.
In other sectors characterized by many small firms, obsolete equip- 
ment, inadequate management and a long-run decline (such as wool textiles, 
pumps, paper and board) the IRC also pushed for mergers to reduce fragmen-
/«0\
tation. It justified its merger-promotion by claiming that market 
forces alone would not bring about these changes at all or only to an in- 
sufficient degree, because no finance was available, or shareholders lack- 
ed information, or managers rather followed their vested interests of pre- 
serving the status-quo. Mergers were never considered by the IRC to be an 
end in itself, but as a means to facilitate the necessary rationalisation 
that had to follow.
With the conclusion of the "merger phase" in September 1968 (when the 
GEC/EE-merger created the last "national champion") the IRC's efforts 
shifted towards the provision of assistance for selective investment 
schemes, as regulated in sec. 2(1) of the Act. As opposed to meigers 
those were rationalisation schemes yielding early results and beneficial 
to the national economy in the form of promoting technological change, im- 
port substitution, exports, additional capacity creation and new jobs. 
Judging from IRC (1971) this activity became the most important one in the 
last phase of IRC's existence, covering 11 projects out of a total of 15
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since February 1970 alone. In this context the IRC filled, according to 
W. McClelland (1972, p. 25) and Q. Robinson (1970, p. 78), a "credit gap" 
caused by generally tight credit conditions, and an unwillingness of banks 
to support rationalisation projects through medium- and long-term loans. In 
addition, the IRC unlike the City-institutions got involved in the manage- 
ment of industrial firms, undertook active search activities to identify 
projects, played the role of a "catalyst" approaching firms, and establish- 
ed follow-up procedures. For all these reasons the IRC filled an institu- 
tional gap, which we have identified (in 2.2.J*.) as one of the elements of 
structural weakness in U.K. industry^ by supporting selective investment 
schemes. Without IRC-funds these would not have been undertaken.
In IRC (1969, p. 7) the corporation emphasised that the success of 
mergers and selective schemes depended largely on management efficiency to 
carry out the necessary (post-merger) rationalisation process. its close 
ties with a number of firms, its follow-up procedures and its use of minor- 
ity shareholdings as a means of control gave the IRC ample opportunity to 
determine the quality of any given management by assessing a firm's market- 
Ing strategies, financial control, product development, industrial rela- 
tions and other areas of management responsibility. In accordance with 
our hypothesis in 2.3.2.5. the IRC found that inefficient management was 
frequently a reason for a company's unsatisfactory performance. Especially 
In rescue cases and with regard to ill-run companies the IRC proposed the 
Introduction of changes in management personnel and techniques. W. McClel- 
land (1972, p. 25) termed this activity of the corporation its "stimula- 
tion" function.
Another activity of the IRC was checking foreign multinational corp- 
orations (such as Chrysler, SKF, Rank, Phillips) in their attempts to gain
(19)
control over U.K. companies. The IRC was also set up to take into ac- 
count regional pol icy-considerations,, but this n^ver_became_gne of its ma- 
jor concerns. Politically more problematic was its role with regard to 
Industrial relations and trade unions. In IRC (1969, p. 7) it clearly con- 
sidered this an important area for change. Furthermore, according to 
statements by IRC-executives Grierson and Roll in Expenditure Committee 
(1972, vol. 2, Q. 1260), the policy-makers believed that the injection of 
public money and the Labour Government's backing through the IRC would help 
to generate trade-union-support for private industry's rationalisation. As 
a token measure the IRC had one trade union member on its Board. But when 
certain IRC-supported mergers resulted as part of the post-merger ration- 
alisation in mass redundancies, as was the case in Woolwich and Merseyside
with GEC-workers or in Chelmsford with RHP-workers, it became clear that 
the IRC had never considered it necessary to draw up any contingency plans 
These would have included provisions for labour redeployment in case of 
redundancies, proposals to reform the industrial relations system in firms 
with the approval of unions affected, and evaluating the social effects of 
rationalisation 6n regions and employment. After growing opposition by 
unions and the labour-force against redundancies in IRC-supported firms 
talks were started with the TUC in 1968/69 to draw up a code of good prac- 
tice in merger situations.
All in all, the scope of IRC's activities was considerable and grew 
with "experience in office." Its initially rather vague terms of refer- 
ence and the unspecified definition of its role left the IRC a high degree 
of flexibility to develop and determine the range of activities itself.
fr.2.$. The assessment of the IRC in terms of its impact on industry and
Its role in the overall development of industrial policy in the U.K. 
According to W. McClelland (1972, p. 33) 5 1* IRC-projects out of a 
total of 70 were in early 1971 proceeding satisfactorily. Another pro- 
visional evaluation conducted by the IRC in late 1971 showed that out of 
90 projects 75 were considered successful. Except for a first year loss 
the IPC achieved between 1968/69 and 1970/71 annually a surplus of ir.come
t
over expenditure. In 1971/72 it earned gross profits (before interest, 
tax and dividends) of L7.07 m. on capital assets and investment expendi- 
ture of k107.6 m. (a gross pre-tax profit-rate of almost 7%). This indi- 
cated that the IRC could be commercially viable with its returns covering 
Its borrowing costs and administrative expenses.
In a wide context however the capacity of the IRC to engage In profit- 
able and successfully proceeding projects was not^ sufficient. As is evi- 
dent from Tables 2.1. to 2.*»., the IRC failed to halt the decline of capac- 
ity expansion, profitability and growth in the private company sector. 
Given a small budget, short life, limited intervention powers (which ruled 
out compulsion, use of grants, permanent holding of equity, or assistance 
to Single firms other than by government directive) and an overriding 
emphasis on commercial viability rather than social objectives, the IRC 
was not equipped to produce the far-reaching long-run initiatives required 
for any reversal of the industrial decline.
This Is not to deny its impact on specific economic variables, such 
as the level of concentration in industry or improving medium-term loan 
financing of industrial investment projects. With company mergers as its
principal activity the IRC played, for example, a key role in the "merger- 
boom" of the late 1960's.
Table ^.2: U.K. acquisitions by large companies (with net assets above 
tO. 5 m.) in U.K. company sector
number of expenditure on 
companies acquired acquiring subsidiaries
in b m.
196i» 939 502
1965 995 507
1966 805 W
1967 661 883
1968 598 1653
SOURCE: Industrial Policy Group (1970, p. 
Table A. 2. shows that during 1967/68 the number of acquisitions fell com- 
pared to the previous years, while the scale of transactions rose at the 
same time dramatically. This was primarily a result of IRC-support for a 
number of very large-scale mergers. As a result of the merger boom
1968 the degree of concentration increased noticeably in many sectors of
(21) private industry. There is, however, at the same time considerable
doubt whether mergers as such or a higher degree of concentration actually 
lead in general to higher productivity, improved efficiency, and other 
claimed benefits. Over time, as in IRC (1970, p. 6), the agency itself 
became increasingly aware of the limits and difficulties involved in get- 
ting tangible benefits out of mergers. " And in sec. 2.3.2 we have pointed 
out that compared to other industrialised economies the U.K. has a high 
degree of concentration among its industrial companies, while at the same 
time suffering from constraints, such as small production runs, "defensive"
investment and management inefficiency. These reflect a failure of firms(22) 
to take advantage of mergers ^ through aderjuate  rattona-lTsation.
When assessing the sectoral impact of the IRC there can be no doubt 
that Us intervention caused significant changes in the structure of a 
number of industries. For a complete summary of IRC's projects see its 
annual reports and S. Young (197*», p. 231-236). We will concentrate here 
only on the more important ones.
Reorganisation in electrical engineering was probably the most far- 
rcachtng and successful example of IRC-induced structural change. In June 
1967 the IRC supported as its first major initiative as "catalyst" the 
merger between English Electric (EE) and Elliott Automation (EA) with a 
k15 m. loan in order to overcome a liquidity problem as the last remaining
hurdle in the negotiations. This helped to create one of the largest and 
best-equipped European firms in the field of automation and industrial 
control systems. The merger gave EA's RSD-skills the necessary financial 
back-up structure, while allowing EE to diversify out of the declining 
heavy engineering sector, and reduced the duplication of effort. In Sep- 
tember 1967 the IRC decided to support the General Electrical Company (GEC) 
In an outright take-over bid for the weaker, but strategically important 
Associated Electrical Industries (AEl), after previous merger talks had 
failed. To overcome the resistance of the AEl-management the IRC had to 
act as an "accelerator," by successfully using pressure on the AEl through 
the media and shareholders. This acquisition promised the reduction of 
duplication of effort in sectors with rapid technological change and major 
economies in R&D and in production, such as telecommunications, switch- 
gear, transformers, turbogenerators, microcircuits, process control and 
domestic appliances. Thus resources could be set free for more investment 
and more rapid product development, enabling GtC to carry out its planned 
export offensive. Finally, when Plessey made a bid for EE in August 1968,
the IRC pushed instead successfully for a merger between GEC and EE in
(23)September 1968. Thus the IRC helped to create a combine that con- 
trolled *»0% of the whole electrical engineering market in the U.K. In 
sectors such as turbine generators, transformers, switchgear, radar and 
aerospace aids, and communication equipment the GEC's U.K. market share 
exceeded 60S.
After the mergers the GEC, as envisaged by the IRC, carried out mas- 
sive rationalisation. From the Census of Production in BUSINESS MONITOR 
(1976, T.I, pp. 2-23, and 1978, T.I, pp. 2-37) it is evident that all sec- 
tors with substantial GEC presence were characterised between 1968 and 
1971 by a significant decline of employment and strong increases in pro- 
ductivity. G. HAYS (1972, pp. 76-77) points out that during the period 
1968-71 the GEC made 36,000 of its initial workforce of 265,000 employees 
redundant. An additional ^0,000 workers were called upon to switch their 
Jobs within the company. Thirty-two plants had been closed down and a 
further seven plants were in the process of closure by mid-1971- At the 
same time GEC's earrings per share had gone up by 50% in those three years. 
The public debate sparked off by the mass redundancies in GEC at Woolwich 
and at Merseyside emphasised IRC's dilemma of promoting commercially suc- 
cessful rationalisation that inflict social costs and contradict some of 
Its alms In the areas of industrial relations, employment and regional 
policy.
The mergers centering around the GEC satisfied another IRC-objective?, 
namely to create "ripple effects 11 in related sectors. EE 1 s.computer activ- 
ities were hived off and went into the newly created International Com- 
puters Ltd. (ICL). The GEC/AEI-holdings In C.A. Parsons were merged with 
A. Reyrolle 6 Co. into Reyrolle Parsons which later also acquired Bruce 
Peebles with IRC-support. Later (1976/77) the Government tried however 
to reverse this hiving off by bringing Reyrolle Parsons back into the con- 
trol of the better managed GEC. Apart from this intervention in the power 
plant industry the IRC also provided funds in the merger between the boil- 
ermakers Clarke Chapman and John Thompson. All these moves were part of an 
overall reorganisation of the heavy engineering sector necessitated by the 
decline of orders from the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). 
After a study in close consultation with the CEGB of the resulting over- 
capacity in the supplier industries (power plant and boilermakers) the IRC 
decided to promote the mergers described above. As in the case of its 
support for establishing two consortia in the nuclear power industry (see 
below in sec. *».3)» which were later (in the mid-1970's) merged into one 
with the GEC again in overal1 control, these interventions by the IRC
marked only the beginning of a long-run process of structural change and
(25) paved the way for continued government involvement in heavy engineering.
Other successful "national champions" with significant market shares 
In the U.K. were created in mechanical engineering, such as the steam tur- 
bines and diesel engine sector, where the IRC supported mergers to create 
in January 1968 Amalgamated Power Engineering. In the compressors and 
hydraulic equipment sector the IRC helped to merge firms into International 
Compressed Air Corporation in April 1968. In 1972 this new firm employed 
a workforce of 37,000, with an average ^-year growth in capital employed of 
8% p.a. between 1968 and 1972 and a post-merger increase of the pre-tax 
profit-rate from H».U in 1967/68 to in 1969/70 despite stiff compe- 
tition from larger U.S. and Swedish multi-national firms and their U.K. 
subsidiaries.
Similarly successful were its intensive and elaborate efforts in the 
ball hearing industry where the IRC prevented the Swedish multinational 
firm SKF from gaining a dominant position in the U.K. market and instead 
promoted the setting up of a sufficiently large and competitive domestic 
firm, the RHP. As part of post-merger rationalisation which the IRC helped 
to finance, RHP improved its management structure, substantially reduced 
Its product range, achieved a 20% productivity increase and shortened the 
delivery times for most types of bearings from up to one-year down to 8-16
weeks within two years. This allowed the RHP as one of the few remaining 
local producers to face the growing competitive pressure of the Swedish 
and Japanese multinational firms in a declining market plagued by world- 
wide overcapacity.
However, some mergers promoted by the IRC turned out to be subsequent 
failures. This was especially true in the car industry. Its equity hold- 
ing in the Chrysler/Rootes acquisition was not sufficiently utilized to 
monitor or initiate rationalisation despite an IRC-nominee on the company 
board. Later the IRC-shares were sold to Chrysler and thereby the govern- 
ment lost all control to oversee and direct the affairs and strategies of 
the company. In December 1975 the Government had to accept a very costly 
rescue operation after Chrysler had threatened closure of its loss-making 
U.K. operations (see below in sec. 5-2.1.1). This could have been avoided 
had the Government maintained a continuous measure of control.
The creation of British Leyland (BLMC) through a merger between Ley- 
land Motors arid British Motors Holding Corporation in January 1968 re- 
quired the IRC to put pressure on the BMH-management. It also provided a 
k25 m. loan for a h200 m. investment plan to deal with outdated plant and 
machinery, the overloaded product range, comparatively small production 
runs, the lack of quality in product development, the widely dispersed net- 
work of plants and a poor industrial relations record. The IRC was con- 
vinced of the quality of management in BLMC and thus confined its monitor- 
ing role to a minimum. But the rationalisation efforts were never com- 
pleted and BLMC continued to loose its market share until 1975, when the 
Government was forced into another expensive rescue operation. Only now,
after 10 years, are there finally first concerted efforts of substantial
(26) reorganisation in the company supervised and financed by the NEB.
Failures of IRC-induced mergers which marked the beginning of a long 
series of government interventions, occurred also in the machine tool in- 
dustry. There the IRC-support for Marvin, Kearney & Trecker, and Herbert 
Ingersoll had to be followed up by additional public funds to overcome in 
each case serious financial difficulties. Both in the fields of scientific 
instruments and instrumentation (G. Kent) and of steelwork plant and 
pressure vessels (Da^y-Ashmore) the IRC had supported mergers that failed 
to result in the intended economies. In both cases the IRC had to provide 
more funds combined with .stronger monitoring, detailed rationalisation 
plans and new management personnel and techniques. This helped both firms 
to succeed in recovering.
At the end of its existence the IRC was asked by the government to
look into the liquidity problems of Rolls-Royce (aero-engine producer) and 
Cammell Laird (shipbuilders) (see also sections and 6.1). In both 
cases the IRC undertook detailed investigations with proposals for far- 
reaching changes covering management techniques and rationalisation plans 
as conditions attached to providing financial assistance. The abolition 
of the IRC in 1971 prevented it from seeing both projects through, and sub- 
sequently both Rolls Royce and Cammell Laird had to be bailed out shortly 
afterwards at far higher cost to the public than the original IRC-assist- 
ance.
There were other examples, such as the Textile Re-equipment Scheme in 
the cotton and allied textile sector, where promising and important IRC 
projects were prematurely interrupted by its abolition.
In some cases attempts to promote sectoral restructuring in usually 
fragmented industries failed to materialise because of management resist- 
ance and IRC's lack of compulsory powers. This was the case in plastics 
machinery, textile machinery and computer software, while initial suspi- 
cions In the pumps and wool textile industries were overcome after a slow 
start with the IRC supporting.in the end a number of proposed mergers. 
Less difficult for the IRC was the promotion of structural change through 
merger-support in the construction equipment, private steel, mining ma- 
chinery, yarn bulking and household textiles sectors.
IRC's mixed fortunes reflect both its potential as an instrument of 
Industrial regeneration in a variety of sectors and its limits to inter- 
vene effectively in a low-growth economy with constraints imposed on its 
legal powers, limited lifespan and capacity to combine commercial with 
social goals. Its Importance in the overall development of industrial 
policy, however, should not be underestimated. In many sectors its activ- 
ity marked the first step in a series of industrial policy initiatives to
 
follow (cars, machine tools, nuclear power plant, etc.). It provided a 
model for para-governmental agencies in other countries (e.g. Belgium) and 
In the U.K., where especially the initial proposals in 1973-75 to set up 
thp NEB reflected a learning-process to avoid the shortcomings of the IRC 
and to build on its strengths and benefits (discussed in Ch. 7). Its se- 
lective investment schemes, such as the Textile Re-equipment Scheme, were 
a model for later initiatives of that sort under the Science and Technology 
Act 1965, the Industrial Expansion Act 1968 and sec. 8 of the Industry Act 
1972 (see below sec. 4.2.6, A.3. and 5-2.1).
Its capacity to intervene selectively, gather information from indi- 
vidual companies, monitor the activities of assisted firms, and push 
through management changes and/or rationalisation plans made it the most
important industry policy initiative of the Labour Government 1S6A-/0. In 
all these aspects the IRC filled an institutional gap in a state apparatus 
which up to then had had neither the expertise, nor the legal frajnework to
carry out such activities. It was also the first policy instrument with 
the expressed objective of intervening in the production conditions and to 
address some of the underlying elements of structural weakness in U.K. pri- 
vate industry (credit gap, management inefficiency, fragmentation of pro- 
duction   see Ch. 2 above). Its "expansion in office" proved the need and 
potentials of government intervention on that level.
The IRC also improved the level of coordination between various gov- 
ernment agencies and economic policies. The mergers it supported were not 
to be referred to the Monopoly Commission (MC) and thus exempted from the 
Government's competition policy. The justification given was that result- 
ing benefits in production efficiency more than compensate any possible
decline in allocation efficiency caused by increasing monopoly power.
The IRC was required to maintain close contact with the MC which had to be 
consulted in order to approve specific schemes in advance. Because of the 
Corporation's interest in supporting "high technology" sectors it estab- 
lished an ongoing exchange of information with relevant EDCs, the NRDC, and 
in particular Min Tech which by 1969 had become responsible for sponsoring 
most industries and giving directives to the IRC. Government departments, 
such as the Ministries of Defence, Agriculture, Power, etc., made use of 
the information-gathering abilities of the IRC by asking it to undertake 
studies of particular sectors. Where private firms supplied state-owned 
firms, the IRC considered the preferences and plans of these public sector 
consumers and thus used public purchasing or procurement policy as a factor 
to promote the reorganisation of supply industries. Examples were the min- 
ing machinery firms and the National Coal Board (NCB), the boilermakers,
 
power plant producers or nuclear power consortia and the CEGB, telecommun- 
ications manufacturers and the Post Office, private steel firms and British 
Steel Corporation (BSC).
Given all those different aspects involved in the evaluation of IRC's 
Impact its importance as a major step forward in the historical evolution 
of industrial policy and as a point of reference for future po 1 :cy initia- 
tives was significant. Its effects in some industrial sectors were far- 
reaching. But while it pointed to the potential of intervention in indus- 
try by Government or independent public agencies, it emphasised at the same 
time through its limits and failures the need for a much more comprehensive 
policy approach vis-a-vis private companies.
ii.2.6. The industrial Expansion Act 1968
In January 1968 the Government announced its intention (in the White 
Paper "Industrial Expansion," Cmnd. 3509) to provide itself with, interven- 
tion powers as a possible substitute for the IRC because of its slow stnrt 
in 1967. Added to this objective was the need felt by the Government to 
support in the aftermath of the sterling-devaluation in November 136? 5e ~ 
Icctive schemes that would generate benefits in a short period of time, 
would not necessarily have to be commercially viable if compensated by 
results in the "national interest" (import-saving, export promotion, job 
creation, expansion of capacity in strategically important sectors or re- 
gions, etc.)» and would otherwise not go ahead early enough because of lack/2g\ 
of available external finance.
These so-called "industrial investment schemes" could according to 
sec. 1(2) and 1(3) of the Industrial Expansion Act 1968 be proposed by any 
government department and had to be approved by Parliament. They had to 
satisfy the vaguely formulated condition that they were ''likely to benefit 
the economy of the United Kingdom," defined in terms of higher efficiency 
and/or profitability, additional productive capacity, or technological im- 
provements in processes or products of an industry or parts of it (sec. 
2(1)). The forms of government assistance for these schemes were speci- 
fied in sec. 2(2) as loans, grants, credit guarantees, under-writing of 
losses, purchase of goods and services from the companies in question, 
share holdings and outright purchase of the undertaking or of part of it. 
Sec. 2(3) made the financial support of the government conditional on the 
company's consent and thereby excluded any compulsion powers.
 
In addition sec. 3(0 and 3(2) covered so-called "general schemes" 
setting up boards for specific sections of private industry to make recom- 
mendations to or carry out administrative functions on behalf of any gov- 
ernment department concerning the selective investment schemes. Min Tech 
and other departments were on the basis of sec. 5(1) and 5(*0 to be advised 
regularly by an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from in- 
dustry, IRC and NRDC. Sec. 5(5) regulated the relation between IRC and 
HROC with the Industrial Expansion Act by allowing explicitly the IRC and 
MROC to cany out investigations and negotiations for the purpose of form- 
ulating and administering investment schemes. In that way the government 
could make use of their expertise and ties with industry. Aggregate ex- 
penditure on these schemes was limited in sec. to t100 m. with a pos- 
sibility of being raised to h150 m. under sec. M3)  
But the considerable legal powers thus enacted in 1968 were subse-
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quently hardly utilised. Only two such investment schemes were ever put 
before and approved by Parliament. Both were however major initiatives, 
covering a variety of measures to support the establishment or expansion 
of two industries. On their own the two schemes are good indications of 
the potential force and extent of a comprehensive industrial policy.
The first such scheme was put forward in MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY 
(1968). It established the largest European commercial and scientific 
computer hardware producer, International Computers (Holdings) Ltd. (ICL), 
in a three-way merger supported by Min Tech through equity participation 
and a research and development grant. This scheme which marked the start 
of an increasingly extensive government involvement in the U.K. computer 
industry and which involved Min Tech in detailed monitoring procedures will 
be discussed more fully in our case-study on computers in 6.2.
The second scheme (in BOARD OF TRADE (1968)) covered government sup- 
port for the building of three aluminium smelters in the U.K., each of 
which was envisaged to produce up to 120,000 tons annually at full capa- 
city from 1971 onwards. As in the case of shipbuilding or computers, this 
scheme was an example of a more coherent industrial policy approach which 
combined different measures into an overall strategy for a particular sec- 
tor. For instance, all the smelters were to be located in development 
areas so that the companies involved could benefit from the higher invest- 
ment grants. The government agreed to supply the aluminium smelters with 
cheaper electricity to help in cutting down their operating costs, as the 
huge amount of electricity required would otherwise constitute a major cost 
element. The scheme therefore included Special Electricity Contracts be- 
tween the British Aluminium Corporation (BAC) and the North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board, and between the CEGB and Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) which 
in a consortium with BICC had set up the Anglesey Aluminium Metal Corpor- 
ation (AAM) to build and operate the Anglesey smelter. °' To get this 
cheap supply of power from the most modern nuclear reactor type (the Ad- 
vanced Gas-Cooled Reactors (AGR) then still under construction) the alumin- 
ium companies were made to pay a capital charge (for the production of i:he 
power stations and transmission grids) plus an annual payment to cover the 
reactors 1 operating costs, without receiving in return any claims or owner- 
ship rights with regard to the power stations and their products. To be 
able to pay their share of the reactors' construction and operating costs 
the BoT provided under the scheme loans of h30 m. to BAC and h33 m. to RTZ, 
with repayment over 30 years at a fixed interest rate of 
The third smelter was to be built by Alcan Aluminium (U.K.) Ltd. which
had its own generating station using cheap coal supplied by the NCB. No
BoT-loan was needed in this case.
All three smelter proposals had been analysed beforehand in a study
by the IRC on behalf of the Government to "which it reported in January 
1968. The scheme therefore combined investment grants, cheap supplies of 
basic inputs from the nationalised industries (coal, electricity), govern- 
ment loans and an IRC study to set up a domestic aluminium industry and 
save imports in the post-devaluation period.
After initial difficulties the three U.K. smelters are now running at 
full capacity. They produced in 1977 350,000 tons of aluminium. This 
leaves the U.K. still with annual imports of 100,000 tons, worth t60 m. 
But the direct balance of payments savings of the smelters now amount to 
circa b210 m. annually. Initially heavy capital outlays and a slump in 
demand during the crisis of 197^/75 meant that only now, 10 years after 
the introduction of the scheme, has the operation of the smelters become 
profitable. Alcan (U.K.), for example, achieved after years of losses from 
its investment finally a pre-tax profit of h10 m. in 1976 and of h24 m. in 
1977. The major advantage of the scheme was that the smelters were con- 
structed before the major cost and price explosion of the early 1970's. 
If built today the smelters would cost about three times as much to be in- 
stalled and operated. Apart from the import savings, the government found 
the scheme, however, to cost more than originally envisaged. Because of 
major delays in the construction of the nuclear reactors more expensive 
power from less cost-efficient plants had to be supplied to the smelters 
at the agreed subsidised rate. The aluminium companies are currently 
planning to expand their smelters' capacity pending negotiations with the 
government about another beneficial agreement to guarantee the supply of 
cheap electricity. These plans have been prompted by the optimistic de- 
mand forecasts, the how profitable operation of the smelters, the high 
costs of building a new smelter and the fact that the U.K. is still a net 
Importer of this material/31 '
The powers under the Act to introduce "industrial investment schemes" 
were used very little, because the IRC expanded its activities during and 
after 1967/68 and included many of the potential schemes under the Act. 
Furthermore, industry was frequently not willing to cooperate, while the 
schemes depended on the consent of the affected firms. For example, Min 
Tech was forced to abandon a scheme under sec. 3(1) of the Act to set up a 
Machine Tool Industry Board in 1968 because of the opposition from the 
Machine Tool Trades Associates. Finally, the Act was repealed in 1971.
Despite its modest and limited impact the Act was fairly important 
for a variety of reasons. For the first time the Government gave itself 
wider selective intervention powers that had-up to then been confined to 
para-governmental agencies (NRDC, SIB, and above all the IRC) or specific 
industries, such as the aerospace, shipbuilding or nuclear power indus- 
tries. These powers went beyond those of the IRC or the SIB because of 
the emphasis on benefits in the national interest beyond purely commercial 
considerations. The Act provided the Government also with the means to 
set up advisory bodies and thus establish its own machinery for informa- 
tion-gathering, project evaluation and monitoring of progress. Many of 
the Act's concepts and provisions, such as the principle of selective in- 
vestment schemes, the concept of direct government intervention in private 
industry in the "national interest," and the use of advisory bodies by the 
Government to implement its policies, were later used again and extended, 
wfth the Industry Act 1972 as an obvious example. Finally, the Act helped 
to fill certain loopholes by amending existing legislation.
The few times the Act was used for selective schemes (computers, alu- 
minium smelters) it resulted in successful and far-reaching interventions 
by the Government in the area of Industrial restructuring on a sectoral 
basis. In particular,the Act allowed a combination of different measures to 
be applied in a coordinated way in order to achieve maximum impact. As in 
the case of the IRC the potential of industrial policy to intervene in the 
production conditions and structure of different sectors was also shown 
in relation to this Act. But at the same time policy was again limited by 
the opposition from industry, the premature abolition of a measure and 
constraints on the extent and scope of its use.
The major difference from the IRC was that this measure involved di- 
rect Government intervention in private industry which allowed the in- 
clusion of non-commercial criteria, the provision of grants, and assistance 
ttT'indivtdual- firms irr~horTimSrgeT'~s~ituati"on~s~. ATThe same'Ttme the Gov- 
ernment itself at this point did not necessarily have the close, ongoing 
contacts with private firms, or the flexibility and expertise in project 
evaluation which characterised the IRC. To overcome these disadvantages 
the IRC was consulted regularly a<= part of Min Tech's Advisory Committee.
In general, the measures to promote industrial restructuring in the 
late 1960's advanced the capacity of the state apparatus to intervene se- 
lectively in private industry. In a number of sectors major changes in- 
duced by industrial policy took place with varying degrees of success. On 
many occasions projects put forward by the SIB, the IRC or under the Indus-
trial Expansion Act marked the beginning of continuous Government involve- 
ment with regard to these sectors and specific firms. This was necessi- 
tated mostly by failures on the part of management or policy-makers to 
see through successfully projects of rationalisation, restructuring and 
modernisation. The measures discussed above under the category of indus- 
trial restructuring certainly were a breakthrough in the evolution of in- 
dustrial policy. They were also models for future measures. But their 
effectiveness was nevertheless limited by a number of factors, including 
insufficient legal powers, inadequate monitoring and exercise of control 
over industrial affairs, premature abolition in light of the long-run 
nature of their projects, and industry's opposition. Thus any beneficial 
impact of these measures was confined to particular firms or sectors, 
while the general decline of profitability, capacity expansion, and pro- 
duction efficiency in private industry as a whole continued and even ac- 
celerated during the late 1960's (see relevant tables 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4).
4.3- Measures in support of Science and Technology
4.3.1. The rationale for a "science and technology" policy in the U.K.
Measures in this category had been introduced to a limited extent 
already before the general expansion of industrial policy after 1964. 
During that process over the last 14 years they were constantly extended 
under both Labour and Conservative administrations al'ke and frequently in 
response to demands from private industry.
The reason, why political parties and.firms find a science and tech- 
nology policy in general justified, lies in the nature of the subject 
Itself. Both production techniques and product development are key fac- 
tors In determining the efficiency, market share and expansion of firms in 
any given industry. At the same time there exist frequent obstacles to 
success which prompt governments to intervene: a) Firms may neither be 
willing nor capable of facing the high risks involved in many R&D-efforts 
whi.ch often may not result in commercially promising projects, with con- 
sequent abandonment and loss of money invested. Another risk factor in 
R&D is frequently the long time-scale involved, making cost and revenue 
estimates more difficult and potentially inaccurate. Firms that are typ- 
ically characterised by a relatively short time-horizon and risk aversion 
in their decision-making prefer short-term, less costly improvement inno- 
vations and product differentiation at the expense of risky, long-run R&D
projects. 0 '
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b) Technological change
or a product innovation may not materialise because of management incapa- 
city to assess the costs and benefits of a R&D project, to understand the 
potential significance of a project, or to organise company resources ef- 
ficiently in order to exploit the results of R&D. This argument was elab- 
orated in K. PAVITT and S. WALD (1971). Especially smaller firms and 
those in traditional sectors rarely have in-house RSD facilities or con- 
tacts with external sources of scientific and technical knowledge.
c) Government funding fre- 
quently is the only source of finance for RSD activities of firms which do 
not have sufficient internally generated cash-flow and cannot rely on banks 
or shareholders to back RSD projects with high risks and long gestation 
periods.
d) To be commercially suc- 
cessful an innovation must meet users' needs. There may be a communica- 
tion problem between producers and users with the supplying firm not being 
adequately informed about the customers' needs and the potential buyers 
not being aware of the availability of a product. L. NASBETH and G. RAY 
(ed.) (197*0 point also out that the first users of a new product or tech- 
nique may face considerable financial and technological risks.
e) In addition there may
exist what K. PAVITT (1976) termed "indivisibilities." These occur when a 
large number of firms each require relatively small amounts of knowledge 
in a specific area below a scale large enough to justify expenditure on 
R£D. Alternatively, in the so-called "high technology" sectors of air- 
craft, space, computers, and nuclear energy, the scale of resources re- 
quired for the commercially viable launching of products and processes in 
terms of basic research, testing facilities, components and equipment sup- 
ply may be beyond the reach of any single firm.
For all these reasons there may be an "exploitation gap" in industry 
with RSD either not being carried out at all, being terminated before 
reaching the stage of commercial use, or never becoming commercially via- 
ble, although it led to an innovation. Many firms carry out large-scale 
RSD successfully without any government help. And often innovations take 
place through experimental development rather than expensive, full-scale 
R&D efforts. But this does not invalidate the rationale for government 
support for RSD in industry in order to overcome some of; the constraints 
discussed.
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i».3.2. The range and development of U.K. government policy in 
science and technology
Before 196*» measures were mostly confined to the undertaking of basic 
research in government-owned laboratories .or research establishments and in 
universities, administered and promoted by the NRDC. In addition R&D in 
"high technology 1 ,' sectors, such as aerospace, nuclear energy, electronics, 
was supported by the'government 1 s defence contracts with spin-offs for 
civil R&D.
The period 196A-1970 saw a major expansion of government intervention 
in this area. The Labour Government set up Min Tech with initial responsi- 
bility for the publicly owned research establishments, the NRDC, and spon- 
sorship for the computers, electronics, telecommunications and machine tool 
industries. By 1970 it had expanded to cover all aspects of industrial 
policy and sponsorship for most sectors. Under Labour the emphasis was 
also shifted away from defence-related R&D towards civil R&D. Priority of 
assistance moved from basic towards applied research, advanced Cor explor- 
atory) development, demonstration projects in the pre-production stage in 
the form of prototypes and pil.ot plans for testing and evaluation purposes, 
and above all full-scale commercial development of specific products and 
processes. Many initiatives originated from Min Tech and its various bod- 
ies in support of these more advanced stages of R&D beyond purely basic re- 
search in order to fill the "exploitation gap." They were mostly made pos- 
sible by the Science and Technology (S&T) Act 1965 and the Development of 
Inventions Acts 1965 and 196?. At the same time the government increased 
its involvement in the high-technology" sectors. Support for projects in 
the aerospace industry grew rapidly because of the cost explosion in a few 
high risk cases. The rationalisation of the structure of the nuclear power 
plant producers was begun by the IRC which also intervened in other 
research-intensive industries, such as machine tools, electronics, tele- 
communications. Most important was thesesfabt1shmen"f~6f a coordinated 
strategy to promote the U.K. computer industry which centered around the 
creation of ICL under the Industrial Expansion Act 1968, but included many 
more new measures (see relevant case study in sec. 6.2).
During 1970-7** the Conservative Government tried to improve the coor- 
dination and effectiveness of the widely dispersed and constantly prolif- 
erating state initiatives in support of private industry's R&D by setting 
up sector-specific Research Requirement Boards (RRBs). They were charged 
with monitoring existing activities, inquiring further into the R&D sup- 
port needs of various sectors, and starting new schemes accordingly. In
addition the customer/contractor principle was introduced as a form of 
standardised management techniques to regulate the funding and carrying 
out of R&D projects within the state apparatus in correspondence with 
users 1 needs. Rationalisation in and support for the aerospace, computer 
and nuclear power industries were continued.
Under the Labour Government 197^'78 existing support measures were 
further consolidated. New measures focused on supporting the last stage 
of industry's RSD through funds for product development, technological 
change within production processes and the diffusion of commercially viable 
innovation, often in sectors that so far had been not at all or only in- 
significantly assisted by the State. For this purpose the Government made 
extensive use of its new powers under the Industry Act 1972 (selective 
investment schemes) and the Industry Act 1975 (NEB). Under the "Industrial 
Strategy" the Government increasingly sought, to integrate its RSD policy 
with other industrial policy measures into overall sectoral strategies for 
particular industries.
The range of policy initiatives has thus been gradually expanded to 
cover all aspects from basic research to full-scale commercial development 
of products and processes In an increasing number of sectors. The differ- 
ent phases briefly discussed above express together an overall evolution- 
ary pattern from an initially very limited range of policies towards a far 
more extensive and coordinated strategy of government support for and in- 
volvement in the various aspects of industrial RSD. This development was 
based on "learning" from many failures, a continuous flow of inquiries con- 
cerning the effectiveness of existing measures and the specific needs of 
particular sectors, and an on-going dialogue between representatives from 
industry and government agencies on..possible improvements in policy-making. 
In the following paragraphs we shall discuss the most important elements of 
the "science and technology" policy in the U.K. more fully.
4.3.2.1: Support for Basic Research: This area has traditionally involved 
public bodies. Despite possible benefits private industry may not ade- 
quately get involved in the generation of scientific knowledge through basic 
research because of its distance (In terms of time and probably applicabil- 
ity) to commercial development. Apart from basic research carried out 
In universities and Research Councils (see footnote 33) the Government funds 
this type of activity also in the so-called Research Associations (RAs). 
Started in 1917 the RAs carry out industrial research cooperatively, en-
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abling firms with similar interests to pool their resources for the pur-
. (3*0 pose of economies.
Of major importance in this area are also the Government's own re- 
search establishments and laboratories. These include: a) Establishments 
whose work is principally in support of the Government's statutory and >-eq-- 
ulatory functions with regard to the social costs of existing or new tech- 
nologies in terms of health, safety, pollution or amenities. Those are 
the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, the Laboratory of the Govern- 
ment Chemist, the. Torry Research Station (handling and processing of fish) 
the Fire Research Station, the Forest Products Research Station, the Hy- 
draulics Research Station, the Water Pollution Research Laboratory, and the 
Civil Aviation Navigational Services Programme. b) The main indus- 
trial Research Establishments (iREs), specifically the National Physical 
Laboratory (NPL), National Engineering Laboratory (NEL) and the Warren 
Springs Laboratory (WSL). Together with the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) 
they may support the Government's statutory and regulatory functions, such 
as projects of the NPL on developing new standards of measurement or on 
industrial cleaners, of WSL on air and oil pollution or of the AEA on fire- 
resistant materials and medical technology. But for the most part they 
undertake a wide range of R&D activities of potential benefit to private 
industries. c) R&D establish- 
ments in support of specific high technology sectors, such as the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment (RAE), the National Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE) 
and the Rocket Propulsion Establishment (RPE) for aerospace, the AEA for 
nuclear power, and the National Computing Centre (NCC), the Computer-Aided 
Design Centre (CADC), and the Advanced Computer Technology Project (ACTP) 
for computers.
We concentrate here only on the IREs, including AEA's civil R&D activ- 
ity carried out under sec. ^ of the S&T Act 19&5 which was introduced to 
expand public support for civil R&D and make better use of AEA's resources. 
Establishments under category a) have no direct relation to private indus- 
try, while those under category c) are discussed more fully below, such as 
those in support of the computer industry in sec. 6.2.
The activities of the IREs generate scientific knowledge In a wide
range of areas. These involve according to SCST (1972B, para. 30-30
mostly "long-term research" not undertaken by private companies because of 
lack of qualified staff, financial resources or approprfate R&D-infrestruc- 
tures and testing facilities. Sometimes firms are not aware of the appli- 
cation potential of specific projects or prefer less risky innovations with
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a bhorter time-span. The IREs therefore, filled a (jap. But apart from AEAs 
sec. 4-work (all authorised hy the Government and carried out usually in 
collaboration with private firms) the activities of the IRFs during the 
I960's were generally self-generated without any prior considerarion of 
industry's needs and evaluation of their respective commercial viability. 
Evidence, such as in SCSI (1972.B, pr»ras.'37, 39 and 55) , suggests further 
that the IREs undertook only slight efforts to promote the results of their 
work or offer their services to industry. In 1971"72 only of NPL's, 
of NEL's and 13% of WSL's total costs represented work done directly for 
private industry.
First steps to overcome this shortcoming of the i.REs were introduced 
in the late 15)60's, with the emphasis on information and advisory services, 
such as WSL's courses on process control computers in 1967 and 1968. With 
the establishment of the customer/contractor'principie in 19/1/72 contract 
work became finally the main principle guiding the formation of R&D-pro- 
jects. At the same time RRBs were set up for all research-intensive sec- 
tors to monitor and finance the activities of the IREs and AEA, to act as 
a catalyst between industry and government establishments, and to analyse 
the R&D-needs of specific sectors. These measures resulted with regard to 
the IREs in a gradual expansion of contract work, stronger orientation to- 
wards users' needs, and more concern for exploratory and even commercial 
development rather than purely basic or applied research. The IREs thus 
became more directly beneficial to industry.
ZL3.?.2.: The NRDC: Initially, that is, between 19^8 and the mid-60's, this 
para-governmental agency was mainly involved with funding the basic and 
applied research carried out by universities, individuals and the govern- 
ment's research establishments and with patenting any inventions arising 
out of this activity. It also was supposed to promote the commercial use 
of these inventions by way of license agreements with private firms in ex- 
change for royalties. As pointed out in SCST (1972C, Q. 73, 81), this re- 
lieved the IREs and even the AEA from having to exploit their own resulcs 
commercially and thus contributed to their lack both of contact with pri- 
vate firms and of eviluating their projects in terms of market criteria. 
Under the Development of Invention Acts 1965 and 1967 the powers of 
the NRDC were extended to include so-called "joint ventures" with private 
industry. In these the corporation provides a fixed contribution (usually 
50%) related to the project's estimated development costs, to be recovered 
with interest in case of successful completion by means of a levy on salos.
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This type of assistance is known as "launching aid." It war, first applied 
to fund aerospace projects (see below). It involved the NRDC ir. projects 
thai otherwise would not have been possible for a firm because of lack cf 
finance. With the repayment to the NRDC depending on the success of the 
resulting product's marketability it also acted as a form of risk-sharing. 
Firms were given an incentive not to spend beyond estimated costs, because 
the level of assistance was fixed in advance of actual expenditure and any 
overspending had to be paid by the firm alone. As an additional form of 
support the NRDC sometimes acquired shares of private firms. In exception- 
al coses, as in the case of hovercraft or export of computer software, the 
NRDC formed new companies as its subsidiaries to sell products or processes 
which it had previously supported In their RSD-staqe. By 1976/77 the NRDC 
was involved in 185 joint ventures at an aggregate cost of fc.23.17 m. and 
held shares in about 20 firms.
Since 1971/72 the corporation managed to satisfy its statutory duty 
to earn a commercial rate of return on its operations. Since then it has 
repaid all government loans. In 1976/77, for instance, it achieved a sur- 
plus of h10.62 m. from an operating income of h19-39 m., based on royalties 
from its 5,000 patents and licensing agreements and on revenue from hun- 
dreds of joint ventures. The NRDC achieved some major successes of com- 
mercial development, most notably the setting up of the hovercraft industry 
with the U.K. as a world leader and the exploitation of Cephalosporin (a 
penicillin-type drug with cumulative royalties exceeding h30 m.). The suc- 
cessful development.of computer software packages, of fibre materials to 
reinforce concrete components, and of underwater engineering with many 
specific applications in the exploration of North Sea Oil added to NRDC's 
income as we11.
But these successes and the impressive, income figures ignore the. fact 
that the majority of NRDC-projects were high-risk ventures resulting fre- 
quently in failures. ^f-96 ~new^Tteveh3pmetrt-p by the corp- 
oration in 1970/71 59 failed and were discontinued, while only 25 entered 
the exploitation stage. Despite the general success with the Hovercrart 2 
firms (Sealand and Tracked Hovercraft) went bankrupt in 1973 alone due to 
failures of product development. Moreover, plans to apply the concept 
elsewhere (Hovertrain) had to be abandoned. Another typical case was car- 
bon fibre, developed by the RAE and the AEA as a reinforcement material 
with superb qualities, 3 wide range of potential users to replace other 
fibres, and the potential to attack the dominance of U.S. fibre producers. 
The NRDC then licensed the invention to Rolls-Royce which subsequently had
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to face the risks of first users when serious problems with its explication 
in the new RB 211-engine led to the firm's bankruptcy. Two other U.K. 
firms (Courtaulds, Morgan Crucible) with licenses from the NRDC- refused to 
set up domestic production facilities for -carbon fibre, because demand 
existed at this point only potentially (but not actually) and risks were 
therefore too-high; Instead they both concluded agreements with U.S. fIrns 
covering production in the U.S.A. and the exchange oi: technical information 
so that U.K.'s potential competitive edge wc.s lost. The NRDC had no legr.! 
power to encourage or direct the firms to set up production facilities In 
the U.K. and thus exploit this important innovation in the "national inter- 
est.» (36 >
^.3-2.3«: Informa t ion and Advj spry Se rvjjjc. cs : These became increasingly im- 
portant after 196^4 as a means to deal with imperfect knowledge of industri- 
al users and to promote the application of new technologies. Apart from 
already mentioned efforts of RAs, IREs and AEA, they include, for example, 
Min Tech's Technical Information and Library Services Reports Centre which 
organised and made publicly available a substantial flow of technical re- 
ports published throughout the world. This was later extended by Dol's 
Technology Reports Centre as a national clearing house for unpublished 
technical reports from the U.K. and overseas. The Low-cost Automation 
Centres were effective in promoting the use of automation techniques, hln 
Tech also set up a Numerical Control Advisory and Demonstration Service to 
help furthering the diffusion of NC-machine tools. Similar services to ex- 
pand computer application will be discussed in sec. 6.2. The Industrial 
Liaison Scheme of Min Tech had centres in various regions to improve local 
industries' awareness of new technologies and to put firms with technical
difficulties in touch with appropriate organisations for help. In May 1977
NEDC set up the Manufacturing Advisory Service to assist firms in making 
best use of available techniques' in marTuTactuTlng"Tech~ndl6gy and o'rganisa- 
tion. Dol's Committee for Industrial Technologies which promotes especially 
new innovations concern1 ing terotechnology, materials handling and corro- 
sion, and the Centre for Interfirm Comparison are the latest in a long 
series of such services.
'». 3   2. '*.: Further measures to support exploratory and ful 1  "^ol^^cj.Mi^ien- 
cial development: We have already discussed some measures in this direc- 
tion aimed at bridging the "exploitation gap," such as AEA's non-nuclear 
R£D-work under sec. ^ of the S&T Act 1965, the switch to .more contract
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work by the IREs, and NRDC's "joint ventures." Deyonc! thai; sec, 5 of the 
S&T Act 1965 gave Min Tech wide powers to further the practical applic.3i.ior, 
of K&D-results in industry.
One major initiative under sec. 5 were the so-called Pre-Proouct.ion 
Order Schemes to help first users in dealing with the risks of using a new 
product and to provide at the same tine producers with test information 
facilitating its full-scale launching. Under the scheme Min Tech. purchased 
special pieces of advanced machinery not yet in full production from se- 
lected manufacturers. It then placed them for a certain amount of time on 
free loan with potential users who were required to report to both Hiri 'lech 
and the producer on the equipment's working performance. Ai. the end of the 
evaluation period the machine was either sold, rented, or otherwise dis- 
posed of. Its first such scheme in 1966/67 covering new machine tools was 
a full success with all items sold to the initial users. By 1970 such 
schemes had been extended to machinery for textiles, plastics, printing, 
fish processing, mechanical handling, construction, and scientific instru- 
ments. According to G.M. Fields and P.V. Hills (1976, p. 19), 60 such 
schemes worth t5.5 m. had been entered into by February 1975, with public 
funds now being recovered through a levy on the sales of the thus promoted 
new machines. Under sec. 5 Government departments have also over the last 
decade increasingly placed collaborative development contracts with indus- 
try to fund specified R&D-projects with commercial potential carried out 
by private firms. As a result of an IRC-study such contracts were, for 
example, given to leading U.K. firms in 1969 and again in 1972 to further 
work on micro-circuits. At the suggestion of various SCST-studies on the 
U.K. computer industry contracts were after 1972 also offered to software 
houses as a means of supporting their R&D-activity. A more detailed anal- 
ysis of these two examples is undertaken in sec. 6.2. below.
Finally, in July 1977 t20 m. were made available under a sec. 5~
sc"Heme "to support the"""3eVeTopm"ent~of new"p"roduct? and processes in rnanu-
(37)facturing industry. This resembled in outline schemes put forward in- 
creasingly after 1973 under sec. 8 of the Industry Act 1972 (discussed be- 
low in sec. 5.2.2.) which aimed at promoting large-scale modernisation ef- 
forts of specific sectors and of^on included also special assistance for 
product development. By combining a variety of aid forms developed under 
sec. 5 and by covering all sectors and all stages of RSD, the scheme con- 
solidated and extended the support available under the S&T Act 1965- It 
marked the most coordinated effort to direct science and technology policy 
more towards industry's own R&D and towards completion of projects by
bringing new products or processes onto the -market. It thereby consti- 
tuted a major step forward in the gradual tendency of policy-making ofter 
196^ to move beyond purely basic, and applied research carried out by Gov- 
ernment establishments.
3 . 2 . 5 . ' R&D-support i £L_Lll£__sp_l££J ' ed "nig h_ te i^nc > 1 c:n y ' ^_ s e_c t£r_s_ ; i\ 1 s k s 
and costs with regard to RSD in these sectors are often beyond the means 
of most private firms. Their projects generally have long "gestation per- 
iods" from the basic research and design stage to the actual commerc i a i 
application of a new product. This results in forecasting difficulties 
and uncertain investment appraisals, especially when unforeseen technical 
problems and other unpredictable cost factors may play a major role. These. 
risks make the funding of a project often very problematic, not only be- 
cause major sums are involved, but also because shareholders and banks pre- 
fer more secure Investment projects, and firms have to wait a long time 
before any of their expenditure is recovered sales. These difficulties 
are often exacerbated by rapid technological change despite the long ges- 
tation period, and by overwhelming competitive pressure mostly from the 
much larger U.S. companies.
In order to maintain independent U.K. production facilities in those. 
"high technology" sectors, such as computers, nuclear energy, aerospace, 
and to a lesser, but still significant extent, machine tools, telecommuni- 
cations, or scientific instruments, increasingly massive Government sup- 
port has been required and was readily provided in the post-war period. 
The U.K. Governments have justified their more and more expensive involve- 
ment in the advanced technology areas of U.K. industry usually be reference 
to the deliberately vague term "national interest." More specifically this 
could imply import savings, maintaining important resources witMn the 
U.K., pioneering in the achievements of technological breakthroughs, or the 
strategic importance of certain products for spreading technological change 
and innovative activity in industry as possible reasons for state interven- 
tion.
In D.E.A. (1967) the Government realised the importance of the public 
sector as a customer in the context of intervening in the structure of the 
supplier industry or directing its product development. Especially with 
regard to various advanced technology sectors Government purchasing policy 
(including local authorities and nationalised industries) discriminated 
against overseas producers, and gave domestic firms a more or less guar- 
anteed market outlet in which new products could be tested <<r,d proven for
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their commercial applicability and quality.
With regard to computers, for example, the Government successfully 
combined d I scrirninatot y public purchasing, R£L'>-5upport for product devel- 
opment of hardware, software, data transmission and microcirujits, equity 
holdings, international collaboration agreements arid promotion of conputer 
application in many industrial activities to establish and sustain a stronu 
domestic industry (to be discussed as a case study in sec. 6.2).
In the nuclear field R&D was carried out by the AtA as a public monop- 
oly. Over a span of 25 years the AHA fully developed up to the pilot plant 
stage four generations of nuclear reactors (Magnox, Advanced Gas Cooled 
Reactors (AGR), Steam, Generated Heavy Water Reactors (SGMWR), and presently 
the Fast Breeders) and participated in international RtD-collaboration pro- 
jects, such as the High Temperature Reactors (HTR), centrifuges, and thermo- 
nuclear fusion. It also managed to become a world leader in the R&D and 
production of nuclear fuels. In its role as monopoly buyer through the 
electricity generating boards the Government has consequently favoured U.K. 
reactor types over others, especially the enormously successful U.S. light 
water reactors (for more details see below in sec. A.3.3-2). And it has 
repeatedly intervened in changing the structure of the private nuclear 
power plant industry. In July 1968 the IRC, asked to implement recommen- 
dations of its previous report on this sector, helped with equity partici- 
pation to create two consortia. In 1975 pl^ns were finalised to merge the 
two into one U.K. nuclear design and construction company with equity par- 
ticipation of the AEA as a means of public control. At the same time a 
tri-partite Nuclear Power Advisory Board was sec up to coordinate the R&D, 
producer and consumer interests better and to assist the Government's de- 
cision-making in this area.
In aerospace Government research establishments, such as the. RAE, sup- 
ported the R&D-activity of private firms. Up to the mid-1970's the Govern- 
ment supported mergers-, leav4iig-^^fina1nrt^oiTly-n3^ and 
two airframe producers in the U.K. Public ownership in the industry was 
gradually extended, beginning in the 1960's with small firms (Short Bro- 
thers and Harland, Beagle), then Rolls-Royce in 1971 and finally ending 
in full-scale nationalisation of the whoi^. industry in 1977- Discrimin- 
atory public purchasing and the promotion of international joint collabor- 
ation projects were also in this sector parts of policy. But the largest. 
form of support came through continuous "launching aid" for the full-scale 
commercial development of a whole series of engines anci airframes. Accord- 
ing to data from N.K. GARDNER (1976, p. 1^-1^5), the launching aid by suc-
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cessive governments since 19^5 came to an equivalent c( hi50 
prices) of which only 101 had been recovered by 197'*. Even Vvhe.n abstract- 
ing from the most expensive projects (that is, Concorde, Rolls Royce's 
RB 211) launching aid contributions of hU-^o m. for eight airframe and 
six aero-engine projects compared with b30.9 m. in recoveries The Vis- 
count as the only project^ where recoveries exceeded ccntr i but ions, d id r,ot: 
earn the Government enough surplus revenue to allow for reasonable rate 
of interest on public funds. The major justification for this level of 
Government support was in terms of the benefits to the balance of payments, 
as exports in civil aerospace of h^SOO in. and import savings of L3500 m. 
(all in 137^ prices^ of which 75% came from projects supported by launching 
aid, resulted in a combined benefit of h8000 m. between 19^5 and 137'<« At 
the same, tims launching aid into a few extremely costly aerospace projects 
absorbed a disproportionally large part of the total public support for 
R&D which otherwise could have been more evenly spread over a wider range
/oO\
of sectors.° '
*».3«3. Assessment of science and technology policy
In general the funds provided by Government in this context averaged 
around 30% of total R&D-expenditure in manufacturing industry. Some pol- 
icy initiatives, such as the pre-production order schemes, hovercraft, de- 
salination, were clearly successful. And Government support was vital in 
the process of building up and maintaining a strong U.K. presence in nu- 
clear energy, aerospace, computers and other sectors of advanced tech- 
nology. But there are nevertheless a number of problem areas to be dis- 
cussed with regard to the science and technology policy in the U.K. which 
have not yet been fully dealt with and which have constrained the policy's 
effectiveness.
^.3.3.1.: Allocation of Government funds: Before 1965 more than 90% of the 
total public funds went into defence R&D. Since then this has been cor- 
rected, and presently support for civil R&D exceeds that for defence by a 
ratio of 3:2. Through policy initiatives after 1965 (including joint ven- 
tures by the NRDC, contract work by the IREs and the AHA on the basis of 
the customer/contractor-principle and under guidance of the RRBs, develop- 
ment contracts, technical information and advisory services, and pre-pro- 
duction order schemes) funds were shifted increasingly away from basic and 
applied research outside industry towards exploratory and commercial devel- 
opment of marketable products. These measures meant that policy be-
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came more oriented towards industry's needs as a user, "the market, poten- 
tials of new products, the diffusion of knowlednr^ the transfer of 
technology   all important factors in reduc r ng the "exploit.>';ion gap." 
Policy was also improved in terms of gradually strengthening the contacts 
between Government and industry and between manufacturer and user of new 
products.
Despite these policy shifts the most crucial aspect of allocating 
funds most effectively over a wider range of sectors was not addressed. 
The largest proportion of public R£-D funds was taken up by a rev; exceed- 
ingly expensive projects in research-intensive, high-risk sectors that 
may have a high export propensity or import saving potentials. In 197 V72 
and 1972/73, for instance, between 80 and of the U.K. Government's 
total R&D-suppcrt was spent on the nuclear industry, Concorde, and the 
RB-211 aero-engine alone. These projects with long time-horizons and con- 
siderable technical uncertainties turned out subsequently to be far more 
costly than originally estimated. The prevention of unemployment, bank- 
ruptcies of important firms, promoting prestige through the achievement of 
technological breakthroughs, averting foreign competition with its threat. 
to national independence in key sectors of advanced technology, and the 
desire not to waste already spent public funds were all considered import- 
ant enough reasons to continue, support despite exploding costs. Such ex- 
tensive funding of a few projects came at the expense of cheaper, but ef- 
fective measures designed to encourage innovative activity over a wide 
range of industries where the competitive performance of U.K. firms had 
continued to deteriorate. The measures introduced after 1965, which aimed 
at product development, technology transfer and diffusion of knowledge (see 
above), were not sufficient to prevent a relative decline of industry's 
R&D~efforts, as is evident from Table ^.3.
Tabled.3.: U.K. industrial innovation __m_manuf act_y_r i_ruj. bY sector JS6_3~ 
1975, measured in terms of total RGD-expenditure as of value of net 
output.
1963 1968 1972 1975
total manufacturing *1.1 3«7 3« c< 
food, drink and tobacco 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 
chemicals and drugs 6.3 5.8 6.^ 6.7 
petroleum products 8.6 6.1 5-8 2.2
iron, steel and other metal 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.5 
products
mechanical engineering 3.2 3.2 2.1 2.0
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(Table ^.3- continued)
2
*~t
} .
scientific instruments
electrical and electronics
shipbuilding
motor vehicles .
aircraft and missiles
fabricated metal products
textiles and man-made fibres
SOURCE: U.K. Government Statistics (e.g. Census of Production), analysed L.y 
Sussex University Science Policy Research Unit and presented in Financial 
Times, 28/4/1978, p. 15.
The declining trend of R&D~act ivi ty in most sectors is part of U.K., 
industry's overall deteriorating position (discussed above in Ch. 2). It 
resulted most likely from a combination of general underinvestment, pres- 
sures on company liquidity that leave little finance for less immediate 
activities such as R&D, and management inefficiency to keep informed about 
and/or apply new technological developments and to pay adequate attention 
to design and marketing. The impressive record of German and Japanese firms 
In recent times has clearly shown the importance of product innovation, 
specialised design, marketing strength, and rapid application of advanced 
technology (such as electronics) especially in machine building and process 
engineering. The overproport ionate concentration of Government funds in 
a few, expensive projects did not help U.K. firms to overcome their back- 
wardness with regard to these vital aspects of industrial competitiveness. 
Instead science and technology policy should now continue to expand at an 
accelerated pace initial efforts after 1965 in support of product develop- 
ment, application of new production techniques, diffusion of knouledge and 
technology transfer in industry as a whole.
4.3.3.2.: Ri sks : Promoting already existing scientific knowledge is safer 
than funding the commercial development of new products and processes. 
Public fun-J^ repeatedly fell victim to the high risks of many R&D-projects. 
Since i960 three aerospace firms (Handley Page, Beagle, Rolls-Royce) be- 
came insolvent and had to be bailed out by the Government because of set- 
backs in projects supported by "launching aid." Many NRDC-act ivities h:icJ 
to be discontinued after public funds hdd been committed and spent. Ti'.s 
same was also true for aerospace projects, such as the Airbus which inci- 
dently became a commercial success after completion by France arid Germany.
and the Channel Tunnel.
But the most serious miscalculations with devastating results in terms 
of public expenditure on RoD occurred in a few high-risk projects. in the 
case of Concorde, for example, development and production costs were at 
the time of the joint collaboration agreement between France and the U.K. 
in 13o2 estimated at h150 170 m. with strong future demand prospects r'or 
supersonic jets. Substantial technological problems, concerning the de- 
sign of wings and engines to meet pollution and safety standards and aero- 
dynamic requirements, caused delays and helped to push up costs to over" 
hi bn. of which the U.K. Government will have to pay h56*J ni. (in 1373 
prices). There are so far only nine orders from British Airways and Air- 
France, so that production of only 16 planes is planned. The selling 
price of Concorde does not even cover production costs, let alone recover- 
any of the development costs. So far passenger demand at a ticket price 
of above standard first-class in subsonic jets is completely insuffi- 
cient to cover operating costs, inflicting heavy losses on the two airlines 
using Concorde. Rolls Ro/ce's RB-211-engine was based on some revolution- 
ary technological improvements- with commercial advantages in terms of re- 
ducing noise and weight. The consequent power and fuel economies enabled 
Rolls Royce to conclude a contract with Lockheed in 1968 before the devel- 
opment of the engine against strong competition from U.S. firms under which 
its new Tristar jet was to be supplied with RB 211-engines. This agreement 
included very tight concitions regulating the delivery dates, a low fixed 
selling price-based on Rolls Royce's overoptimistic cost-plus estimates, 
and stiff penalty clauses in case of delay, The U.K. Government agreed to 
contribute h^7 m. in launching aid on the basis of the company's initial 
development cost forecasts. Subsequent technical problems caused costs to 
explode and the project to be delayed. In various^ stages more public funds 
were provided for the project until Rolls Royce finally went into liquida- 
tion in 1971, unable to deliver the engine on time. Faced with even more 
expensive alternatives the Government decided to nationalise the firm, re- 
negotiate the contract with Lockheed and put up the money required to fin- 
ish t'-'e project which in the end cost a total of 1:225-5 m. before any re- 
coveries set in. Fortunately the engine in its different versions is pre- 
sently selling well, with a recent agreement to use it !n new Bee ing-plane-: 
as its latest success. In the wake of the experience with Concorde and 
RB-211 launching aid policy was finally changed in 1975 to include n-ore 
elaborate methods of cost evaluation and to apply stronger scrutiny or. the 
part of the Government over the financial position of the- companies in-
volved and over the carrying out of projects.
Failures have also occurred with U.K. nuclear reactors. Original 
cost estimates ot the AGR between 1%5 and 1-968 amounted to 1.89-32 m. At 
that time the AGR was thought to be cheaper, safer and mon... fuel-efficient 
than the light water reactors developed in the U.S.A., with considerable 
export potential as a result. But the building of AGR-based power stations 
was delayed by 3~5 years because of technical problems. And by the end of 
1975 costs per station had increased to b?,20~280 m. The AGR also turned 
out to be less efficient than initially planned, whereas technological 
progress on the light water reactors had made these more competitive. While. 
the AGR, not .yet successfully tested and proven in the U.K., did not win a 
single export order overseas, the U.S. reactor? became an enormous success 
at the world market.
A.3«3«3- Management inefficiency and lack of public control: These have 
frequently aggravated the problems of supporting RSD in industry with pub- 
lic funds. The NRDC, as discussed above, was not capable of exercising 
control over the dec is ion-making of firms that were given licenses to ex- 
ploit carbon fibre. Consequently this potentially valuable invention was 
lost to U.S. firms. According to G. GANZ (1977, p. 9-10 and 18-19), the 
feasibility studies by the U.K. Government between 1956 and 1959 concern- 
ing Concorde were confined entirely to technical issues, and failed to 
look at the market forecasts for supersonic jets under different sets of 
assumptions. Both in the case of Concorde and RB-211 major sums were com- 
mitted by the authorities without any public debate, say, in Parliament. 
Rolls Royce's figures on costs^and delivery times of the RB-211 were not 
checked, nor were the affairs of the company and the progress of the pro- 
ject monitored by the Government. The late efforts by the IRC (which were 
in addition in 1970 prematurely halted in preparation of its abolition by 
the recent 1 y e 1 ec ted Con s e rva fTv e~1jo v e r rime nT) HtcTffia Re~firrtTie?" f i nanc i a ] 
assistance by the state conditional on cost-cutting rationalisation, change 
of management techniques and personnel, and the regular provision of de- 
tailed information was strongly resisted by Rolls at the beginning. The 
IRC concluded that the company was badly run. Managers had only little 
knowledge about the effects of the technical difficulties encountered de- 
spite the very tight contract with Lockheed as concerned delivery time and 
price. Their information flow differentiated only between divisions, but 
not between individual contracts. No contingency plans for any possible 
cost and time overruns hod been made, so that the company had accepted r,
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contract far too big for its own financial resources even with 
aid contributions. The IRC also noted a low degree of coordination be- 
tween the company's divisions, overmanning, anc! djp'l icat Son of effort,
Lack of information, monitoring and control on the part of the Government
made any preventative measures impossible.
The failure'to export U.K. nuclear reactors was partly also caused by 
the two producer consortia not having standardised the components, fuel 
and core designs of their plants. Only in the mid-lS'/O' s were initiatives 
set by the Government to overcome this problem, including the merger of 
producers into one group (the National Nuclear Company), stronger R&D- 
col laboration between the AEA and the consortium of producers, and the 
setting up of a consultation machinery (the Nuclear Power Advisory Board) 
between all parties concerned.
The problems discussed above point to the need for improving the com- 
munication network between Government bodies and industry in order to iden- 
tify more precisely problem areas in the development and application of 
new technology. For a more effective science and technology policy the 
Government will have to expand its control powers and expertise. Its 
support measures could then be more adequate responses to industry's needs 
both as producers and users of new products and processes, while at the 
same time be also a more influential factor in the considerations and de- 
cisions of private firms. So far Government has not found a method or cen- 
tralised mechanism to set priorities determining the allocation of funds, 
to gather information from industry and to coordinate, the various existing 
measures. Beginnings in this direction have been made with the RRBs or 
the process and product development scheme under sec. 5 of the S&T Act 
1965. These need to be extended further, together with joint ventures, 
information services, and development contracts. ^Involvement in high-risk 
projects of advanced technology in certain research-intensive sectors 
should be decided upon on the basis of much more accurate and detailed 
analyses of risks, costs and benefits and should be carried out under more 
intensive monitoring. But above all emphasis should be laid on cheap and 
effective ways to encourage technological change, product development and 
design improvements in as many sectors as possible.
CHAPTER 5: THE EXPANS 1 ON OF I i^DUSTR AL_ POL I CY J N J'H^_J_970 ' J?J^! ! [ ' C'I
INTENSIFIFD POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE CXTI-.NT 
OFJSTATE I NTEKVENT1 _QU__i N Ti-JE r^CONOW
!n the previous chapter we analysed the evolution of industrial policy 
within specific areas of intervention, such as the provision of additional 
funds for investment finance, initiatives to encourage indust r i,-:! res true   
turing, and assistance for research and development in private industry. 
Our discussion of the various Pleasures introduced since 19^'? svre?sc;d the 
growth of state intervention in private industry under the Labour Govern- 
ment 136*1-70. During that period important policy initiatives were carried 
out in all three areas of intervention. Especially in relation to the pro- 
motion of industrial restructuring within different sectors of private in- 
dustry we discussed (in sec. *4.2.) measures, such as the IRC and the Indus- 
trial Expansion Act 1968, which Indicated the potential of industrial pol- 
icy to alter the structure and production conditions of private companies. 
These measures were not only key instruments for the attempts in the 196o's 
by the government to improve industrial performance, but constituted also 
important novelties in domestic economic policy by introducing the concept 
of the para-governmental agency or because of the wide powers of direct 
intervene ion in private industry assumed by the state.
In our discussion of measures to raise investment finance (in sec. 
*».1.) and to promote science and technology (in sec. *4.3.) we did not con- 
fine ourselves to the policy changes of the period 196*1-70, but pointed 
also to the consolidation and extension of- state intervention in these 
areas during the 1970's. This latter development was part of on overall 
process which began in 1971/72 and which marked a new stage in the evolu- 
tion of industrial policy towards a more coordinated and worked out ap- 
proach by U.K. policy-makers to deal with the problems of private industry. 
Apart from consolidating policies within limited areas of intervention, 
such as investment finance or science and technology, as described above, 
the most significant characteristic of industrial policy in the 1970's has 
been its more extensive coverage in terms of both sectors and objectives 
on the basis of only a few, very powerful measures. These have greatly 
increased the flexibility and the ability of the state to intervene in a 
variety of industrial situations. At the same time, while industrial pol- 
icy thus expanded its scope considerably during this dpcncie, the idcosooi- 
cal conflicts within and between the political parties over the role of 
state intervention intensified. In Ch. 5 we discuss therefore <«) the tm-
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plementation of those major policy initiatives of the iS/O's which have 
avoided the problem of industrial policy in the 1960's to rely primarily 
(with the possible exception of the IRC and the Industrial expansion Act 
1968) on more narrowly defined measures separated from each other on the 
basis of limited objectives; and b) the ongoing political debater, as 
they affected the course of industrial policy since 1970.
5   1   The f a J1 u re of ''d ? se^gngernent" ujide r^ t h£,jCo£se rvo_fc i ^e_. Op^nTrne
1970-197**
This section discusses the attempt of the Conservative Government to 
"disengage" the state apparatus from the economy. Its failure and the 
subsequent reversal towards more intervention in private industry provide 
a clear indication of both the need for and the rationale of an industrial 
policy in the context of the U.K. economy.
The concept of "disengagement" as a broad strategy was developed step 
by step in the period 196^-1970, after the Conservative Party had abandon- 
ed its previous committment to economic planning. It was formulated in 
opposition to and as an alternative to the Labour Government's increased 
involvement in the private sector and expansion of the state apparatus. 
It consisted of different elements which together were designed to bi ing 
about a substantially reduced, but more effective range of government 
agencies and policies.'
With regard to industrial policy disengagement was based on reduc- 
tion of state intervention in private industry. Its major aim was to en- 
courage private enterprise wherever possible and to replace the selective 
and discriminatory intervention under Labour's Min Tech with only "gener- 
al pressures." These should create the appropriate climate for market 
forces alone to bring about the desired changes through competition and 
adjustment. Consequently many of Labour's industrial policy measures were 
abolished. These included investment grants, SET, IRC, and the Industrial 
Expansion Act, thus dismantling the whole apparatus developed over the 
previous six years to address some of private industry's essential prob- 
lems. In addition, a "lame duck"-po1icy was announced in October 19/0 
at the Party Conference in a speech by DTI-Secretary J- Davies, in which 
assistance "to bolster up or bail out companies where (the Government) can 
see no end to the process of propping them up" would be refused. Certain 
industries, most notably aerospace and to a lesser extent shipbuilding, 
were excluded from this policy, but at the same time warned thai;, while
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needing a "supporting hand," an "open-ended liability" v..,.uld not toler- 
ated.
This policy course appears to have harmed many private- finis. The 
negative impact of phasing out investment grants and ro i n inuj'icing invest- 
ment allowances has already been discussed above in 4,1.2, 1 he abolition 
of the IRC together with that of the Industrial Expansion Act 1968 in the. 
Industry Act 1971 stripped the government of any powers Lo intervene selec- 
tively on the level of firms or sectors in support of industrial reorgani- 
sation or capacity expansion.
In the case of the IRC there was no evaluation of its costs and bene- 
fits carried out to justify its abolition. Instead it reflected more the
Conservatives' long-standing opposition to its powers and lack of public
(2^ 
accountability. ' More than 40% of IRC's assets were disposed of very
rapidly by the DTI through sales of its equity at the stock market. The 
termination and dismantling of the IRC interrupted its follow-up and moni- 
toring activity prematurely in the middle of many iong-term rationalisa- 
tion projects. The DTI which took over responsibility for IRC-projects 
abstained from exerting pressure on management and from exercising control 
over the progress of various schemes. Subsequently companies, such as 
Kearney and Trecker, Rolls Royce, Cammell Laird, Chrysler, and Herbert, 
failed to succeed in effective rational sat ion and had to be. bailed out 
at great cost to public expenditure. This might have been avoidable with 
continued public monitoring and control, as was typical for the IRC. Its 
Textile Reequipment Scheme, which provided small- and medium-sized textile 
firms with otherwise not available cash for reequipping their outdated 
capital stock, was another victim of its abolition, with significant poten- 
tial benefits not being materialised.
In 1971 the government reduced also Its export promotion services by 
charging firms fees for participation in trade fairs and other services 
and by ending financial assistance to meet the translation and travel 
costs of firms in pursuit of export markets. These cuts were implemented 
at the time of U.K.'s entry into the EEC which supposed to open up new 
export possibilities for U.K. products, but in effect led to a sharp deter- 
ioration of U.K.'s trade balance with the other ZFC-members after 1971.
Funding under the S&T Act 1965 was also temporarily reduced in 1972, 
with cuts being pushed through fairly indiscriminately. According to 
SCST (1973 B, App. 1, p. 141-142) for example, the budget of the up to 
then highly successful ACTP, a "launching aid" program for product devel- 
opment in computer technology (including software and peripherals), was
- 1)4 ~
cut in 1971/72 by nearly 30%.
The effects of disengagement on industry v/ere even more agqravoted by 
the government's "lame duck" policy. In the case of UCS such a policy 
added to management inefficiency, lack of post-merger- rat .ion r~l I rot ion and 
inadequate monitoring by the SIB, and finally led to the downfall of the
company (more fully discussed in the case-study of the shipbuilding indus-
(3)try in sec. 6.1). The government's refusal to provide- DCS with addi- 
tional funds of t$-6 m., which combined with proper controls to enforce 
rationalisation could have saved the firm, should be compared with the cost: 
of h55 rn. to bail out UCS by setting up Govan as its nationalised succes- 
sor. In 1970 the DTI refused aid to Herbert Ingersol1, a machine tools 
project previously supported by the IRC, and five years later Herbert had 
to be rescued as well. In 1970/71 aid was also denied to motor-cycle pro- 
ducer Birmingham Small Arms (BSA) and to the.Mersey Docks and Harbours 
Board (MDHB), only to be followed in 1973 by rescue operations that cost 
the government 1:3-5 m. in the case of the MDHB and h4.8 m. for BSA.
The "disengagement" strategy was ultimately defeated, The withdrawal 
of involvement in and assistance to the private sector of industry came 
during a period of falling investment, cash liquidity problems and signif- 
icantly lower profitability across industry (see tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). 
Unemployment, surpassing the one million-mark, reached post-war records, 
while the competitive pressure on U.K. firms was probably still exacerbated 
by U.K.'s entry into the EEC. The government had not only deprived itself 
of powers to intervene in this process of deterioration within industry, 
but had most likeiy contributed to it. Political pressures to reverse 
this policy course were beginning to build up with demands from both sides 
of industry. They reached a first climax with the crises of UCS and Rolls 
Royce in early 1971. Both were companies of national importance In their 
respective industries and could not continue to operate without further 
massive injections of public funds. Rolls Royce was important as a large 
direct and indirect employer, for the domestic development of advanced 
technology, for national defence, and for maintaining a viable aerospace 
industry in the U.K., with major international obligations in addition. 
UCS was a significant employer in a depressed area. In both cases public 
funds already spent would have been wasted in case the firms stopped oper- 
ations. There was also tremendous pressure from the unions with the UCS- 
workers occupying the yards to prevent closure. For all these reasons the 
government decided to save the firms by bringing them under public owner- 
ship. This first move away from a rigid "lame duck" policy was soon after-
wards followed by the rescues of the shipbuilders Harl,;.nd am! V.'oiff 
(largest employers in politically unsettled and ccoiioivika i 1 y depressed 
Northern Ireland) and Cammei1 Laird, and later of BSA and MDHB.'
By 1972 policies under d i sengagement' were, further abandcncd with the 
adoption of a statutory incomes policy and substantial overall increase 
of public expenditure. RSD assistance was restored to pre-election levels 
or, as in the case of supporting RSD in the computer industry, went beyond 
them. The final end of disengagement in the area of industrial policy carre 
with the passing of the Industry Act 19/2 which even exceeded previous 
powers of state intervention. It combined assistance : n ih-j context of 
industrial policy to further, for example, modernisation in various sectors
with regional policy goals to increase investment and create employment in
(*0 
U.K.'s depressed regions.
The various categories and forms of aid under the Act were, modelled 
after previous measures, such as investment grants, the IRC, and the In- 
dustrial Expansion Act. Part 1 of the Act, for instance, reintroduced a 
grant system, the Regional Development Grants (RDG).'5)
Sec. 7 of the Act introduced as a result of political pressures 
against high unemployment in 1971/72 selective assistance for projects 
that benefit employment in assisted areas in terms of providing, maintain- 
ing, or safeguarding jobs. The section allowed for a very wide range of 
intervention possibilities by making basically all activities of any in- 
dustry in those specified regions eligible for assistance. These included 
explicitly modernisation, efficiency improvements, capacity expansion, re- 
construction, and also the orderly contraction of a sector's activities 
which clearly indicated the end of the "lame duck" policy in 1972. Assist- 
ance was to be offered only with the consent of the firm, and when no other 
source of finance was "appropriately" available. The forms of assistance 
not only included the standard loans and equity holdings, but were extended 
to cover also loans without interest or at concessionary interest rales 
(usually 3% below the commercial rate), and government assurances or guar- 
antees to meet contingencies, such as a *irm's default on repaying loans 
or its non-fulfillment of contracts. This implicitly meant the provision 
of assistance in future rescue cases and for projects without commercial 
viability. Following up on the difference between the IRC and the schemes 
under the Industrial Expansion Act section 7 reconfirmed that direct gov- 
ernment intervention was thought more appropriate than para-governmental 
agencies to take into account non-commercial, socio-political aspects cf 
industrial activity.
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Sec. 8 regulated financial assistance t ot nl 1 i nj up to r.i','0 m. for 
projects "in the national interest. .« 1 i holy to benefit the economy," thiiL- 
removing the sec. 7"constraints of employment safeguard:, and local ion 
within assisted areas. Parliamentary opprovcil w^ required for projects 
consuming more than h5 m. in public funds. The forms of aid ware the some 
ones as under sec. 7» except that full-scale national 5 salioii of any firm 
was ruled out by allowing the state only to hold maxirmlly i>0/; of company 
shares.
As was the case with the Industrial Expansion Act 1368 this Act also 
set up a machinery to gather information, advise the government, administer 
the schemes and monitor their progress, centering around the Industrial 
Development Advisory Board (IOAB) set up by sec. 9 and the Industrial 
Development Executive (IDE).
Lastly, the Industry Act 1972 provided a follow-up program of support 
for the shipbuilding industry after the SIB had expired in 1371. Under 
sec. 10 Shipbuilding Credit Guarantees were extended to include mobile off- 
shore installations. Sec. 11 provided both sectors with a further subsidy 
in the form of construction grants, worth 10-20% of contract price depend- 
ing on the different phases of construction. As a result of the IDE-study 
on shipbuilding, which emphasized the need for modernisation schemes to 
raise productivity, sec. 7"assistance to this sector was exempted from the 
usual condition of generating or safeguarding employment.
A relatively slow start was made in using the wide powers under this 
Act. According to-DTI (1973A) 115 projects with total value of h**5 m. and 
creation of 7800 new jobs were supported in 19/2/73 under sec. 7 through 
assistance totalling b10.8 m. A total of b25*5 m. in grants, equities and 
loans was spent under sec. 7 on rescue cases of firms with employment in 
assisted areas, such as Carnmell Laird, MDHB or Govan. Under sec. 8 
t 1.25 m. was spent to merge Kearney & Trecker and Marvin (both first 
supported by"the IRC)" and create in KTfl a viable advanced machine tool 
firm. A new motor-cycle firm Norton Villiers Triumph (NVT) was created by 
rescuing BSA with a h*».8 rn. equity holding under sec. 8. In July 1973 the 
government started to expand the use of sec. 8 by introducing a sectoral 
scheme of assistance worth b15 i"- to promote the reorganisation of a spe- 
cific industry, in this case the wool textile industry. This scheme, 
modelled after the Cotton Act 1959 and IRC's Textile Reequipment Scheme, 
became the first such example of using sec. 8 to prcmoie sector-wide mod- 
ernisation in a series that expanded rapidly after Labour's election vic- 
tory in 197A and covered more and more industries (discussed below in
5.2.1). Despite the slow beginning with regarcl to rescue cost", rnd selec- 
tive sector-wide schemes the i ar- reach i rig potentials of the Act's cowers 
were already indicated under the Conservative Government. Th<: severe re- 
cession and Labour's return to office in i$7''i finally sot the conditions 
for applying the Act's powers as widely us possible (sc2 below in 5.2.1.). 
But the mere fact of introducing the Act with unprecedented povers in an 
ciccomodat ion of industrial policy to changed circumstances and by encorpo- 
rating the experience with previous measures is in itself full proof of a 
shift away from disengagement towards continuing the evolution process of 
industrial policy. Thus the attempt to do with as little state interven- 
tion in private industry as possible and to rely instead on the concept of/o\
"rfidrket forces" ultimately failed.
5.2. Consolidation and new challenges for industrial policy under the 
Labour Government 197^-1978
At the time of the elections in early 197^ industrial policy had al- 
ready developed into an important part of policy-making. Strategies in 
which it. was to play a less dominant role (indicative planning, disengage- 
ment) had failed (see sec. 3-^ and 5-1 above) and had been followed by rapid 
expansion of industrial policy measures covering more and more sectors and 
aspects of industrial activity on an increasingly selective basis.
While giving government increasing powers to intervene in private in- 
dustry and improving its understanding of industry's problems, industrial 
policy overall did not succeed in reversing the decline of U.K. industry in 
terms of investment activity, profitability, production efficiency. Al- 
though it produced significant changes in a number of sectors (discussed 
especially in 4.2. and 4.3. above), its effectiveness was ultimately weak- 
ened by major policy shifts and consequent short-lived duration of measures, 
by insufficient monitoring and follow-up procedures concerning specific pro- 
jects, by lack of overall policy coordination, by inadequate communication 
with industry, and by an inability to overcome industry's frequent opposi- 
tion and influence the decisions of its managements, without major conces- 
sions.
The beginning of a world-wide recession at the end of 1973 meant at the 
same time that the new Labour Government was almost immediately faced with 
a situation of run-away inflation, negative growth rates., rapidly declining 
investment activity, soaring trade and budget deficits, rising unemployr^r.i , 
and unusually severe liquidity crisis in private industry which led to a
series of bankruptcies even among the l-niger domestic firr.ib. 'mo inicr~ 
national dimension of that crisis posed nv:my nc-w pioblomG, .in terms of a 
monetary system, trade agreements and a redefined relationship between de- 
veloped and developing economies. Additional challenges i"or the vsricus _;> 
national industries resulted from market saturation for established pro- 
ducts and overcapacity in many sectors, new technologies and ;;;ore expensive 
energy sources. For those reasons the recession was not simply o normal 
part of the business cycle. With regard to U.K. industry it brought the 
long-run trend deterioration (analysed in Ch* ?.) to a hc.r.d ond called ur- 
gently for a more substantial and complete industrial rec;enerat ion.
Faced with the limitations en industrial policy so far and the need for 
policies capable of initiating more massive changes In the private sector t:o 
meet the challenges in the post-crisis recovery, the Labour Party had adopt- 
ed as official policy during its last years in opposition «3 new and power- 
ful, but politically controversial approach to industrial policy. To allow 
a form of more regulatory "planning 11 within the wider context of a "social 
contract" with the unions, which would promote reforms of labour legisla- 
tion and collective bargaining, industrial democracy and an improved wel- 
fare system in exchange for wage restraint, the stste was to take strateaic 
control over many important sectors of private industry. This was to be 
achieved by nationalising the key companies in s number of sectors through 
a state holding corporation, concluding binding planning agreements witn 
the largest private and publicly controlled firms and enforcing 
disclosure of information on their affairs and intentions. This 
program clearly constituted a radical departure from the industrial 
policy measures exercised up to then. It challenged both the ra= 
tionale and the methods of existing policy through new forms of 
intervention. In sec. 5.2.4 (on the "Industrial Strategy" as an 
alternative to the Initial planning proposals) and in sec.7.1 (in 
the case-study on the NEB) we will discuss the various elements of 
this program more fully and analyse their subsequent subversion 
into much more limited and less powerful policies. In addition 
we will also deal (in sec.5.2.1 to 5.2.3) with the full use of the 
powers under the Industry Act 1972 especially in rescue- cases 
and sector- wide rationalisation schemes by th* Labour Government.
5.2.1. The use of industry Act 1972 in rescue cases
The depth of the liquidity crisis in the mid-70's was reflected by the 
financial difficulties of many U.K. firms which during th,-t period were
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threatened with bankruptcy. They consequently required oo'/ernvnt assis- 
tance to avoid pi ant'closures, mass redundancies and a further reduction of 
(j.K.'s industrial base with serious consequences for employment and balance 
of payments. See. 7 (for firms with employment mostly in assisted areas 1 
and sec. 8 of the Industry Act 1972 had already been used by the previous 
Conservative Government to rescue some firms (KTM, Govari, Cam,, eil Laird, 
NVT, KDHB). But after 197'j this activity by the State was rapidly expanded. 
In 1975 alone h7'-i rn. were paid out under the Act for the purpose of rescuing 
firms. V'hat had been between 1966 and i971 only an occasional port of in- 
dustrial policy, as in the case of IROaid to Root.es/Chrys ler and D;.wy Ash- 
more or the bailing out of Rolls Royce and DCS in i97i, became in the mid- 
70's after years of progressing deterioration of U.K.'s industrial strength 
a major area of intervention. 
Table 5.1: Rescue assistance under the Industry Act 1972 after i97^
Industry Act 72   rescue aid:
Sector/ 
Fi rm
a)Vehicles
British 
Leyland
Previous
Assist-
ance a)amount b)form
IRC h100m 
h200m
Guarantees
May?5
Equities under 
British Leyland 
Act 75
Chrysler 
U.K.
IRC hl62.5m loans, 
grants
long-run 
c)date rationalisation program
Transfer to NEB, h500 m. 
in loans and equities 
under Industry Act and 
from NEB for 3-year mod- 
ernisation program
Aid to cover losses over 
A years and fund speci- 
fied investment and pro- 
duct development
Dec75
Fodens Guarantee Jan75 Rescue project later
funded by City
b)Shipbu?Iding (apart from Govan and Cammell Laird which were assisted
under Industry Act 72 before 197*0
Sunderland - hl6m Equity Aug7^ In April 76 world's lar~ 
Shipbuilders gest fully enclosed
shipyard opened, based 
on successful integrated 
assembly line produce ion 
technique of Appledorc 
yards
(Table 5.1 Continued) 
t'.y,-. Ac t ^ 3 7 2 ~ scunPrevious ___________
Sector/ Assist-
Fi rm ance a)amount b)form
c) Motorcycles
NVT Created 
in 1973 
through 
Industry 
Act 72 - 
rescua 
of BSA
NVT Engin- NVT 
eering Ltd.
Wolverhampton NVT 
Industrial 
Engines Ltd.
Synova Motors NVT 
Ltd. (Heriden 
Workers Coop)
d)Machine Tools
KTM
A. Herbert
IRC,
Industry 
Act 72 - 
Assist- 
ance in 
1973
IRC
h8m
hO. 2m
m
hi.9m
ny-run 
I: iona 1
hkm
h15m
Guarantee Har75
bO. 2.75m Loan Jan76
Loan Oct76
Loans, 
Grants
Fu r t he r aid r e f u s e-d i n 
Jan. v.'hcr; only small 
grant was offered to 
allovj orderly disposal 
of unsold motorcycles 
and run-down of produc- 
t i on
Set up to continue pro- 
duction of motorcycle 
parts and engineering 
sub-contract work
Set up to take over NVT's 
capacity in the produc- 
tion of industrial petrol 
engines
Set up to produce motor- 
cycles in previous NVT" 
plant with outside man- 
agement advice. Purchase 
of NVT's marketing org- 
anization in 1976. Loan, 
technical assistance, 
marketing and management 
advice from GEC in Jan 77
Loans June76 Vickers took controlling
Equity interest and provided
Write-off June76 management
of previous
government
funds
fiiianaafce^ To-^ay ©4f 4e.bts and
strengthen firm for long- 
Equity July75 term investment plan
through capital restroc."
Guarantee July75 turing, later transferred
to NEB
e '^J ectr ica1 Engineering and Electronics 
Ferranti - h15m Equity May75
f)Scientific Instruments.
Cambridge IRC b^.Sm Equity 
Instruments (Kent)
Ind.
Act 72
(SMI)
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NEB-transfer
Oct75 NEB-transfer
(Table 5-1 Continued)
Prev i ous Industry Act IS/?- - rescue a i d :
Sector/ Assist" long-run
Firm ance a)amount b)form c)dat.c rational!
g)Domestic Ap p1i a n c c s
Kirkby Man- 
ufacturing 
and Engineer- 
ing Ltd. 
(Workers Coop 
to produce 
heating rad- 
iators)
h)Newspapers
Scottish News - 
Enterprises 
(Workers Coop)
QClothlng
Bear Brand 
(tights and 
hosiery)
J)Toys.
Triang 
Pedigree
hS.Orn Grants 1974-
1978
hi.75m Loan:
hO.35 Loan Mar75
[Repeated fundi 
e s s a ry to cover 1 o s s c s , 
allow debt, repayment ^''id 
fund working capital. 
Finally in late 1978 Doi 
refused further assistance 
with experiment appearing 
therefore to fold.
Was subsequently abandoned 
as an experiment in indus- 
trial democracy
To fund modernisation 
program
Equity,
Loan,
Grant
May75 Airfix Industries took 
majority interest in firm
SOURCE: own research based on material from Trade and Industry-issues and 
G. Ganz (1977)
0
Table 5.1. briefly sums up the major rescue cases under the Labour Govern- 
ment, using the powers of the Act. in most cases assistance was offered to 
safeguard employment, and maintain production of firms in advanced technol- 
ogy sectors or with important contributions to the balance of payments (ex- 
ports, import saving). When large funds were involved, the government fir_.t 
granted guarantees against defaults by the firm in repaying loans, paying 
interest or fulfilling other contract obligations. This was usually an in- 
terim measure to allow the company in question to carry on with its opera- 
tions, while final reorganisation plans were worked out. These usually 
specified a program of capital restructuring, investment, rationalisatIon 
of production and product development, supported by government funds and 
monitored by the machinery (I DAB, IDE, etc.) set up under the Industry Art. 
Sometimes the government managed to get other firms or banks involved in 
supporting rescued firms, as, for example, in the case of Fodcns, Chrysler, 
Synova, KTM, Scottish News Enterprises, Triang Pedigree.
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The most likely form of assistance w,-,s loans. Equity holdings, which 
in the cases of Sunderland Shipbuilders, Govan, British Leyland, A. Heruert, 
and Ferranti amounted to full-scale nationalisation or at ler;st majority 
public control, were used predominantly to-avoid ovcr-q^arincj by a firm end 
as a method to secure public control. Grants were generally offered to 
cover a firm's actual and expected losses or to finance the r-pcymeri t of 
debts. And to improve the chances of successful rationalisation new compan- 
ies were created with the help of public funds (e.g. NVT, KTM, Cambridge 
Instruments). The most important rescue operations involved not only equity 
participation by the government, but. ulso long-range modern i sot ion plans. 
To secure in these important cases continued exercise of public control and 
high-quality monitoring, especially as additional funding for these plans 
was likely, the government transferred its equity holdings in British Ley- 
land, A. Herbert, Ferranti, Cambridge Instruments (together with those in 
Rools Royce. !CL, and other firms) to the NEB (see sec. 
In seme industries these bail-out interventions had a major impact. 
In the vehicles sector the government took British Leyland, U.K.'s largest
exporter, under public ownership. And soon afterwards it. prevented the
(10)
threatened pull-out by Chrysler from the U.K. In shipbuilding the Indus- 
try Act 1972 provided the intervention framework to succeed the efforts of 
the SIB during 1S&6-1971. Used for the nationalisation of Govan and Sunder- 
land and for supporting the modernisation of other yards, such as Cammel: 
Laird or Austin 8 Pickersgill, it preceded the extension of public ownership 
over the whole sector in 1977 (see sec. 6.1.). After initially heavy fund- 
ing of motor-cycle manufacturer NVT this sector became the first and only 
case in which the Act's provisions to assist the "orderly contraction of an 
industry" were used, with Synova Motors the only remaining U.K. producer.
With rescue operations in the machine tools, electronics, and scientific
*
instruments sectors the government reemphasised its determination tc sup- 
port U.K. firms engaged in advanced technology -- an objective repeated in 
the nationalisation of the airframe industry in 1977.
With Meriden (Synova) , Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering Ltd., and 
Scottish Daily News the Labour Government supported the setting up of work- 
ers' cooperatives. Following in each case work-in occupations hy the. work 
force to prevent plant closures in areas of high unemployment, these sup- 
port schemes were made possible by the Act's wide powers to fund projects 
also for non-commercial, social reasons. Especially during i97't/75 with 
A. Benn as Secretary for Industry they were considered important industrial 
experiments and in line with intentions among a significant part of the La-
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bour Party to further industrial democracy and to use induMrur. 1 policy 
politically as a means of reform in the interest of socialism. Since then
the government has become less willing to support these ^ncl possible fur-
. (11) 
ther worker-run companies.
As evident from table 5.1. the rescue-aid under the Act was often o 
continuation of already previously granted support. On certain occasions 
however the powers of the Industry Act 1972 were not sufficient and k;d to
be widened by amendments) or the rescue operations were based on previsions
(12) 
outside the Act. v 
It is still relatively premature to judge the success of most bail-out 
cases. Certain firms, such as NVT cr Scottish Daily Ne^s, clearly foiled 
to achieve long-run viability. Others continue to face considerable diffi- 
culties with uncertain future prospects. These include A. Herbert, iMeridori, 
Kirkby, British Leyland, and also Chrysler (U.K.) whose heavy losses contin- 
ued after the rescue despite the introduction of new models and a rising 
market share; and eventually Chrysler announced in mid-1973 its intention to 
sell its European operations to Peugeot~Ci troen. Because r.he U.K. govern- 
ment initially failed to purchase equity, it has now despite a voluntary 
planning agreement with the U.S. multinational firm very little control cver 
Chrysler's pull-out and its effects on U.K. operations. The most successful 
recovery after being rescued was achieved by Ferranti, while other NEB-sub- 
sidiaries (Cambridge Instruments, and even Herbert and British Leyland -- 
see sec. 7.?-.) and shipbuilders (Sunderland, Govan) have also made some 
progress in their rationalisation program. In general, firms which were 
more tightly monitored by the government (e.g. NEB-subsidiaries, publicly 
owned shipbuilders) have had a better recovery record so far than firms 
with less public control (e.g. Chrysler),
5.2.2. Labour's sector-wide rationalisation schemes under sec. 8 of the
Industry Act 1972
The crisis of the mid-70's exposed in most U.K. industries more than 
ever before the fundamental competitive weakness in terms of their produc- 
tion conditions (defined and analysed in Ch. 2 as composed of investment 
activity, production efficiency of existing resources, investment finance 
and profitability) and their underlying elements of structural weakness 
(management inefficiency, industrial relation, "defensive" investment, 
insufficient production runs, product differentiation and duplication of 
effort, inadequate product development and design, limited involvement, of 
banks and shareholders in industry). In this context policy efforts to
remove these constraints in many sectors became increasingly urgent. With 
the Wool Textile Scheme in 1973 policy-makers had found an effective a It :M - 
native to the more far-reaching but controversial policy proposals of the 
Labour Left which called for substantial expansion of public control in pri- 
vate industry, compulsory disclosure of information and legally binding 
planning agreements (see below in sec. 7.-1). The success of that schema 
paved the way for its application in a rapidly growing number of sectors
and established this particular use of sec. 8 as the Act's most important(1 -2
function after 197V75.
The schemes were an improvement on previous measures of selective in- 
tervention, such as the Cotton Act 1S5**» the investment grants, the devel- 
opment contracts under the SST Act 1965, IRC's Textile Reequipment Scheme, 
the SI 3, and the schemes of the Industrial Expansion Act 1968. With regard 
to many sectors they continued previously interrupted and uncompleted pol- 
icy efforts. For example, rationalisation and product development was now 
supported in, say, the textile machinery or machine tool sectors, where the 
IRC had begun restructuring by supporting mergers. Or previous SST Act 1965' 
funded support for the development of micro-circuits was now extended 
through a sec. 8-scheme. But while earlier measures had been limited to 
specific aspects of industrial activity (RSD, mergers, etc.) or to specific 
sectors only, these schemes could be applied within one single, policy mea- 
sure, the Industry Act 1972, and at the same time could combine different 
forms of assistance for a variety of activities which rll would strengthen 
a particular industry.
Table 5-2.: The sector-wide rationalisation schemes under sec. 8
Asso-
As- cia- 
sist- ted 
Num- ance Pro- 
ber Ofter-ject 
of ed Costs 
Offers (hm) (cm)
(31/ (31/ (31/ 
12/ 12/ 12/
77) 77) 77)Sector
Amount Form
of of Purpose 
Assist-Assist- of 
Duration ance ance Assistance
Clothing
Drop 
Forgings
Oct75" 
Dec77
Nov77' 
Dec78
c°.0m grants, 
loans
consultancy use by 
small firms, rational- 
isation, use of modern, 
specified machinery
hf;m grants, aid to small firms,
loans modernisation invest- 
ment
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Table 5.3-: Industrial policy measures of government assistance to private industry 1964-1577 (net expeaditure
RDG


wos, as already pointed out, the case with the introduction of investment 
grants in 1966, of free depreciation in 1972, of the Industrial Expansion 
Act 1968, with the switch of emphasis in 19&V65 from defence R&D to civil 
R&D, with the expansion of NRDC's activities in 196.G and 1967, with the est- 
ablishment of RRBs and the customer/contractor-principle in "(371, or with 
the amendments of the Industry Act 1972. The growing number of general or 
specific inquiries Into the problems of various industries and possible 
policy-Induced remedial actions, as carried out by the CDCs, the S!B, ths 
IRC, the I DAB/IDE-network, the SCSI, the CPRS, the Expenditure Committee, 
or the Industrial Strategy's SWPs, not only improved the understanding of 
Industry's difficulties a.nong policy-makers, but in many cases had a direct 
Impact on policy-making and led to changes of existing or the introduction 
of new measures. Because of all these various aspects of "learning from 
experience" there was a certain continuity in the evolution of industrial 
policy despite frequent and sometimes drastic policy changes. This contin- 
uity was further strengthened, as the government was frequently forced to 
Intervene in sectors and assist private firms which had already previously 
been supported.
Certain measures, such as the IRC, SIB, the RRBs, the product and 
process development scheme under the S&T Act 1965, and the sectoral schemes 
under sec. 8 of the Industry Act 1972, significantly improved the coordina- 
tion of different, simultaneous initiatives which covered a variety of firms 
and/or sectors, relied on various types of assistance, and/pr implied di- 
verse objectives. The growth of contract work by the IREs, the 
expansion of technical information and advisory services, the 
establishment of joint ventures by the KRDC,the introduction of 
development contracts and pre-production order Schemes, and the 
flexible use of the sec.6 of the 1972 Act to offer different 
types of assistance for various sector-specific rationalisation 
projects indicate furthermore the growing concern and ability of 
policy-makers to tailor policy measures more closely to the iden= 
tified needs of private industry. Better coordination and *ncreas= 
ed relevance of .industrial policy measures were both 
emphasized as preconditions for more effective intervention, The 
Industrial Strategy, although certainly Inadequate as a substitute 
for the proposed system of planning agreements and lacking the 
powers required to bring about remedial actions by individual 
firms, has to be seen in the context of these objectives as an 
attempt to Identify the most important problems facing specific



































































gives the government Lcuiticr.al ir.f orviation o.n tne rcc 1 n&turi.. 
of costs, pricing policies end profitability cG\^rir,;5 both do::.^-- 
tic and international operations* This :nay help the' £overn::;ent 
to close loopholes of existing, planning agreements and improve 
its price controls, exchange controls, ironltorinr; of transfer 
pricing, and collection of corporation taxes. Not surprisingly 
the proposals for both the P.A.S. and i;E3, which marked a radical 
departure fron traditional state intervention based on "consent 
sus" policy, were vehemently opposed by industrialists, financial
institutions and moderate or conservative politicians.
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support measures did not go far enough to protect the suppliers



















APPENDIX


























8. Proposals for frequent variations of the exchange-rate, which 
would in effect amount to a gradual devaluation of the pound,were 
for example made by R.C.Tress and J.H.Fleming (in the London and 
Cambridge Economic Bulletin, June 1962, p.Ill) and by J.Keade (in 
the Three Bank Review-issues of June 1961, September 1964 and Sep= 
tember 1966). Gee also the idea of 'sliding parities 1 , as deve- 
loped by J.Black (in Economic Journal, June 1966,p.268), or J.Wil- 
liamson's somewhat similar concept of 'crawling pegs 1 (as formu-- 
lated in the 1966-publication "How to Stop Stop-Go"). In early 
1963 a debate began in The Times between various economists clo= 
sely associated with or involved in the formulation of Labour's 
economic policies over the relative virtues and disadvantages of 
devaluation. T.Neild B after 1964 economic advisor to the Labour 
Government,had already in 1961 (in an article in The Listener, 
V5/1961,p.?63) argued in favour of devaluation as the most pre- 
ferable method to deal with balance of payments crises. For N.Kal= dor, another influential advisor to the post-1964 government, a 
floating exchange-rate for sterling was a necessary precondition 
to achieve a higher growth-rate or maintain full employment. His 
article(in The Times,19/2/1963) provoked a reply by P.Harrod (in 
The Times,21/3/1963)» in which devaluation was rejected because 
of the expense to compensate non-resident holders of sterling 
and because of its aggravating impact on the price-wage-price 
spirale, which would destroy the prospects for a successful inco= 
mes policy and thus make the possibility of improvements in the 
balance of payments less certain. Instead Harrod proposed r selec= 
tive"and "temporary" import controls in case of serious deficits 
of UK's current and long-term capital balance. Kaldor reaffirmed 
hie own position (in The Times,28/2/1963) by saying that devalu= 
ation would cope more effectively than temporary import restric= 
tions with problems of that magnitude and in addition would bene= 
fit industry also through an increase in exports. T.Balogh, an= 
other economist with important influence inside the Labour party 
during that period, took fl.n The Times,19/3/1963) a strong pjsi= 
tion against devaluation. According to him such a step could
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with tax cuts aimed especially at corporations and. individuals' 
with higher incomes (justified ai; forms of positive incentives 
for skilled workers and management and juxtaposed to the nega- 
tive sanctions of reduced unemployment benefits to keep workers 
in low-income categories j'rom leaving their low-pay and often 
unpleasant jobs) and with"the emphasis shifting from direct in- 
come taxes to more regressive indirect taxes, further indicate 
the end of an era of income redistribution by fiscal means. The 
demise of post-war economic policy based on Keynesian principles 
is also clearly reflected in the crucial role assigned, by the Con- 
servatives to monetary policy as the only means to combat infla= 
tionary pressures irrespective of its recessionary impact on the 
economy. The various aspects of this program not only bear the 
imprint of Monetarism to an unprecedented degrees They will un= 
doubtedly also have a major Impact on industry* We believe that 
the problems for many firms will increase, that industrial decline 
will*probably accelerate and that such a program will in the Ion  
ger-term become untenable for both political and economic reasons. 
Although therefore likely to be reversed or considerably weakened 
during the life of a Thatcher Government, the program, as it stands 
now, marks another round of * disengagement*, one more shift so 
characteristic of the evolution of industrial policy in the U.Ke 
(discussed especially in the concluding remarks to Part 2 at the 
end of Ch.5).
re. 



6. Concrete examples for this need to expand Industrial policy 
measures and the level of public assistance in light of deterio- 
rating conditions within industry are mentioned throughout the 
entire thesis. For instance, the introduction of new measures of 
general investment incentives in 1972 (free depreciation,regional 
development grants) and in 1975 (stock relief, plans for inflation 
accounting) came in the wake of recessions, where the liquidity 
shortage among U.K. companies proved the Inadequacy of existing 
measures (discussed in sec. ^.1*2 and 4.1*3). The waves of bank- 
ruptcies in 1971/72 and. especially in 197 V?5 were the prime rea- 
sons for the introduction and the subsequent expansion of the 
Industry Act 1972 (see sec, 5.1 and 5.2.1). Similarly, certain 
domestic Industries had to face a serious intensification of diffi- 
culties in the 1970's, exacerbated by outmoded production facill= 
ties, lagging behind in product development and overcapacities, 
which, as in the case of shipbuilding (see sec.6.1) 9 machine tools f 
textiles, and various other sectors of mechanical and electrical 
engineering (see sec. 5*2.2), required sector-wide schemes of 
modernisation, rationalisation and product devlopment. Other sectors 
were continous sources of bottlenecks (such as the foundries) or 
engaged in advanced technology projects with only limited financial 
resources available and had to be backed up with sector-wide sche= 
mes as well. Both the Industry Act 1972 and the NEB became very 
important sources of investment finance during a period of increase 
ingly limited access for many domestic firms to external finance 
in the money and capital markets 6 Sec, 8's counter-cyclical invests 
ment schemes APS and SIS (see sec. 5.2.3) were introduced after 
the crisis of 197V75 had produced in the U.K. the steepest decline 
in investment activity in the post-war period.


defined notion of state intervention that can find adequate 
wers to these problems outlined here.
13  The qualitative and quantitative growth of industrial policy 
has also been reflected in the changesjsof the state apparatus 
which accompanied its evolution. The existence of the Dol reflects 
the evolution of industrial policy into an independent and autono- 
mous branch of economic policy. On the other hand the U.K. still 
lacks a central planning authority which could develop into 
an effective counterweight against the determination of overall 
policy by the Treasury and its powerful Civil Service. The dis= 
integration of the DEA and the concomitant rise t>f Mintech after 
1966 up to the creation of the Dol in 197^ show that industrial 
policy has up to now not been carried out as a subcategory and in 
the context of a central planning mechanism, but as nn alternative 
to it. Without the coordinating and execution powers of a planning 
apparatus, as the.P.A.S. would have been, the Dol is still" a. 'spe- 
cialist 1 department subordinate to the Treasury-Bank of England 
nexus. Not only does it lack control over the macro-level of eco- 
nomic policy and has therefore to operate within the constraints 
set in the Treasury or central bank with regard to fiscal and 
monetary policy, but it also lacks the political muscle to carry 
out its own policies to the degree it desires, if those contradict 
the 'Treasury* view. This became clear during 1975 in the defeat 
of the Dol over the questions what powers the NEB should have and 
how the F.A.S. should be implemented, when the much more 
moderate positions of the Treasury finally prevailed in the Cabinet 
and was followed by a significant purge among .the top echelon 
of the Dol. If we define the concept of the 'state apparatus 0 
more broadly, the issues concerning the implementation of industrial 
policy become even more complex. We would then have to investigate 
the power of the Civil Service in shaping the economic policies 
of respective governments,as was the case in 1972 with the
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